



---

# **REVIEW OF UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMAND HEADQUARTERS**

---

**February 1988**

Report Documentation Page			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE <b>FEB 1988</b>		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED <b>00-00-1988 to 00-00-1988</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters</b>			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S)			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 20301</b>			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT <b>Same as Report (SAR)</b>	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>366</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

**REPORT**

**REVIEW OF UNIFIED AND  
SPECIFIED COMMAND  
HEADQUARTERS**

**DEREK J. VANDER SCHAAF  
CHAIRMAN, STUDY TEAM**

**FEBRUARY 1988**

**Prepared at the request of the Secretary of Defense**

13 SEP 1989

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**



# REVIEW OF UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

## INDEX

	<u>PAGE</u>
Index	i-iii
I. OVERVIEW	1-16
A. Introduction	
B. Summary	
C. General Description of the Unified Command Plan Including Component Commands	
II. THREE MAIN REASONS THAT ACCOUNT FOR AND CAUSE EXCESSIVE STAFFING	17-26
A. Maintaining an Unnecessary Military Service Component Supporting Command	
B. Layering of Base Operations Management	
C. Excessive Manpower Expended on Operational Planning	
III. THE UNIFIED COMMANDER'S ROLE IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION	27-30
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS THAT EFFECT SPECIFIC COMMANDS AND THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN	31-46
A. Changes in Area of Responsibility for the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. European Command and the U.S. Pacific Command	
B. U.S. Transportation Command	
C. U.S. Space Command	
D. U.S. Special Operations Command	
E. Disestablishing Forces Command as a Specified Command	

F.	Disestablishing the U.S. Army Western Command	
G.	U.S. Naval Forces Europe	
H.	U.S. Forces Caribbean	
I.	A Unified Subcommand for North East Asia (Japan and Korea)	
J.	Command Structure for Alaska and the Aleutian Islands	
K.	Strategic Air Command	
V.	U.S. NEEDS GREATER VISIBILITY OF ITS PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO NATO HEADQUARTERS	47-50
VI.	OTHER ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY	51-60
A.	European Headquarters Functional Analysis is Flawed and Cannot Be Used for Realignments or Consolidations	
B.	Definition of Headquarters Needs Improvement	
C.	Improvements Needed in Organization and Functions Manuals and Accounting for Time Spent	
D.	A Zero-Based Approach to Headquarters Manning	
E.	Worldwide Military Command and Control System is a Manpower Driver and Should Be Examined from that Standpoint	
F.	Management of Headquarters Support Contracts	
G.	Headquarters Staff Other Than the Unified and Specified Commands Should Also Be Reviewed for Possible Overlap and Duplication	

## ATTACHMENTS

1. Original Tasking Memorandum
2. Principal Studies Consulted
3. Commands and Organizations Visited
4. Study Team Members
5. FY 1988 End Strength Appearing on PB-22s Submitted to Congress
6. Personnel in Headquarters Unified/Specified and Associated Component Commands
7. Commanders' Areas of Responsibility

## APPENDICES

- A. Joint Chiefs of Staff
- B. U.S. Atlantic Command
- C. U.S. Central Command
- D. U.S. European Command and North American Treaty Organization
- E. U.S. Pacific Command and UN Command, Korea
- F. U.S. Southern Command
- G. U.S. Space Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command
- H. U.S. Special Operations Command
- I. U.S. Transportation Command
- J. Forces Command
- K. Tactical Air Command
- L. Strategic Air Command

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## I. OVERVIEW

### A. Introduction

At the request of the Secretary of Defense, a review was conducted of the Joint Staff, the Unified and Specified Command Headquarters and headquarters support activities, to include component commands. The primary objective of the review was to find ways to reduce manpower levels and overhead costs, paying particular attention to overlapping responsibilities, duplication of functions and excess layering of organization echelons. The text of the tasking memorandum from the Secretary of Defense is at Attachment 1.

Although the request was to review all Unified and Specified Commands, the Study Team paid particular attention to more well-established commands, because some time is necessary to reach a mature level of organization. The Study Team devoted considerably less time to the Transportation Command, the Special Operations Command and did not visit or review activities at Southern Command.

The Study Team had a short period to analyze the staffing requirements of the Unified and Specified Commands. We began by reviewing all recent studies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), as well as the Unified and Specified Commands (see Attachment 2 for a list of principal studies consulted). Next, the Study Team visited and obtained mission, functions, personnel and budgetary briefings from the Joint Staff, all of the major Unified and Specified Commands, Component Commands, Subunified Commands, and other pertinent organizations. (A list of all commands and organizations visited is included at Attachment 3.)

During the course of the review, previous manpower studies (when available) for a Unified, Specified or Service component command headquarters were also analyzed and considered. In addition, contracts for support services and studies were briefly examined.

The Study Team examined headquarters staffing at the commands themselves, the Service component commands and the headquarters of other activities that supported either the headquarters of the Unified or Specified Command or the headquarters of the Service component command. In order to accomplish the Secretary's objectives, it was necessary to take a broader view of the definition of management headquarters than that contained in DoD Directive 5100.73. We attempted to identify all positions that were "essential" for the commander to control and manage force assigned. In most cases this substantially exceeded the number of personnel defined by

DoD Directive 5100.73, "Department of Defense Management Headquarters and Headquarters Support Activities." This definition recognizes the contributions of military component commanders, associated combat operations staff, field operations agencies, support units, such as those that operate the Worldwide Military Command and Control System, direct reporting units that provide direct support to the headquarters, and other types of units needed for effective accomplishment of headquarters responsibilities.

As is always the case in this type of review, but is especially so here--given time constraints (seven weeks start to finish)--the opinions, recommendations and alternatives provided are largely the result of previous knowledge and understanding. The opinions offered are based on briefings presented, discussions with staff members of the headquarters, and analysis of documents. They were based on my own 24 years of experience in Defense matters, as well as many years of experience in Defense matters by other members of the Study Team (Attachment 4). This study should not be viewed as an audit or inspection product of the Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, because I did not attempt to apply audit standards. To have done so would have required a much longer time--at least six months, but more likely a full year. However, if such an audit had been conducted, it probably would not have produced a product much different from a conceptual point of view. An audit would, however, have helped in providing a much clearer picture of the day-to-day work habits of the persons employed in the headquarters and the products they produce. A full audit also would have also allowed an opportunity to better identify personnel who are working in management headquarters but are assigned to subordinate units. However, issues as to the necessity of the work performed and the value added at each level of command would still remain.

#### B. Summary

From the start, I made a decision not to recommend any across the board percentage reductions. I felt that percentage reductions were inappropriate. They generally result from frustration over the complexity of the DoD headquarters structure and the recognition that various competing interests prevent any consensus or specific corrective actions even though there is an overall prevailing consensus that headquarters are too large, ineffective and not adding value. I believe that the numerous percentage type headquarters reductions levied by the Congress on the Department of Defense over the past two decades reflect frustration in trying to determine what functions accomplished by a headquarters activity

are necessary, a lack of understanding as to how all the various headquarters interact and relate to each other, and how each major headquarters adds to our war fighting ability. The result has been a series of arbitrary across the board percentage headquarters reductions. While the Department was forced to accept these reductions, they do not always result in actual strength reductions. The required result is generally achieved by redefinition of what constitutes a headquarters function/position in order to reduce the base on which a percentage reduction is applied. As a result, we have a situation where the Department is reporting about 33,132 positions in Unified and Specified Commands and supporting Service component commands in budget justifications provided Congress (see Attachment 5), while we identified 59,510 positions in these same headquarters during the review (see Attachment 6).

When an appropriate definition for headquarters and headquarters support activities is used, there are approximately 59,510 people associated with Unified and Specified and Component Command Headquarters. In my judgement, an appropriate definition encompasses all staff activities and associated personnel used by a commander to control and manage his subordinate units, including combat operations staffs, operational support facilities and direct reporting units supporting headquarters activities.

The review disclosed significant areas of overlapping responsibilities, duplication of functions, layering and opportunities for saving manpower. The recommendations that I make in this report, to eliminate 7,309 military and civilian positions from the headquarters structure of 59,510 by the end of fiscal year 1989, are built around three overriding themes and several minor themes.

First, there is no need for a Military Department supporting command for each and every Unified Command in the structure. The report recommends the elimination of Service component commands for the Unified Commanders not having geographical areas of responsibility.

Second, the report recommends that policy and oversight functions for base operation management should be substantially reduced at the Unified and Service component command level and eliminated from Corps, Numbered Air Force, Air Division and Fleet Command Headquarters. This Administration has gone to great lengths to improve the quality of life and delivery of services at the community (base level) by ensuring that local commanders are responsible for the delivery of these services. The policies for the base operation functions are largely established at the

highest levels in the Department, or even above the Department, and are executed at the lowest levels. The intervening structure is riddled with layers of policy and oversight that is not in accordance with established policies and, in my view, is unjustifiable because it makes no significant contribution to any Defense function.

Third, there is a tendency, particularly in staffing the policy and plans, operations, and logistics directorates of the major staffs, to attempt to resolve management problems and policy issues by adding more staff to address matters that are simply not amenable to resolution by the application of manpower. When addressing these kinds of issues, the application of more staff only serves to confuse the issue by bringing in more, but less relevant, information, thereby delaying a resolution. C. Northcote Parkinson could probably write a "law," maybe he already has, that better capsulizes this phenomena.

In addition to the recommendations based on these three overriding or crosscutting themes that have general application, the report contains a number of recommendations that arise from specific issues that are narrower in scope. These recommendations include making detailed changes to the Unified Command Plan by altering the geographical areas of responsibility for the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), disestablishing FORSCOM as a Specified Command, and significantly adjusting the size and scope of operations for the Navy component command to the USEUCOM and the Army supporting command for USPACOM.

In addition, during this review, several other issues surfaced that the Department should address, namely:

- headquarters staffs other than the Unified/Specified Commands and their components should be reviewed for possible overlap and duplication, particularly the Defense Agencies, acquisition and logistics commands, headquarters staffs that provide direction to National Guard and Reserve activities and those that manage and support military sales and foreign assistance activities.

- the Worldwide Military Command and Control System is a manpower driver and needs to be examined further from the manpower application standpoint;

- the definition of headquarters needs improvement;



- improvements are needed in the preparation of organization and functions manuals and accounting for time spent;
- the Joint Staff manpower survey process should be improved to take a zero-based approach;
- greater visibility of U.S. personnel assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Headquarters is needed;
- the European Headquarters Functional Analysis Study that was done by congressional direction, is seriously flawed and cannot be used for realignment or consolidation; and
- the Joint Staff administrative process has not properly adjusted to its new role, and the structure of the Joint Staff should be reconfigured in conjunction with a revision of its administrative process.

A section of the report addresses each of these issues. The Joint Staff administrative process is addressed in Appendix A, as part of the general discussion of Joint Staff matters.

The recommended personnel reductions are shown on the table on the following page. These reductions should take place over the next 20 months and be in place by the start of FY 1990. The individual Joint Staff and Command headquarters appendices at the end of this report are a critical and an integral part of the report, providing a more detailed discussion.

RECOMMENDED PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS AND ASSOCIATED  
MANAGEMENT SUPPORT CONTRACT SAVINGS

	<u>Potential Military and Civilian Total</u>	<u>Management Support Contracts (\$Thousands)</u>
A. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF		
Office of the Chairman, JCS	20	
Joint Staff	250	
Target Planning Staff - Unfilled Authorized Billets	<u>16</u>	
Subtotal, Joint Chiefs of Staff	<u>286</u>	
B. U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND		
Operational Planning Billets	100	
Merge Intelligence Activities	150	
Duplicate Watch Standers	25	
Disestablish U.S. Forces Caribbean	99	
Disestablish Caribbean Joint Intelligence Centers	21	
Disestablish Joint Air Reconnaissance Center	30	
Disestablish Atlantic Training Command	41	
Terminate U.S. Atlantic Fleet Contracts		\$2,800
Disestablish Naval Activities Caribbean	<u>41</u>	
Subtotal, U.S. Atlantic Command	<u>507</u>	

	Potential Military and Civilian <u>Total</u>	Management Support Contracts <u>(\$Thousands)</u>
C. U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND		
Consolidate Operations with Plans and Policy	34	
Combine Special Fusion with Intelligence Directorate	2	
Eliminate Special Command, Control & Information Systems	<u>1</u>	
Subtotal, U.S. Central Command	<u>37</u>	
D. U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION		
Consolidate Indicators and Warning Centers	35	
Reduce 24-Hour Watch Positions	20	
Consolidate Joint U.S. Military Group, Spain	23	
Abolish Contact Office Turkey	17	
<u>U.S. Army, Europe</u>		
Reduce 24-Hour Watch Positions	20	
Realign Base Operations Management and Oversight	550	
<u>U.S. Navy, Europe</u>		
Eliminate Headquarters	238	
Eliminate Fleet Operations Control Center	84	

	Potential Military and Civilian Total	Management Support Contracts (\$Thousands)
<u>U.S. Air Forces, Europe</u>		
European Personnel Center	80	
Inspection and Safety Center	31	
Eliminate 7055th Operations Squadron	66	
Eliminate 7000th Special Activities Squadron	37	
Ground Launched Cruise Missile Spaces	35	
Airlift Control Center Positions	24	
Operations Support Center- 24-Hour Watch Positions	20	
Management Support Contracts		3,700

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Consolidate U.S. Delegation and U.S. Mission	<u>40</u>	
Subtotal, U.S. European Command and NATO	<u>1,320</u>	3,700

E. U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.N. COMMAND, KOREA

Create Dual-hat Positions at U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Pacific Fleet	110	
Merge Intelligence Organizations in Oahu	500	
Consolidate Operational Planning Under Unified Commander	70	

	Potential Military and Civilian Total	Management Support Contracts (\$Thousands)
Eliminate Excess Staff Billets	31	
<u>Western Army Command</u>		
Abolish Command	467	
<u>Logistics Command Pacific</u>		
Eliminate Command	66	
<u>Data Processing Service Center Pacific - Reduction</u>	11	
<u>Training Command Pacific</u>		
Eliminate Command	68	
<u>Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific</u>		
Realign Intelligence Production Department	34	
<u>Pacific Air Forces</u>		
Deputy Chief of Staff-Operations	50	
Deputy Chief of Staff-Plans	40	
Deputy Chief of Staff-Personnel	44	
Deputy Chief of Staff-Logistics	60	
Engineering and Services Group	100	
<u>U.S. Forces, Japan</u>		
Eliminate Army IX Corps	25	
Disestablish U.S. Naval Forces Japan	73	

	Potential Military and Civilian Total	Management Support Contracts (\$Thousands)
<u>U.S. Forces, Korea</u>		
Reduce to Shell Organization	168	
<u>U.S. Eighth Army and Support Elements</u>		
Realign Base Operations Management and Oversight	<u>500</u>	
Subtotal, U.S. Pacific Command and UN Command, Korea	<u>2,417</u>	
F. U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND	-	
G. U.S. SPACE COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND		
Watch Standers	28	
<u>Air Force Space Command</u>		
1st Manned Space Flight Squadron	83	
Shift Training to Combat Crew Training Squadron	11	
Unified Command Manpower Savings	341	
<u>Naval Space Command</u>		
Management Support Contracts	-	1,300

	Potential Military and Civilian Total	Management Support Contracts (\$Thousands)
<u>North American Aerospace Defense Command</u>		
Watch Standers	<u>11</u>	
Subtotal, U.S. Space Command and NORAD	<u>474</u>	
H. U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND		
231 transfers in from Military Services only	-	
I. U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND		
Unify Military Traffic Management Command with Transportation Cmd	193	
Unify Military Sealift Command with Transportation Cmd	202	
Unify Military Airlift Command with Transportation Cmd	<u>620</u>	
Subtotal, U.S. Transportation Command	<u>1,015</u>	
J. FORCES COMMAND		
Disestablish as Specified Command	300	
Reduce Overlap between FORSCOM and CONUSA's	<u>300</u>	
Subtotal, Forces Command	<u>600</u>	
K. TACTICAL AIR COMMAND		
Consolidate Combat Operations Staff	300	

	Potential Military and Civilian Total	Management Support Contracts ( <u>\$Thousands</u> )
Disestablish Air Defense Combat Operations Staff	<u>121</u>	
Subtotal, Tactical Air Command	<u>421</u>	
L. STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND		
Eliminate Air Divisions - Continental United States	130	
Eliminate Pacific Operational Liaison	17	
Eliminate Rather Than Convert Positions	<u>85</u>	
Subtotal, Strategic Air Command	<u>232</u>	
GRAND TOTAL, ALL COMMANDS	<u>7,309</u>	

Estimated Savings in FY 1990: \$336 million

Estimated Savings, FY 1990-1994: \$1.7 billion



I recommend the elimination of 7,309 military and civilian positions by the end of FY 1989. Although, I did not have time to make a detailed budget quality estimate, if all of my recommendations are implemented, the savings should be approximately \$336 million in FY 1990. The FY 1989 savings are highly dependent on when a decision is made to implement and the pace of the implementation process. Five year savings (FY 1990-FY 1994) should exceed \$1.7 billion.

These savings are based on a composite annual man-year cost (salary plus support increment). They require further analysis of the military and civilian reduction mix, exact grade structure and timing, before a budget quality estimate can be prepared. Further, in several cases I recommended transfers, which will require expenditures--e.g., Permanent Change of Station (PCS) funds. The costs of any required PCS moves and severance pay cannot be estimated at this time and will reduce the FY 1989 savings estimate.

Personnel reductions can be accommodated using several different methods, including attrition, applying the reduction against valid vacancies and reductions in force (RIF). Where possible, the first two methods should be used since RIFs would require additional costs to implement.

Although probably no one will agree with all of the recommendations contained in this report, I believe that substantial savings can be made without jeopardizing military readiness and without curtailing useful and necessary work conducted by headquarters. In many cases, output will actually increase when layering and staff sizes are reduced.

It will be interesting to watch how the Congress reacts to any recommendations that are accepted for implementation. Some of the proposals will represent a clear test of the congressional commitment to follow-up on their demands for a more efficient Department of Defense (DoD), since civilian personnel reductions and transfers of jobs from one location to another are required. (These transfers and reductions in force will no doubt be viewed the same as base closings.)

In a sense, reductions in the Defense structure seem predestined as the country enters another cycle of reduced military spending. Reductions in Defense spending for fiscal years 1987 and 1988, are already having their effects. The "system" has a natural tendency to cause these reductions to flow down to the combat and combat support units. I believe that the recommendations contained in the report offer alternatives to

help ensure that war fighting units do not bear the full thrust of the manpower reductions that reduced Defense appropriations are already forcing on the Department. The Department needs to find ways to plow back (into its combat force structure and capital investments) the savings that accrue from any steps the Secretary of Defense takes to implement the recommendations contained in this report.

C. General Description of the Unified Command Plan  
Including Component Commands

The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, title 10 U.S.C., and DoD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components," April 3, 1987, delineate the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Those documents provide the basis for the establishment of the Unified and Specified Commands.

A Unified Command has broad continuing missions and is composed of forces from two or more Military Departments. Some Unified Commands have geographical areas of responsibility, while other Unified Commands are nongeographical and supporting in nature. A Specified Command is normally composed of forces from a single Service, is organized on a functional basis, and has a broad and continuing mission. The primary purpose of a Unified or Specified Command is to provide optimum effectiveness of U.S. military forces in combat operations, to project U.S. military power, and to support and advance national policies.

For the purposes of this report, the eight Unified Commands have been subdivided into the five with geographical war fighting responsibilities (supported Unified Commands) and the three Unified Commands without geographical areas of responsibility (supporting Unified Commands). The 10 Unified and Specified Commands are listed below:

Unified Commands with Geographic Areas of  
Responsibility (Supported Commands)

U.S. Atlantic Command

U.S. Central Command

U.S. European Command

U.S. Pacific Command

U.S. Southern Command

Unified Commands without Geographic Areas of  
Responsibility (Supporting Commands)

U.S. Space Command

U.S. Special Operations Command

U.S. Transportation Command

Specified Commands  
(Single Military Department Commands)

Forces Command (Army)

Strategic Air Command (Air Force)

Unified and Specified Commands are composed of forces from any or all of the Services, as appropriate. Service component commands within each Unified Command are designated as U.S. Army Forces, U.S. Naval Forces or U.S. Air Forces of the appropriate command, and are organized to support the missions of the Unified or Specified Command. Headquarters staff and facilities for component commanders are provided by the Services involved.

Forces assigned to the Unified or Specified Commands are under the operational control of the Unified and Specified Commanders. The authority of the commanders is established in Chapter 6 of Title 10 U.S.C. Operational command includes, but is not limited to, the exercise of those functions of command over assigned forces involving composition of subordinate forces, assignment of tasks, designation of objectives, and the full authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission (except as provided by law). The commander of a Unified or Specified Command is responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for the performance of assigned missions.

A description of the Unified and Specified Commands, their individual areas of responsibility (AOR), and stated mission is contained in each appendix. The map showing general geographical coverage of the commands is provided at Attachment 7.

A key part of every Unified or Specified Command is the separate Military Service Headquarters and Service components that make up the forces assigned to a particular Unified Command. The forces within a Unified Commander's AOR may be under his full command, his operational control (OPCON), assigned in support of

the unified commander or remain entirely under the command and control of a Service component commander.

As previously discussed, during consideration of the headquarters strengths, we identified approximately ~~59,287~~ **59,510** headquarters personnel who support the Unified Command Plan and associated forces. These are shown in the Table below:

	<u>Headquarters Strength</u>
Joint Chiefs of Staff	2,005
U.S. Atlantic Command	3,580
U.S. Central Command	1,679
U.S. European Command (includes NATO)	15,649
U.S. Pacific Command and UN Command, Korea	12,074
U.S. Southern Command	1,012
U.S. Space Command and NORAD	3,457
U.S. Special Operations Command	1,155
U.S. Transportation Command	7,317
Forces Command	3,829
Strategic Air Command	5,645
Tactical Air Command	<u>2,108</u>
Total	<u>59,510</u>

## II. THREE MAIN REASONS THAT ACCOUNT FOR AND CAUSE EXCESSIVE STAFFING

### A. Maintaining an Unnecessary Military Service Component Supporting Command

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 attempted to place responsibility on the Commanders of the Unified and Specified combatant commands for accomplishment of all missions assigned to those commands and to ensure that the authority of the Unified Commanders is fully commensurate with their responsibilities. The legislation also had a clear objective to provide for more efficient use of Defense resources and enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve management and administration within the Department of Defense.

The draft Unified Command Plan submitted to the Secretary of Defense last fall, was supposed to have incorporated appropriate provisions of the DoD Reorganization Act to accomplish the above objective. Neither the balancing of authority with responsibility nor the efficient and effective use of resources envisioned in the Reorganization Act is likely to be achieved unless the Unified Command Plan is changed to eliminate Military Service component commands to Unified "supporting" commands that do not have geographical areas of responsibility. Three Unified Commands fall into this category--the U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM), the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

There are major personnel savings and efficiencies to be made by eliminating Service component commands for Unified Commanders that do not have geographical areas of responsibility. It is also likely that some of these same economies and efficiencies could be accomplished by taking the same action to Unified Commanders (supported commanders) that do have geographical areas of responsibility. Indeed, this has been done successfully in the past. However, I am not making the latter recommendation at this time. I believe it is prudent to proceed carefully on a test basis. I do, however, recommend a substantial reorganization (reduced size and a change in command assignments) for the Army component to the USPACOM and the Navy component to the USEUCOM.

Application of this concept to all Unified Commands, including those that have AORs, could cause problems of span of control, particularly in wartime, when large force elements are assigned to the Unified Commander. On the other hand, the span of control

for the supporting Unified Commanders will be reduced in wartime as their peacetime force units are assigned (chopped) to theater Unified Commanders. Testing the concept first, as is strongly implied by the Congress when one examines the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act and its legislative history, makes sense.

Even though I am not recommending at this time that the Secretary of Defense consider elimination of Service component commands for any of the geographical Unified Commanders because of concern over wartime span of control, I believe that there are opportunities to improve the peacetime management of these commands in a number of ways, including further unification and use of dual-hatted positions.

Later in this report I make recommendations to disestablish the Army Western Command in the Pacific (WESTCOM) and the U.S. Naval Forces Europe (USNAVEUR) as Service component commands of the USPACOM and the USEUCOM, respectively. I also recommend the incorporation of the U.S. Naval Forces Japan into the U.S. Forces Japan headquarters and suggest that serious consideration be given to treating U.S. Army Forces Japan in a similar manner. The application of this concept appears to be particularly applicable to Southern Command. Even though I did not visit Southern Command, I know from experience that the U.S. Southern Command is largely an Army command and its Navy and Air Force component commands are relatively small and unimportant in terms of underlying peacetime force structure. The command probably could be "unified" quite easily.

A comparison between the USLANTCOM and the USPACOM provides an indication that when separate component commands are not established, manpower is saved and there is no impact on performance. For at least three decades prior to 1985, the USLANTCOM and the U.S. Atlantic Fleet (USLANTFLT) were combined, while the USPACOM and the U.S. Pacific Fleet (USPACFLT) have always been separate commands. The USLANTCOM and USLANTFLT have been separated for about two years and the full impact on manpower has not yet been felt, although the separation has already resulted in additional personnel being assigned to the USLANTCOM. Nevertheless, at this early time the two headquarters together appear to be more efficient than the USPACOM and the USPACFLT. The USPACFLT requires 26.7 percent more headquarters billets to manage a force structure of 9.4 percent fewer ships, 18.8 percent fewer aircraft and 2.2 percent fewer personnel than does the USLANTFLT. This analysis is shown in more detail in the report appendix on the U.S. Pacific Command.

Service component commands often seem to be established for the reason that "we've always done it that way." If one Service has a four star Service component commander to a Unified Commander, there appears to be pressures for each of the other Services to have something similar. The Army, for example, recently proposed that the Western Command (WESTCOM) be elevated to a four star position and the command be renamed (reestablished) as the United States Army Pacific Command. The Senate Armed Services Committee rejected the proposal, as it should have. The Unified Commanders do not always require separate component commanders for each Military Service, much less commanders of equal rank to pass orders and directions to subordinate headquarters.

In addition to using significantly less manpower, creating truly unified nongeographical Unified Commands will help to clarify responsibility and leave no doubt in the minds of the supported theater Unified Commanders as to who is responsible for providing mobility forces, special operations forces and information from space-based sensors. The adoption of some basic "rules" about how Unified Command headquarters will be manned will ensure that each Military Service becomes deeply involved in, and plays an important role in, planning and allocating these important combat and combat support functions.

The current arrangement certainly does not provide anything like "equal" Service interest and involvement. For example, the "unified" U.S. Transportation Command and the U.S. Space Command appear to be largely "Air Force products." The Navy has historically attempted not to rely on the Military Airlift Command (MAC), operates its own Space Command and has been opposed to giving effective operational control of the SEAL teams to Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command (CINCSOC). The Navy's inability or unwillingness to rely on the MAC for its airlift support has, over the years, played no small role in creating a significant Navy-dedicated airlift structure. To some extent, a similar situation existed with the Army, which had to rely heavily on the MAC to provide the "go to war" transportation, but was not a part of the management structure. This failure of the Army and Navy to become deeply involved in the Military Airlift Command or the Air Force and Army to play any significant role in the Military Sealift Command (MSC) caused the creation of the Joint Deployment Agency after two decades of frustration over ineffective mobility planning.

In order to ensure that each Department has an interest or stake in each supporting Unified Command and becomes an active player in this partnership, I suggest that a basic ground rule be

laid down that each Department must provide at least 25 percent but not more than 50 percent of the headquarters manning.

The Joint Strategic Target Planning system is a good example of how this approach can and does work. We found that headquarters activity to be efficiently run. Also, it has personnel assigned from all three Military Departments, even though the Army does not have any of the strategic weapons for which this organization does planning. The Army provides 23 of the full-time (not dual-hatted) officers, the Navy 45, and the Air Force 87. Full-time enlisted personnel positions are also divided among the three Services. This is a good example of one Service having a predominant interest, another Service a lesser interest and, from a force structure as opposed to a war fighting standpoint, the third Service having little or no interest. Yet all participate and do so effectively.

It is also important that the dominant Service not always have or be ensured of having the four star commander position. For example, one can envision over the years as parts of the Strategic Defense Initiative become operational that the Army will have a much larger interest in the space mission. The Navy already clearly has a strong interest. Thus, each of the Services should be preparing a general officer or officers to compete for selection as United States Unified Commander for Space Activities. Having the commanders of the supporting Unified Commands come from different Services will also ensure that these commanders are not "captives" of the Military Departments.

In summary, the layering of functions in various headquarters is, to a large extent, due to the notion that Unified Commanders must have separate and distinct Service component commands. The application of a different organizational concept to the three nongeographical commands (U.S. Space Command, U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Special Operations Command), to the U.S. Navy in Europe and Japan and to the U.S. Army in Hawaii will save 2,134 staff years and help the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and others to better pinpoint responsibility for both successes and failures. Therefore, I have recommended that these staffing reductions be made at the component level in order to give more authority, control and clear responsibility to the Unified Commander.

#### B. Layering of Base Operations Management

During the field visits, we gave special attention to identifying overlapping responsibilities, duplication of functions



and excessive layering of organizational echelons in base operations. Organizational, management and command relationships differ among the DoD components, as do Service philosophies for developing and implementing policies and programs. For the most part, these differences are understandable and there is no need to standardize organizations. However, in certain functional areas, namely base operations support, such as quality of life, community affairs, equal opportunity, family housing, morale, welfare and recreation activities, education programs, military and civilian personnel management, physical security, facilities construction and management, and medical services, it is evident that major manpower savings can be achieved by applying a few simple managerial concepts and DoD installation management policy.

I concluded that savings are possible by minimizing layering of management and oversight and pushing authority and resource responsibility down to the lowest feasible levels. This is particularly true when the additional management layer is located at a "fighting command," and commanders must devote time and resources to oversee housekeeping and support and functions, rather than focusing on their war fighting mission. Most of these services are delivered at the base or community level. Responsible commanders at that local level should be able to better establish priorities and allocate resources within their areas of responsibility.

Over the past several years, policies and concepts for managing installations/communities have undergone major change. In lieu of detailed regulation by higher headquarters, installations are supposed to be managed using the Model Installation Program approach. The DoD Directive 4001.1, "Installation Management," September 1986, and Service implementing regulations confirm the management principle that installation commanders should be given authority commensurate with their responsibilities. Moreover, according to that Directive, headquarters staff activities, "...shall be directed toward facilitating any installation commander's ability to accomplish the mission."

The policy and oversight staffs at several intermediate levels can defeat the intention of the Directive on installation management, especially if these staffs are large. Typically, headquarters staff elements issue supplementing regulations and guidance on top of the higher level headquarter policy direction. What is discretionary becomes mandatory and anything not specifically permitted is forbidden. Most frequently, the staff at intermediate headquarters tell operators not just what to do, but how to do it. Innovation and creativity are stifled. Reward goes to those who pass frequently imposed conformance inspections by higher

headquarters, not to those who are providing superior service to the community.

Headquarters staffs typically issue policy, evaluate performance and allocate resources. Base and community level organizations implement the policy and spend resources to deliver services and products. Other than arbitrations on unique issues or supporting command positions, middle level base operations management (i.e., at the Corps, division support commands, numbered Air Force/Air Division, or Fleet Commands, and to a larger extent at the Service component staff level of a Unified Command) duplicate higher and lower headquarters functions. They usually provide only advice and recommendations, adding little of value or substance--even though the functions and organization manuals consistently list policy formulation and oversight as the principal functions to be performed. Policy for these functions is primarily written at the highest levels in the Department--at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Military Department staffs.

A glaring example of the problem is the organizational and management relationships within the U.S. Army Europe and the Eighth U.S. Army Korea. (See Appendices D and E for a detailed description of the situation.) I concluded that over 1,000 billets could be eliminated from middle management in these two organizations and subordinate headquarters alone. It appeared that many field grade officer positions and mid-level civilian personnel positions are "justified" by the layering of supervision.

An example of what I believe is a sound alternative for providing base operations support, services, and quality of life was found in Hawaii. The U.S. Army Support Command Hawaii (USASCH) provides base operations and quality of life support to the entire military community located at 29 installations throughout the Hawaiian Islands, Johnston Island, Guam, Saipan, and American Samoa. A population of about 90,000 (including active military, their dependents, and civilian employees) are supported by a USASCH total work force of about 4,000--including both headquarters management/support and operators. The Commander, USASCH, reports directly to the Commander, WESTCOM. The WESTCOM headquarters staff does not provide policy or oversight to base operations and services.

In comparison, the U.S. Army Europe has a work force of about 37,000 providing equivalent support to a population of 415,000 in West Germany and Berlin. In the Eighth U.S. Army Korea, where the majority of personnel are on a 13-month remote tour--a work force of about 16,000 is providing roughly equivalent support to

a population of 45,000 (33,000 active duty military and U.S. civilian personnel and about 12,000 dependents). This excludes support provided by the Korean augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA). There are in excess of 1,700 management personnel providing headquarters management for base operation functions above the community level in Korea. I believe that the "single support command" concept, as used in Hawaii/other islands, has the potential for major manpower savings in both Germany and Korea.

The Department can no longer afford redundant policy and oversight management staffs for base operating functions. New concepts, such as the Model Installation Program and the single support command, have proven successful when local commanders are given increased authority and control of resources. The USASCH was one of the first organizations taking part in the Model Installation Program. Local commanders and managers are closest to the needs of the community and should be the most able to meet them. It is my assessment that the Model Installation Program has and is offering an enormous opportunity to reduce headquarters staffing, the Department has not taken full advantage of that opportunity.

The pool of manpower providing headquarters staffs for base operations support, community and personal services is a substantial target for reduction. I believe that thinning out of base operations support level of management between the Pentagon and the military community, where the service is delivered, will result in both major manpower savings and improved "quality of life." The detailed command appendices recommend reductions of over 1,200 spaces due to base operations support management layering.

#### C. Excessive Manpower Expended on Operational Planning

Throughout the course of this review, headquarters staffs involved in intelligence, operations, logistics, policy and plans justified much of their staffing on the need to write, rewrite, and keep current, existing JCS operational plans. This planning function is performed by Unified, Specified, and Component Command headquarters and proved to be the most difficult function to assess. It was impossible to even reach a rough estimate as to exactly how many workyears were involved in this type of planning. Certainly, several thousand were justified on this basis, but our brief review of the work product and the reactions of auditors who have examined these plans from time to time were useful in attempting to understand how much effort is actually expended on maintaining the plans. Taking all of the foregoing into account,

I concluded that (1) more time is justified against these plans than is actually spent on them and (2) more time is actually spent than needs to be, because the plans are forced down to very low levels of command where they are developed in great detail.

It takes more thought and manpower to develop operational plans and execution orders than it does to maintain them. Most plans and policy that support national security have evolved and been in existence over a period of years. (For example, mobilization plans and policies have been receiving strong emphasis since 1978.) The record does not support the contention that these documents must be completely rewritten or totally revalidated every two years or thereabouts. In reality, these documents only require a careful adjustment to accommodate new needs and resources, plus lessons learned from exercises and real-world contingencies. Changes are made incrementally. Off-the-shelf plans or execution policy rarely need to be rewritten totally. New plans were needed for Southwest Asia and Central Command, but even those plans had a large number of established documents on which to draw.

The plan development process that goes on at all levels from the Joint Staff down to the Army brigade and Air Force wing level, probably provides an excellent training regimen, since it is a relatively short step from taking a well-developed plan and converting it into an operations order. I also reached the conclusion, based on the detailed briefings provided at each command with respect to their wartime mission, that a lot of the disconnects in terms of tagging various units to support many sometimes disparate operational plans has been largely eliminated. At a minimum, I received the clear impression that the situation was much improved over what it was in the mid-1970s.

The principal issue seems to me to be to what level of detail these plans must be developed and how far up the chain of command the underlying details need to be provided. The plans are basically defensive and reactive in nature and, therefore, are not likely to be effective at the detail level much beyond the first few days of a conflict. The planning process does have great pluses if we can keep it flexible so our forces are able to react quickly and are able to adjust to necessary changes rapidly. I was told that the Joint Deployment Agency has or will soon have the ability to be able to make rapid reconfigurations of airlift and sealift allocations to fit changing situations--using new elaborate software programs.

A key shortcoming in the process is the lack of review of operational plans at higher levels within the Department. The

Joint Staff takes the position that only the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense (personally) can review such plans. Therefore, it is my understanding that the specific plans and their general configuration are not necessarily written or updated to conform with the annual Defense guidance. Nor are the plans checked after update to ensure that the operational plan is in compliance with the guidance. Somewhere in the process, Defense guidance and the Joint Staff planning process must be synthesized. A principal roadblock to this process is Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 39, as implemented by the Joint Staff.

Obviously, we need to have a corpus of personnel in each headquarters able to develop and write operational plans and operational orders rapidly. As one commander expressed to me, we have had the JCS operational plans (OPLANS) in existence for several decades but not one has ever been used. On the other hand, we have had nearly 100 instances in which the United States Armed Forces had to respond or react quickly. The plans and orders for these operations were written quickly and generally with much smaller staff participation than is routinely used for updating the long-standing OPLANS. For several reasons, manpower reductions can be made in this process. These include reducing the amount of detail passed up the line, consistence of guidance which is clearly tied to overall Defense guidance, plus the use of modern, powerful computer software and word processing equipment, are an indication that manpower reductions can be made in this process.

The individual appendices to this report have identified a large number of planning positions (over 400) that I believe to be excess to real needs. It is difficult to place an exact number because in some situations, such as the WESTCOM, planning staff positions would have been recommended for deletion had I not concluded that the whole command was largely superfluous. I recommend that the Secretary of Defense appoint a small number of Joint Staff personnel, along with personnel from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and from the Office of the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, to review periodically the plans against the Defense guidance. Such reviews would also be helpful in determining if the workyears applied to this process are, in fact, well spent.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

### III. THE UNIFIED COMMANDER'S ROLE IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION

While the issue of resource allocation may be beyond the immediate scope of my charter, I believe that it is relevant to the concept of reduced reliance on Service component commanders. Therefore, the subject is treated briefly.

Perhaps the single most important task performed by a Secretary of Defense is the allocation of DoD resources within and among the Department's many competing claimants. A key end result of this allocation process should be to ensure that our war fighting commanders have the resources they need to execute their assigned missions.

Historically, the uniformed military input on resource requirement has come to the OSD primarily through Military Department channels. The various studies reviewed in preparation for this review are absolutely unequivocal on the point that it is unreasonable to expect either the Joint Staff, because of the long standing need for consensus, or the individual Services to provide objective advice on whether, for example, the DoD should build more Air Force bombers instead of a Navy carrier. In the absence of good sound military advice on these issues, the allocation tasks have largely fallen to the predominately civilian staffs in the OSD and the Congress. Some limited progress has been made in attempts to pull the Unified Commanders and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, into the resources allocation process, but at the moment the influence exerted could best be characterized as too little and too late.

This review of the headquarters structure of the Unified and Specified Commands and the component commands, provided a window for me to observe that the degree of authority granted to the Unified Commands and that which is exercised by them, is not in keeping with the responsibilities given them and with the authorities which they can legally exercise under Title II, "Military Advice and Command Functions," of P.L. 99-433. Clearly, some progress has been made in this resource allocation process as reflected by the Integrated Priority Lists (IPL) process and the (albeit limited) reorganization of the Joint Staff. More needs to be done in both areas, especially organizing the Joint Staff to enable the Chairman to receive the best military advice available that is not unduly enmeshed in parochial Military Department concerns.

An issue remains on how to allocate resources to the three supporting Unified Commands after the Service component headquarters

have been merged. Elements in the Department have strenuously objected to the resource allocation plan suggested but not mandated by the Congress in the reports and debate accompanying the Reorganization Act and the establishment of the Special Operations Command. This is often referred to as "Defense Agency" type of authorization and appropriation financing. There are basically three types of resource allocation structures from which the Secretary of Defense could select.

The first resource allocation proposal, and the one which would probably receive the most congressional support and the least Military Department support, would be similar to the establishment of a Defense Agency budget and program concept for the three Unified Commands. This proposal would involve the creation of a single operation and maintenance appropriation entitled, "Supporting Unified Commands," into which an appropriation to operate and maintain all of the Transportation Command, Space and Special Operations Command would be aggregated. It would include such things as airlift wings, strategic lift ships, aerial port squadrons, special operations units, space sensors, satellite control facilities, etc. I believe that such an authorization/appropriation would have to be done through the combination of all of these programs in order to provide the flexibility that a large financial base provides to respond to budget changes. If this approach were to be attempted separately for each of the supporting Unified Commands separately, the "pot of money" may be too small to provide the degree of flexibility needed.

There are some clear disadvantages to this proposal. As I see it, this approach would require the hiring of additional budget and program analysts within the Unified Commands and may, although not necessarily, require accounting functions at the Unified Commands. This approach would, however, give the Unified Commanders real resource responsibility and authority for their operations and activities. I do not propose that the Unified Commanders be provided appropriation (budgetary) authority over the procurement and research and development and military construction appropriations. They need only play a role in the requirements determination process and the resource allocation process (Planning, Programming and Budgeting System) much like what has been initially adopted for the Special Operations Command.

It can also be argued that giving appropriated resources directly to a Unified Commander, especially for hardware procurement and research and development, will lead to a mentality that what is spent in one year becomes a fixed base for the next year's request. This could tend to reduce the Secretary of Defense ability



and flexibility to carry out his most important task, resource allocation.

Thus, as a second alternative I suggest that the Secretary of Defense consider providing the supporting Unified Commanders with a great deal of control over the programming system, but not over the direct operation and maintenance funding of activities within their command. This can be done by clearly delineating the program elements for which the Unified Commander will have principal responsibility and allowing the Services to allocate and budget resources to those program elements in coordination/approval with the Unified Commander. Irreconcilable differences that may occur from time-to-time between a Unified Command and a Military Department will have to be elevated to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where the Chief of Staff of the cognizant Service can present the Service viewpoint on the issue. Alternatively, these tough issues could be elevated from the Unified Command and the Military Department directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for decision by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Another basic ground rule that must be adopted under the second alternative is that reprogramming of any amount within a Unified Commander's delineated program elements will not be done without consultation and approval of the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense, even if both the Military Department and the Unified Command agree to the proposed reprogramming. This would help ensure that the Unified Commander, who probably is also a member of a dominant Military Service in that command, does not make decisions detrimental to the other Military Services without an opportunity for higher level review.

In either alternative one or alternative two the Commanders in Chief would have to be consulted on Program Budget Decisions (PBDs) that affect their program elements prior to submission of those PBDs for Deputy Secretary of Defense decision.

The third resource allocation option would rely largely on the status quo by memorializing in appropriate DoD directives the current practice of having the Unified Commanders address the Defense Resource Board and giving them clear access to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Comptroller for matters involving resource allocation.

I recommend that the Secretary of Defense go beyond alternative three, which essentially memorializes existing practice, and adopt alternative two, even though, in my opinion, alternative one more closely complies with the spirit of the Goldwater-Nichols

Reorganization Act. Alternative two may also require some restructuring of the current major force programs. For example, Program IV may have to be restructured with some elements taken out, i.e., related to the 23rd Air Force move to Program XI. Other elements (probably in Program II) would need to be identified and brought into Program IV. The same would be true with respect to U.S. Space Command, which is principally concerned with Program III. There may be some minor adjustments still required in Program XI, which was established by legislation for the Special Operations Command.

#### IV. RECOMMENDATIONS THAT EFFECT SPECIFIC COMMANDS AND THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

The individual command summaries (appendices) to this report contain a large number of recommendations which, if implemented, would impact the Unified Command Plan. The more important of these recommendations are discussed in this chapter.

##### A. Changes in Area of Responsibility for the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. European Command and the U.S. Pacific Command

I recommend responsibility for Africa (except for those countries bordering the Mediterranean) be transferred to the USCENTCOM. Presently, the USEUCOM has principal responsibility for Africa, although certain key states fall within the USCENTCOM responsibility. Those currently falling within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility include Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti. I believe that the USCENTCOM should have area responsibility for Africa, except for four nations (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya) bordering the Mediterranean. The USCENTCOM current area of responsibility includes a major portion of Africa and that Command is accustomed to dealing with the differences in Third World nation priorities, language, economic conditions and social mores.

The U.S. European Command is spending a significant portion of headquarters activity in support of U.S. interests in Africa, i.e., planning for contingencies and managing security assistance and military sales efforts. For example, 17 billets in the logistics directorate (J-4) alone were identified as dedicated to Africa issues.

The proposed realignment would help to further consolidate DoD planning and operations for Africa and provide a much closer relationship between the mission and functions performed by the USEUCOM and those performed by the NATO headquarters. This change would certainly make it much easier to review the U.S. European Command for functional overlaps with the NATO commands. More importantly, however, the change in boundaries would reduce NATO nation fears over U.S. planning and executing military operations from within the NATO alliance when the targets are outside of the NATO.

In addition, there is a remaining issue regarding the USCENCOM area of responsibility that has been temporarily resolved, but should be resolved on a more permanent basis. The issue involves the current AOR for sea boundaries. The operational control of naval forces operating in support of the USCENCOM was not relinquished by the USPACOM until the recent formation of the Joint Task Force Middle East. This effectively extended the AOR into the Gulf of Oman where it belonged. The latest draft Unified Command Plan reaffirms the USCENCOM AOR to include only those bounded sea areas (inside the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea) that normally support operations ashore. These maritime boundaries between the USCENCOM and the USPACOM effectively ignore or violate several of the underlying principles used for determining AOR boundaries. The boundaries between the USCENCOM and the USPACOM eliminate potential hostility zones (military fronts) and support facilities essential to the USCENCOM--for example, the Island of Diego Garcia is outside the USCENCOM AOR. I suggest that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to revise the USCENCOM sea and land AOR in accordance with the comments made above.

In addition, the Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East, should also be the Navy Service component commander for the USCENCOM. When this commander is afloat, it is recommended that he have a flag officer for logistics support purposes in Bahrain and a flag officer in charge of USNAVCENT headquarters that should be moved from Hawaii to Norfolk on the east coast--closer to Navy supply facilities and in the same time zone as the USCENCOM. The current arrangement, with the USCENCOM Navy component located in Hawaii, is unsatisfactory with respect to both rank and location.

#### B. U.S. Transportation Command

The U.S. Transportation Command was created in 1986 by direction of the President. Unfortunately, the implementation plan written by the Joint Staff for the establishment of a Joint Unified U.S. Transportation Command is no plan at all and does not address any of the old problems. It simply adds the Joint Deployment Agency and a dual-hatted (MAC and USTRANSCOM) four star general on top of the existing Military Department transportation activities. Other than giving the Joint Deployment Agency more visibility and clout by turning it into a Unified Command staff, little is gained except command layering.

The Unified U.S. Transportation Command emphasized to us that mobility planning and rapid deployment was its sole mission

and that it was not created for purposes of accomplishing any economies or efficiencies in the operation of the Department's transportation activities. The emphasis has been placed on the right element--readiness. However, even if readiness is the sole criterion, the Transportation Command needs to be unified through the disestablishment of separate Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and Military Airlift Command (MAC) headquarters and the creation of a truly unified command to best meet that criterion. I believe such an action will further enhance readiness and mobility planning in multiple ways, including more closely aligning the organization to the way it should operate in wartime. The estimated savings in headquarters manpower over the next two years would be 1,015 positions.

Even if readiness is the sole criterion for establishing the command, there are ancilliary economies and efficiencies that would flow from true unification without detriment to readiness. There are many such economies and efficiencies; they go well beyond the headquarters savings identified in this review. For example, both the MSC and the MTMC have major subordinate elements in Bayonne, New Jersey, and separate management activities at port and terminal facilities elsewhere in the United States, Europe, Japan, and other places. Combinations of these management activities are not only possible, but essential to good in-transit management and visibility of materiel flowing through the transportation system.

The Services have argued that each of their transportation commands have so many "Service-unique" functions that the unification or restructuring of the commands is impossible. There are, in fact, a few Service-unique functions, but they are not a reason to avoid restructuring generally. Consistent with a vigorous unification, where there are Service-unique functions, they can be readily transferred to existing organizations within the Military Departments. For example, some unique Navy support activities (underway replenishment and logistics support to the Fleet) can be easily transferred to the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Commanders where they probably belong anyway.

There appear to be numerous strategic mobility analysis-type functions ongoing within the three Military Department commands that are not proposed for incorporation into the U.S. Transportation Command that should be incorporated, even if the proposal to establish a truly unified transportation command is not adopted. In fact, some of this Military Department "unique" planning involves the preparation of software that must interface with the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES).

There can be no excuse for not incorporating such functions into the Transportation Command, even with its limited charter of wartime transportation (mobility) planning. The Transportation Command is discussed in more detail in the Command appendices.

### C. U.S. Space Command

The U.S. Space Command is located at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, and was activated to consolidate assets controlling U.S. space activities. The USSPACECOM has no geographical area of responsibility but is responsible for management of military space related systems, such as reconnaissance and warning satellites, ground based sensors used to track and receive data from space vehicles. As such, it operates in support of all other Unified and Specified Commands.

The current space organization is largely an Air Force operation with 85 percent of the personnel in the command and supporting commands assigned from the Air Force. As discussed earlier, I believe that significant manpower savings can be achieved by restructuring and unifying this command. The recommendation is that the combined strength of the Unified Command be initially set at 2,050. The reduction of 341 billets can be achieved by merging U.S. Space Command (and its combat operations staff) with the Air Force Space Command (and its combat operations staff). The other Military Departments should be directed to assign additional personnel into the consolidated headquarters with a goal of reaching at least 25 percent Army, and 25 percent Navy/Marine Corps staffing in the next two years. Air Force personnel should decline as Army and Navy support increases.

The importance of space related operations to our national security increases each year. The Army and Navy will be required to play a greater role in this effort, especially as the Strategic Defense Initiative begins to produce operational systems. The Navy operates an "independent" space command that should be integrated into the Unified Command. The Army intends to establish a separate space command, the need for which will be preempted if the Secretary of Defense accepts my proposal.

The Study Team also reviewed the 1st Manned Space Flight Control Squadron of the Air Force Space Command, located at Johnson Space Center after billets at the Air Force Space Command were justified supporting the "Military Man in Space Program." The Department has terminated its Shuttle Operations Planning Center, and cut back very significantly in planned use of the

space shuttle for launching military payloads. Thus, there appears to be no need for a continued heavy Air Force participation in this program. I recommend that the 1st Manned Space Flight Control Squadron be phased out. The Military Man in Space Program appears to have little payoff to the Department of Defense in the foreseeable future. The program, in a sense, subsidizes the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) by providing the NASA with 83 of some of the best and brightest Air Force officers. It appears that these officers could be put to better use supporting DoD research and space efforts, saving 83 billets by end FY 1989.

#### D. U.S. Special Operations Command

During the course of the study, many questions were asked of the geographical (theater) Unified Commanders and their staffs with respect to the command relationship with the new U.S. Special Operations Command. The questions dealt with Special Operations Command related matters such as:

1. The number of special operations personnel in the command headquarters and their mission in terms of headquarters activities versus leading special forces in military operations.

2. What role the Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Forces Command (CINCUSOC) and his staff envisioned for the new Special Operations Unified Command and particularly how they envisioned units of the command operating in another geographical Unified Command area.

3. Whether the CINCUSOC should conduct and control operations within a geographical Unified Command area of responsibility (AOR) in support of anti-terrorist operations or lesser insurgencies.

In response to the answers we received and following discussions with the Commander of the Special Operations Command, I concluded that the likelihood of the Special Operations Command conducting an operation in a theater Unified Command AOR was remote and would take place only in very unusual circumstances at the specific direction of the National Command Authority. We also found that each geographical Unified Command had at least a small subordinate special operations headquarters (generally a planning unit) for planning and control of special operations forces either already within the theater or those assigned to the theater under existing plans.

The table below provides strength figures for the various special operations headquarters organizations within each of the geographical CINCs.

	<u>HEADQUARTERS STRENGTH</u>
Special Operations Atlantic	15
Special Operations Europe	29
Special Operations Pacific	23
Special Operations Central	29
Special Operations South (estimate)	<u>12</u>
Subtotal Special Operations Staffs, Geographical Unified Commands	<u>108</u>

The headquarter staffs listed above are expected to receive significant augmentation from the Reserve Force structure should hostilities ensue within the a Unified Commander's area of operation. We concluded that this structure of small planning staffs within each geographical CINCs organization is appropriate and necessary. These headquarters units need to maintain close liaison with the Special Operations Command headquarters.

In addition, each Military Department has a Special Operations Command headquarters. The strength figures for these headquarters are shown below:

Department of the Army Special Operations	471
Department of the Navy Special Operations	27
Department of the Air Force Special Operations	<u>315</u>
Subtotal Special Operations Staffs, Military Departments	<u>813</u>

Finally, three command elements are a part of the Special Operations Unified Command headquarters. They are listed below:

Special Operations Command Headquarters	241
Corps Support Element	<u>101</u>
Total U.S. Special Operations Command Staff	<u>342</u>
Grand Total, All Special Operations Management Headquarters	<u>1,263</u>

The Special Operations Command is closer to a unified command than any other unified command. In order to establish a truly



unified headquarters for the USSOCOM, I recommend that portions of each of the current Service support components be incorporated into the USSOCOM headquarters, bringing the Special Operations Command headquarters from 342 personnel to a total strength of 573 by transferring 231 billets. These assets should come from the current Service supporting components, namely the First Special Operations Command, the Navy Special Warfare Command, and the Military Airlift Command Headquarters and the 23rd Air Force (see Appendices H and I3).

The same ground rule, that each Service provide no less than 25 percent of the combined command strength no more than 50 percent, should be applied to the Special Operations Command. Operational control of all special operations forces and special operations training facilities in the continental United States, should be given to the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.

#### E. Disestablishing Forces Command as a Specified Command

The missions transferred from the deactivated Readiness Command are not of sufficient criticality to warrant the additional manpower and materiel resources that are needed to establish a specified command. The FORSCOM should be returned to its status as a U.S. Army supporting command. Further, the continental United States (CONUS) and Alaska missions assigned to the FORSCOM are ill-defined, and should not have Army resources dedicated to them until the National Command Authority clarifies the Department of Defense role. (The Alaska mission is addressed later in this report.)

Virtually all of the mission statements of the headquarters functions place an inordinate emphasis on taskings that have traditionally been given a low threat assessment by the National Command Authority, and to which the FORSCOM, itself, gave its lowest management priorities. The priorities are correct, but the staffing levels do not reflect the priorities.

I considered the following with respect to the relatively low priority land defense of the United States:

1. During peacetime civil or national domestic emergencies, the states, through their National Guard headquarters, retain primary authority for the defense and emergency military operations within their boundaries. During national emergencies (i.e., the defense of key assets such as bridges, ports, factories, dams, etc.) and/or the military support of civil defense, the Federalized State National Guard headquarters

having primary responsibility for military forces within state boundaries exercise operational control of these forces. These federalized state offices are the State Area Commands (STARCS).

2. There is no demarcation between land defense, maritime defense and state defense. The Navy, with Coast Guard support, is responsible for the naval defense of the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Coasts, the Great Lakes and Western rivers. However, the actual defense zones established on the Atlantic side extend inland to the state boundaries that approximate the continental divide. The Pacific Zone commander is responsible for the rest of the CONUS. These maritime zone commanders work for the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet commanders.

3. The numbered Continental U.S. Armies (CONUSA) is the key Army management structure that coordinates with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and/or the states. The CONUSA selects the forces (normally Guard units) and, with FORSCOM concurrence, activates and/or federalizes, when needed. The CONUSA deploys and transfers operational command to a STARC or operational control to the FEMA, the EPA, or the state(s), when military support is needed for domestic emergencies. The FORSCOM and all other major Army commands must be prepared to provide disaster assistance, as directed by the numbered CONUSA. Thus, it would appear that the CONUSAs have more planning and execution authority than does the FORSCOM, because the CONUSAs directly support and work with the states, and/or the Federal agencies that have primary authority for an emergency.

4. The role the FORSCOM outlines for itself relative to Alaska also does not justify making it a Specified Command. The Air Force has the lead for the Joint Task Force, Alaska, and the FORSCOM would, in its Army hat, routinely provide forces as a supporting Army component for the land defense of all of Alaska, except for the Aleutian Island chain--an anomaly that makes no sense whatsoever.

I also concluded that an excessive number of personnel at the FORSCOM were justified as planners. There are a large number of commands and agencies that claim to be doing the same planning that the FORSCOM claims for itself.

Finally, when pressed the FORSCOM maintains it has to be a Specified Command and have the additional personnel this requires because Section 162 of Public Law 99-433, entitled "Combatant Commands: Assigned Forces; Chain of Command," requires that the Secretaries of the Military Departments assign all forces under

their jurisdictions to unified and specified combatant commands. The law does provide exceptions for those forces assigned to carry out functions of the Secretary of the Military Department (i.e., training, procurement, research and development, etc.) or for forces assigned to multinational peacekeeping organizations.

The Tactical Air Command (TAC) which, for purposes of assigning units, performs exactly the same function as the FORSCOM, is not a specified command. The Tactical Air Command has not been designated a specified command on the basis that there is some "inherent flexibility and rapid mobility of air forces" than is apparently present in Army units. This rationale is extremely weak in that air forces are not inherently more flexible or deployable than Army forces. More importantly, the Tactical Air Command has overcome the legal problem by "tentatively" tagging or assigning the various wings or squadrons to unified combatant commanders.

A special coordinating group was formed in the case of the Northern American Air Defense Command (NORAD) called the "U.S. Element NORAD" to overcome these legal limitations. Those arrangements seem to be working reasonably well. I have been assured by the Office of the DoD General Counsel that both the TAC and the NORAD arrangements meet the requirements of the law.

Essentially, three choices are available. The Secretary of Defense could (1) create a joint command to resolve this problem, (2) elevate the TAC to a specified command, or (3) disestablish Forces Command as a specified command. I believe that option three is the most cost effective way to handle this situation as detailed in the section of the report on FORSCOM. The missions transferred from the Readiness Command are simply not sufficient to warrant the additional manpower and materiel resources. Reestablishing the FORSCOM as an Army supporting major command that concentrates its efforts on the readiness and deployability of active Army and Reserve forces (the number one mission) will, as a minimum, save 300 headquarters positions. Only if preassigning Army units proves to be impossible or impractical should a change in the law be sought. The additional rationale and analysis for this position is provided in Appendix J.

#### F. Disestablishment of the U.S. Army Western Command

The U.S. Army Western Command serves as a major Army component command and as the Army component to the U.S. Pacific Command. The only combat force within the WESTCOM AOR is the 25th Infantry Division and Reserve units belonging to the Hawaii and Guam National

Guard and the Army Reserve. In essence, the WESTCOM is performing for the Army the function that the FORSCOM performs within the continental United States. The FORSCOM serves as the U.S. Atlantic Command Army component commander. I see no reason why the Forces Command should not also serve as the U.S. Pacific Command Army component command. The Department simply cannot afford the luxury of having 527 personnel in a command to serve as the Army trainer for Hawaii and Guam and as an "advisor" to the USPACOM on Army matters.

The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, already has direct communications with the multi-hatted U.S. Army four star commander in Korea, as well as the commanding general of Army elements in Japan. A small FORSCOM cell could be attached to the USPACOM headquarters to serve as the Army component for planning purposes. The 25th Division and Reserve elements in Hawaii would then be managed by the Forces Command in the same manner that units stationed in the continental United States are managed. Alternatively, I suggest that the Secretary of Defense give consideration to transferring the active duty portion of the IX Corps from Japan to Hawaii to serve as the Army component to USPACOM.

#### G. U.S. Naval Forces Europe

The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) has no direct responsibility to train and ensure the readiness of assigned operational forces. The forces operating within the U.S. Naval Forces Europe (USNAVEUR) area of responsibility and under the direction of the Commander, Sixth Fleet, are, in fact, USLANTFLT assets. These fleet assets are assigned to CINCUSNAVEUR, while operating in the Mediterranean region, but USNAVEUR must rely on the support provided to these forces by USLANTFLT and USLANTFLT type commands. The U.S. Naval Forces Europe Command is, in effect, a "middleman" whose subordinate shore based assets can be transferred to USLANTFLT

When explaining the rationale for retaining the USNAVEUR, two arguments were offered. One was the need to limit the USLANTFLT span of control and the second dealt with the conflict that the USLANTFLT would have in serving as the Navy component for both the USLANTCOM and USEUCOM. With respect to the first argument, it is noted that the USPACFLT area of responsibility is significantly larger than that of the USLANTFLT, yet we did not identify any geographical span of control problems for the USPACFLT even though the USPACFLT does not chop naval forces to unified commanders in Japan, Korea, or the Philippines, but only to the

Seventh Fleet. With respect to the second point, we noted that the Army Forces Command and the Tactical Air Command serve and supply forces to multiple Unified Commands as circumstances warrant. In any case, the ultimate decision on the assignment of forces rests with the National Command Authority who, through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, can resolve any conflicts between competing Unified Commanders for force assignment. Thus, it is my considered opinion that the Department should dispense with a separate USNAVEUR command and direct USLANTFLT to serve as USEUCOM Navy component command.

The disestablishment of USNAVEUR raises four related issues involving (1) the continued U.S. Navy flag officer presence in the Allied Forces South structure (a NATO command), (2) lines of communication and coordination between the USEUCOM and the USLANTFLT, (3) the assignment of naval intelligence functions within the European theater, and (4) the use of facilities currently occupied by the USNAVEUR in London.

In answer to these related issues, I recommend that the current assignment of a four star U.S. Navy flag officer as Commander, Allied Forces Southern Region (CINCSOUTH), along with the double hats of Commander, Sixth Fleet and Commander, Fleet Air Mediterranean, should remain in place. These commands are all located in the vicinity of Naples, Italy. This arrangement ensures continued U.S. control within the NATO southern region by a four star admiral. I suggest the assignment of a small planning and coordinating group from USLANTFLT to the USEUCOM headquarters, similar to what has been proposed for the Army FORSCOM and its relationship with the USPACOM. This arrangement should resolve any coordination and lines of communication problems. The Fleet Ocean Surveillance and Intelligence Center should remain at its present location in London under the command of the Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. It would be incorporated into the Joint Intelligence Center at the European Command Alternate Headquarters (ASH) in the early 1990s. It is also recommended that the facilities currently occupied by the USNAVEUR in London (one building at Grovesnor Square with a virtually cost-free lease) be used to relocate portions of USEUCOM Headquarters that will not be housed at the ASH.

#### H. U.S. Forces Caribbean

The United States Forces Caribbean (USFORSCARIB) is a subunified command under the USLANTCOM and is located in Key West, Florida. This command was established by the previous Administration as a response to reports of a Soviet brigade in Cuba.

In 1985, the House Armed Services Committee requested a study explaining why the USFORSCARIB should not be disestablished. The Department took the position that the command should be retained. I have reached the opposite conclusion.

The command must be placed in the category of nice to have, but clearly not essential to either our peacetime or wartime needs. During actual operations, such as those in Grenada, this command played no role and I have difficulty finding a single contingency in which the USFORSCARIB would take responsibility for any size military operation other than a minor noncombatant evacuation order when conducted under peacetime conditions. In all the important contingencies imaginable, it appears the command will either get in the way or be ignored. I propose that this command be disestablished and the functions performed be returned to the USLANTFLT where they resided prior to 1980.

#### I. A Unified Subcommand for North East Asia (Japan and Korea)

At some point in the not too distant future, the Department of Defense should give serious consideration to the establishment of a single subunified command for North East Asia to include the defense of Japan, Korea, the Sea of Japan and the Kuril Basin.

Clearly, the defense of Japan and Korea are intertwined. The current arrangement with two subunified commands, one in Japan and one in Korea, is less than optimum from a manpower standpoint and complicates the operational planning process. One of the subunified commands is headed by a four star Army officer and the other by a three star Air Force officer. Each has a full complement of flag rank component commanders with large staffs. The Navy side of the house achieves integrated planning and operations in this area by ensuring that neither of the two naval "commanders" will ever command much of anything, certainly no ships or airplanes. Any war fighting support to the waters surrounding Japan or Korea will be provided by elements of the 7th Fleet, which will be controlled by the USPACOM in Hawaii and not chopped to the subunified commanders. The subunified commander in Korea does not have peacetime OPCON of any air forces either, but at DEFCON 3, Air Force elements are chopped to him.

We have allowed the longstanding animosities between Japan and Korea, especially those on the military side, to serve as a reason/excuse for not integrating our planning for this region of the world and for maintaining major subunified command headquarters in each nation.

Japan and Korea have developed rather close economic/commercial ties. Commercial aircraft regularly fly between the two nations without any difficulties. Yet, we have failed to reach cooperative agreements for checking, controlling and intercepting military flights in the area. Some of the higher ranking officers I spoke with opined that Japan and Korea can never work together in a mutually beneficial and cooperative military arrangement. Frankly, I think they are wrong and, in fact, there have been many instances of cooperation when the United States serves as the third party. For example, the Fifth Air Force worked out of both countries for some 20 plus years. The command relationships internal to the U.S. command structure were not good and, therefore, about two years ago a numbered Air Force, the 7th, was established in Korea. The assignment and movement of forces (aircraft) from nation to nation was accepted as a routine practice for years.

There are no significant manpower changes specifically tied to this matter. However, I am of the opinion that there is no need for three admirals in Japan. I recommend that the Commander, U.S. Navy Forces Japan, be disestablished and a portion of that staff be incorporated into the U.S. Forces Japan staff to advise on naval matters. The Seventh Fleet Commander can take care of the joint exercise role quite nicely when augmented with a portion of the U.S. Navy Forces Japan staff. What to do with the U.S. Army Forces Japan remains a problem. I believe that they also could be merged into the U.S. Forces Japan headquarters, but then there is no "solely" U.S. Army commander in-country to plan and conduct joint U.S. Japanese exercises. I also suggest that the Command entitled U.S. Forces Korea, which is to a large extent a holding account for personnel assigned to Combined Forces Command, Korea, and the Eighth U.S. Army, no longer carry any personnel on its roles. The Unified Commander in Korea should, however, continue to carry the title, U.S. Forces Commander Korea.

#### J. Command Structure for Alaska and the Aleutian Islands

The responsibility for the air defense of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands and ground defense of the Aleutians is confusing, will probably not work in an emergency, and should be corrected. Currently, the principal responsibility resides with an Air Force lieutenant general in Alaska wearing one of several hats, depending on the situation.

1. If there is a military operation in which Canada participates, the responsibility is exercised as the North American Aerospace Defense Command Sector Commander.

2. If Canada does not participate, then the Joint Task Force (JTF) Alaska is activated. The Commander, JTF, operates much like a Unified Commander--the chain of command for the JTF Alaska is through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the National Command Authority (the old documents say to the JCS rather than through the Chairman and will be changed as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation). The Alaskan Air Command (which the Air Force lieutenant general also commands) chops to the JTF, as does the Army division in Alaska.

The responsibility for the ground and sea defense (excluding air) of the Aleutians is assigned to JTF Aleutian, when activated. This JTF reports to the USPACOM and the JTF Commander is an Army National Guard brigadier general. The naval component commander is a 3rd Fleet asset designated as Commander, Maritime Defense Section Aleutian. Elements of an active Army division stationed in Alaska would provide ground defense of the Aleutians until relieved by Guard/Reserve forces. Any Navy assets would presumably be "in support" elements of the USPACFLT and would not be "chopped" (transferred) to the JTF Commander. In essence, the JTF is primarily ground forces, but elements of which would require substantial lift from U.S. Transportation Command.

In 1971, the mission for the ground and sea defense of the Aleutians was deleted from the mission of the Alaskan Command.

In 1975, the Alaskan Command was disestablished and replaced by JTF Alaska.

In 1983, the JCS revised the Unified Command Plan to expand the area of responsibility of the USPACOM to include all of Alaska, less air defense. Senator Ted Stevens intervened, and Secretary Weinberger deleted or held in abeyance this change to the Unified Command Plan.

In 1985, the JCS again proposed the 1983 change to the Unified Command Plan. Senator Stevens was successful in getting legislation passed to prevent this change in responsibility.

In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, dealt with this topic. Section 212 required a review of the command structure for Alaska and Section 213B repealed the earlier 1985 prohibition on changing the command structure. Senator Stevens countered this by enactment of Section 908 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1987.

Section 8040 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1988, continues the prohibition of expenditure of funds to change the Alaskan command structure.



The Joint Chiefs of Staff solution to clarify the situation is to establish a subunified command for all of Alaska and the Aleutians reporting to the USPACOM. This is somewhat tricky because of the NORAD situation, but it could be worked out. The Air Force lieutenant general in Alaska would be the Commander and this appears to be eminently more sensible than the current situation. Apparently, this will not work politically because the major issue is defense of Alaska by so-called "Pineapple Admirals" in Hawaii.

A second option is to create a new unified command in Alaska reporting to the National Command Authority through the Chairman, JCS. Senator Stevens would likely support this option. It would, however, create a Unified Command with a large area to defend but little in the way of forces.

The issue of Alaskan command changes has been a nonnegotiable item with Senator Stevens. The Secretary of Defense will have to become personally involved if any further discussion or change is to take place. I believe that the best command arrangement is for the USPACOM to have two subunified commands, one for Korea and Japan and the other for Alaska and the Aleutians. The focus of the "Pineapple Admirals" in Hawaii has to be different than the situation which prevailed in World War II, because the enemy will be different--forcing the focus to Northeast Asia, not Southeast Asia.

The current situation is not likely to work and there probably will be a lot of finger pointing if war or a major incident occurs in that region of the world. I suggest that the Department continue to push for a USPACOM subunified command at every opportunity.

#### K. Strategic Air Command

The Strategic Air Command (SAC) was the first command to establish a separate operational staff in 1976. The establishment of the operations staff outside of the regular headquarters element served as a model for the rest of the Air Force and eventually many other non-Air Force headquarters. As I mentioned earlier, this concept is being abused and used to "hide" headquarters positions from arbitrary percentage reductions in many commands. Since its inception in 1976, the Strategic Air Combat Operations Staff (SACOS) has grown continually and currently has 592 authorized billets. While the original SACOS concept at SAC may have been sound, it has been abused. Currently it appears that the primary purpose of a SACOS is to protect spaces from management headquarters reductions. Between FY 1984 and 1987, the SACOS grew by 139 spaces. Any credibility the concept once had has been lost.

The Headquarters SAC staff strength has remained relatively stable over the last five years, while at the same time there have been increases in the SACOS and reductions in the numbered Air Force staffs. I found that the logistics staff at the SAC is out of proportion with the numbered Air Force staffs where important logistic responsibilities take place. The SAC was also one of several commands where we believe that more billets are justified as "planners" than the workload or the amount of planning activity being carried on warrants.

Finally, I found the Strategic Air Command Air Divisions located within the continental United States to be largely superfluous to the Strategic Air Command peacetime operations or its ability to carry out the SAC strategic mission. These Air Divisions fall in the "nice to have" category, but are unnecessary. Accordingly, I recommend the disestablishment of the eight SAC Air Division headquarters located within the United States. This will reduce layering and duplication of functions but will not impact the control of operational forces. This action would eliminate approximately 130 billets, including eight general officer positions and 31 full colonel billets, 15 of which are in an overstrength position. I also recommend a reduction of an additional 149 positions related largely to the planning and logistics functions within the SAC headquarters. These recommendations are discussed more fully in Appendix L.

V. U.S. NEEDS GREATER VISIBILITY OF ITS PERSONNEL  
ASSIGNED TO NATO HEADQUARTERS

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in 1949, created an alliance linking 14 European countries with the U.S. and Canada for the collective defense of Europe.

The North Atlantic Council, located in Brussels, Belgium, is the highest authority in the NATO, and the Military Committee (under the Council) is responsible for military affairs of the Alliance. The total U.S. staff at NATO Headquarters, including both civilian and military representation, is 345, as shown below:

<u>NATO-Civilian</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Support to International Staff*	17
U.S. Mission to NATO	49
Subtotal, Civilian	66
<u>NATO-Military</u>	
Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee	6
Support to International Military Staff*	56
U.S. Delegation to NATO Military Committee	43
Subtotal, NATO-Military	105
Special Liaison Detachment for Communications and Enlisted Aides	21
Other Activities (communications, standardization and housekeeping)	153
Total Brussels Area	<u>345</u>

\* Excludes civilians reimbursed by NATO

There are two U.S. staffs providing support to Headquarters, NATO. The U.S. Delegation to the NATO Military Committee and the U.S. Mission to the NATO essentially provide similar support and are already collocated in the same building. Consolidation would eliminate duplicative functions and streamline operations and help to ensure a unified U.S. position. I recommend placing both organizations under the direction of the U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, and consolidating similar functions. (Canada and the United Kingdom have a similar consolidated structure. This will eliminate 40 billets and is further addressed in Appendix D4.)

In addition to the 345 U.S. personnel providing support to the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee, the U.S. has assigned an estimated 6,369 personnel to the various military headquarters, as shown on the table below:

Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic	250
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)	356
Other SHAPE Organizations	437
Northern Region Headquarters	183
Central Region Headquarters	1,238
Southern Region Headquarters	1,513
Other	<u>2,392</u>
Total	<u>6,369</u>

Despite the fact that the NATO Headquarters are organized in much the same way as U.S. Unified Commands and that many of the activities of the U.S. Unified Commands closely relate to those at the NATO Headquarters, the Study Team was unable to determine the exact nature of the cooperation and/or duplication involved. The ability to review U.S. staff complements at NATO Headquarters was seriously impaired by the lack of cooperation of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The SACEUR questioned the legitimacy of the team's charter to review U.S. personnel strength at the NATO and subordinate headquarters. We were denied access to the SHAPE Headquarters and subordinate headquarters in Allied Forces South and Allied Forces Central.

The SACEUR and subordinate commanders refused to provide the team with organizational charts of headquarters, including U.S. strengths by organization, mission and function statements, and a reconciliation of U.S. personnel strengths actually onboard compared to Joint Staff and NATO manpower documentation. We did establish that a systematic and rigorous manpower and survey review process does not exist for NATO Headquarters and subordinate headquarters. The team was denied copies of the limited manpower surveys that have been completed on NATO activities.

Although I cannot be certain, because of significant discrepancies between NATO and Joint Staff manpower documents, it appears there are more than 6,300 U.S. personnel at NATO and subordinate headquarters. There are likely to be significant overlaps between the United States staff at the various NATO headquarters, as well as at component U.S. commands that provide support and forces to the NATO commands. This is further exacerbated by the large number of staffs furnished by other NATO members, all of whom contribute personnel to the headquarters. In all likelihood, significant reductions can be made at the various headquarters without impairing the NATO ability to conduct peacetime or wartime operations.

In addition to the possible overlaps, there is a strong likelihood that the U.S. is providing more than its fair share of the "overhead" support. The Department of Defense supports

the SHAPE by providing 793 officers and enlisted personnel (about 35 percent of the authorized billets). In addition, the USEUCOM has a SHAPE liaison office (the U.S. National Military Representative SHAPE) with an authorization of 24 billets and a Berlin element (Live Oak) with 22 billets. In summary, there are 839 active duty personnel at SHAPE representing the United States. To support these 839 personnel at the SHAPE, the DoD employs 2,200 additional personnel.

I do not accept the contention of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe that he is inhibited from furnishing me, in my capacity as the representative of the Secretary of Defense, the information and the access to U.S. military personnel I requested.

I recommend that the Secretary of Defense take appropriate steps to cause a thorough evaluation of U.S. military personnel assigned to the NATO. The evaluation should consider the mission and function of those personnel, with particular attention to any overlap and redundancy of the NATO functions with those of U.S. European and U.S. Atlantic Commands.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## VI. OTHER ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY

### A. European Headquarters Functional Analysis is Flawed and Cannot Be Used for Realignments or Consolidations

I found that the special headquarters study (functional analysis data base) developed by the U.S. European Command in response to congressional direction is seriously flawed and of no use in making manpower decisions. The data base simply does not contain the information needed to make manpower decisions. Unfortunately, the limitations of this study were not revealed in official correspondence from the Director, Joint Staff, to the Secretary of Defense, who subsequently passed erroneous information to the Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations, regarding the accuracy and future use of the information developed by the USEUCOM review.

Since 1985, the Senate Appropriations Committee has expressed concern about an apparent disparity in the size of Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE) staffing when compared with U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) and U.S. Navy Europe. In response to questions regarding Air Force manpower requirements, USAFE personnel responded that its personnel levels are based on Air Force manpower standards. In response to a perceived lack of effort by the Air Force to streamline, the Committee again recommended a funding reduction in the FY 1986 Defense Appropriation Act and directed the European Command, in conjunction with the Inspector General, DoD, to perform a detailed comparison of the Army and Air Force manpower standards and funding requirements for the European theater.

In June 1986, the Secretary of Defense informed the Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, that the directed comparison was being refocused from a manpower standards and funding requirements review to an "audit" of personnel functions of the USEUCOM and subordinate component headquarters to be undertaken by those same headquarters. The Secretary of Defense cited the Packard Commission recommendations, the pending Defense Reorganization Bill and House actions regarding Joint Chiefs of Staff reorganization, all under way at that time, as reasons for reducing the scope of the congressional directed review.

In response to the reduced scope of the Secretary of Defense tasking, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, forwarded a two-phase plan for the conduct of the USEUCOM and component headquarters audit. The plan required that during Phase I the USEUCOM and component headquarters conduct a functional analysis of their

management headquarters and that during Phase II the Joint Staff/Service working groups perform a follow-on independent assessment. Phase II was later deemed unnecessary because the "audit" had no recommendations for any functional realignments, staff additions, or staff deletions in the USEUCOM headquarters or the Service component headquarters. This was a rather incredible outcome considering the various staffs inability to explain or document what value they added or what they did that was different when the same function (for example, personnel policy) was being performed by both higher and lower headquarters.

The USEUCOM headquarters and the Service component headquarters identified 14 major functions groups (such as personnel/administration and intelligence) and developed a data base of functional tasks performed within each group. For each functional task, common data elements were identified for later analysis--such as designated headquarters, name of functional representative, office symbol, functional description and equivalent manyears of effort. The initial data input resulted in the identification of over 2,700 individual functions. Through further analysis by USEUCOM personnel and functional working groups, the individual functions were refined and consolidated into 1,400 functions. (The Study Team analyzed the data base and identified 768 functions being performed at one or more headquarters.)

The refinement and consolidation process used by the USEUCOM resulted in unuseable manyear data. Each individual providing data input was not restricted to a total of one manyear of effort. Instead, individuals working more than a normal eight-hour day were permitted to identify more than one manyear total work effort. This erroneous data input was not corrected. In addition, per discussion with USEUCOM personnel, the functional working groups sometimes unilaterally adjusted the data input for identical functions to make them more "comparable." As a result, the data base contained about 4,700 manyear equivalents, which was about 1,500 manyears in excess of the authorized manning. Instead of correcting the data base, a decision was made to delete all manyear data.

The data base analysis phase performed by the USEUCOM and the Service components did not produce any significant recommendations, according to EUCOM officials, because of the following:

- inherent differences between the three components;
- requirements levied by the individual Commanders to have someone on their staff knowledgeable about a given function;



- concern about upcoming DoD reorganization and the pending ten percent manpower reductions;

- the USAREUR recently underwent a self-initiated manpower review and reduction and was cautious about possible further reductions; and

- shortages of manpower existed for many functions.

The Study Team reviewed the data base and identified many detailed functions performed at more than one headquarters that could possibly be consolidated. However, for a given headquarters function, our review efforts were hampered because all workyear equivalents had been removed from the data base and destroyed. Thus, while we could determine that a specific function was performed at more than one headquarters, we had no way of determining how much time was spent at a given headquarters on that specific function. I, therefore, concluded that the data base is of limited use for identifying areas of consolidation necessary for making difficult manpower reduction decisions.

This conclusion was not the position provided to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations. On March 17, 1987, the Secretary of Defense was informed by the Director, Joint Staff, that the functional data base "will enhance their ability to make precise decisions about future functional realignments as the DoD reorganization continues to unfold." In addition, on June 6, 1987, the Secretary of Defense informed the Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations, that the analysis will "assist us in making the hard decisions necessary to comply with the ten percent reduction in headquarters management personnel levels mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986." These are both inaccurate and misleading statements that imply that a useful functional review was conducted.

I recommend that the Secretary of Defense notify the Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations, as to the limitations of this analysis in order to correct the false impression given the Committee. The Secretary of Defense should also consider, based on advice from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), (1) directing the USEUCOM and the Service component headquarters to update the functional analysis and include manyear equivalent data elements, and (2) using the resultant functional analysis as the basis for a comprehensive realignment and consolidation of headquarters functions after implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act reductions and any reductions proposed in this report adopted by the Secretary of

Defense. I make this recommendation reluctantly, however, because I lack faith in self reviews of this type and I am not convinced that a functional analysis is the best way to proceed, especially if functions performed by the NATO Headquarters are excluded. If this proves to be a useful tool it could be used elsewhere, especially at the USPACOM and in Japan.

#### B. Definition of Headquarters Needs Improvement

We determined that the definition of headquarters, as set forth in DoD Directive 5100.73, allows significant understating of the number of personnel that directly support the headquarters and are, in fact, part of the headquarters, by describing those positions as operations support or placing them in direct reporting units that report to a staff office, not the commander. This causes the statement of headquarters personnel appearing in Department of Defense budget justification (Exhibit PB-22), to understate and mask the true headquarters manning. We noted that a considerable amount of "migration" has taken place in recent years from those activities defined as headquarters to those which are categorized "nonheadquarters" personnel. The migrating personnel continue to support headquarters, performing functions deemed essential to the headquarters. I concluded that for many of these "migrations," the primary purpose was to avoid the "headquarters" connotation and/or manpower limitations placed on headquarters in legislation and congressional committee reports.

I also noted the proliferation of such activities as "direct reporting units," "combat operations staffs," "resource management operating agencies," "operational support facilities," as well as a variety of other support units, which appeared to support the headquarters directly. As explained earlier in the report, for these reasons we counted the personnel in these units as part of the headquarters staff. This suborganizational headquarters structure also contributes substantially to the layering and duplication problem.

I concluded that only in this way could full visibility and accountability for the large number of personnel at the headquarters be presented. We recognize and acknowledge that our approach differs considerably from the headquarters strength counting process that currently supports congressional justification.

I recommend, however, that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to revise the definition of headquarters strength to identify more completely personnel staffing directly supporting management headquarters.

Program budget justifications furnished to the Congress should be revised to reflect the new definition and to establish a new baseline.

C. Improvements Needed in Organization and Functions Manuals and Accounting for Time Spent

A clear understanding of duties performed by officers in headquarters billets requires a well-written, comprehensible organization and functions manual. This is useful not only for outside reviewers, but for incoming staff personnel who need to understand the boundaries of their job and the responsibilities associated with it. During the course of the review, I examined organization and functions statements for virtually every unified, specified and component command, as well as those of other supporting organizations. While they varied greatly in quality, few, if any, were adequate. Many seemed to be written primarily to enhance the importance of an office or an individual with little or no regard to the key significant duties performed. For example, the term "develops or writes policy" was often used because it is a job classification or rating enhancer. Yet many offices that used the word "policy" to describe their function were not recommending or setting policy.

It was virtually impossible to understand the most significant duties performed by individuals because they were seldom highlighted. It was also difficult, if not impossible, to understand the inter-relationship between staffs in various subfunctional units. Briefings presented to the Study Team indicated a pervasive confusion as to who does what, to what extent and when.

I recommend that organization and/or functions manuals be rewritten to more clearly delineate the precise duties of individuals in each functional directorate or subunit within an organization. To do so requires that the functions/duties for each organization be listed in priority order with the most important duty listed first. Duties such as "monitor," "coordinate," or "oversee" should be listed later since they are generally not the primary activity of any given directorate.

Organization and function manuals should also be rewritten to more clearly delineate the prioritized duties of the organizations involved and contain complete and detailed "wiring charts" showing the relationships of each organization to other organizations, as well as to the commander of the activity.

During the course of the review, I discovered that there is an incomplete understanding of how headquarters personnel spend their time. The allocation of an individual's time is not well-known by the senior staff responsible for the function, and frequently individuals themselves have no way of knowing what percentage of their time is spent on any given activity. This murkiness in the duties of individuals within a headquarters makes it extremely difficult to evaluate the necessity for that individual, the relationship of the time spent by that individual and an individual at a superior or subordinate command on the same function, or the "value added" by individuals performing similar functions at different level headquarters. Until senior managers within an organization gain a better understanding and visibility of what their "staffs" are actually doing vis-a-vis those performing similar functions a level above and below, they have no way of determining what size staff is really required. Far too often, I heard the answer "well, I know they're all busy," when a senior manager was pinned down on what his employees did.

There needs to be greater visibility of the products produced by the staff, the functional categories on which individuals devote their time and a clear understanding of whether or not the activities pursued by the staff are really required for the smooth and efficient functioning of the headquarters.

To accomplish this, I recommend that the Joint Staff devise a methodology for periodically capturing the time spent in duties by all staff offices at Unified and Specified Commands and that the Secretaries of the Services also use similar methodology for Service component commands. Capturing these data should not take a great deal of time, but should be accomplished on a cyclical basis, with all offices using standardized functional headquarters categories for the types of jobs being accomplished. Most headquarters are organized into the same functionally titled directorates and much of the activity accomplished by these directorates is virtually the same across the spectrum of commands. There should be no problem in devising a uniform scheme of functional work categories. In addition, individuals should clearly lay forth both the quantity and the extent of work products that are produced (intelligence, analyses, operational plans, host nation support agreements, etc.).

#### D. A Zero-Based Approach to Headquarters Manning

At the present time, the Joint Staff reviews the staffing requirements of Unified Commands once every three to five years. These reviews cover the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved Joint

Manpower Program. No Specified Command headquarters or Service component command undergoes a regular manpower review. While the Joint Staff review process could be improved as suggested below, the process is certainly better than the situation in the Service component commands, as reflected in the manpower documentation provided to the Study Team and in the headquarters ability to describe the relationship of functions performed to many years consumed.

The Joint Staff (J-1) Personnel Directorate conducts surveys of the Joint Manpower Program at the Unified Command headquarters, with a view toward determining the validity of the position, and whether or not a greater or smaller number of positions are required. In general, the methodology consists of having each individual keep close tabs on what he or she does during a period of time (one week or more) and then evaluating the workload of that individual.

The Joint Staff should attempt to take a zero-based approach to the work done by headquarters staff. I realize that this may prove to be a difficult task, but the first question that needs to be asked is whether or not the work needs to be done at all, not how long the individuals are taking to do it. The second question is whether or not individuals are efficiently pursuing the required work. Despite the large amount of "overtime" individuals maintain they are working, much of it may not be necessary in order to fulfill the primary obligations of the job. In fact, there is some evidence that adding more people to a headquarters tends to increase proportionately the amount of "overtime." Personnel working in smaller, lower level headquarters probably work less time than those assigned to larger, higher level headquarters. As a headquarters grows in size and position on the "ladder," overtime seems to increase.

Considering the fact that virtually all Unified and Specified staffs have the same basic structure and the same general functions, it should be possible to determine a uniform requirement for the work to be done. This needs to be zero-based by the Joint Staff to ensure that every position is required, not merely that every position that exists includes an individual who is working eight or more hours per day on some useful endeavor. For example, we question the need for many planning billets when the various operational plans have been in existence for years and largely require only updating. It is always possible to conduct more planning. The question is: how much is enough?

E. Worldwide Military Command and Control System is a Manpower Driver and Should Be Examined from that Standpoint

Throughout the course of the review, the Study Team visited and discussed the operation, capability and manning of Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) centers, all of which required substantial numbers of personnel. The Honeywell H6000 series computers (actually upgraded to DPS 8 equivalent) are located at 45 sites. Twenty-seven of those sites support information processing requirements for DoD joint missions, Military Department and command-unique applications, and can be directly and interactively accessed by the National Command Authority through the facilities of the WWMCCS integrated network. There is a growing number of the host machines and an increasing interest in remote networking, which may also increase manpower requirements.

The primary WWMCCS mission is to provide the National Command Authority a capability to (1) receive warning and intelligence information on which accurate and timely decisions can be made, (2) apply the resources of the Military Departments, and (3) provide direction to the Unified and Specified Commands. It is also intended to support the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and other key military commanders in carrying out their responsibilities. The WWMCCS is used by the National Command Authority and key military commanders for operational activities ranging from day-to-day to crisis operations.

In addition to the existing facilities, there are a variety of upgrades being funded, almost all of which are being accomplished by contract. Some of these upgrades may be scrapped or slowed by funding shortfalls. The General Accounting Office (GAO) recently completed an audit of the proposed replacement of the Honeywell computers. That audit gave the DoD such high marks for improvements to the existing system that there is little reason to proceed to the next generation at this time.

I recognize that the WWMCCS is an essential part of the command and control system used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified Commanders. However, I also know that private industry has cut management staffs by streamlining procedures, changing policies, and relying on information systems to track decentralized implementation of corporate policy. These efforts should be considered when determining how to streamline commands. Also, further consideration needs to be given to how the WWMCCS, as well as other imbedded information technology, might be used to support alternative functional and organizational arrangements.

I recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint Staff to examine the manpower intensiveness of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System and consider whether or not alternatives are available that could specifically be geared toward reducing manpower for that system. The Defense Communications Agency must play an important role in any study designed to furnish the Chairman, JCS, with options to reduce the number of manpower requirements. In the time allotted, we could not determine how many personnel were actually operating the WWMCCS. Another issue that should be studied is the need for multiple centers in the same geographical location. Although it is my initial conclusion that little can be done unless the supported headquarters is terminated or merged as is recommended elsewhere for the "supporting" nongeographical Unified Commands.

F. Management of Headquarters Support Contracts

The Study Team made a very limited review, primarily to identify the dollars and scope, of contracts that are used by the headquarters to support functional day-to-day activities. Our objective was to determine if headquarters staffing was being further "subsidized" through contracts. The study group had only a limited opportunity to review these contracts and in some headquarters (Joint Staff, for example) no review was made.

One problem we encountered across-the-board was a general lack of knowledge of the nature of the contracts, the type of work performed and the true purpose of the contract. Although several million dollars is devoted by many of these headquarters to various contracts, there are apparently few individuals who know exactly what purpose is served by each contract. In a few cases, it appears that the contracts are being used to perform functions that either should have or could have been done by in-house personnel or that they were of a personal service nature where the "deliverable" was not well-defined and a termination date was not established.

In a few instances, commands admitted that specialized efforts had been moved from in-house to contractor resources specifically to ease the burden on in-house personnel. Specific recommendations regarding contracts where the Study Team questioned the purpose or cost of the contract are contained in the individual command sections of this report and total \$7.8 million.

G. Headquarters Staff Other Than the Unified and Specified Commands and Their Components Should Also Be Reviewed for Possible Overlap and Duplication


Under the terms of reference, this study only included unified, specified, component, and NATO commands. Because of that, numerous other command headquarters were excluded, such as the major systems and logistics commands and those managing our Reserve forces. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization commands were not reviewed because of the access problems discussed earlier.

While this study represents a start at reducing overlap and duplication, we observed additional opportunities for manpower and cost savings during the review. I recommend that the Secretary direct a review of other Service Headquarters, Service Secretariats, Defense Agency headquarters, and Reserve forces management, using a methodology similar to that employed in this study. The General Accounting Office recently started a general management review of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

In addition, the Secretary of Defense should direct a separate review of personnel involved in the security assistance process at all levels of command. I identified what appears to be considerable overlapping of functions in the area between the State Department, the U.S. Embassies, the Defense Security Assistance Agency, the Military Departments, the Unified Commands, U.S. Military Assistance Groups (MAGs), various in-country security assistance offices, and Attache' offices, but was unable to pursue the matter with enough detail to make any significant recommendations.

\*\*\*\*\*

I want to thank you for giving me the opportunity to conduct this review and for the especially helpful advice furnished by Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I hope that you find the observations and recommendations in this report helpful in dealing with some of the major challenges and alternatives you face in organizing and managing the Department during a period of resource reduction.

  
Derek J. Vander Schaaf  
Chairman, Study Team





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

14 DEC 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL  
INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters

Recent actions by the White House and Congress make it obvious that the Department is facing substantial budget reductions. The Deputy Secretary and I have already provided direction that will serve to ensure that proposed expenditures for DoD personnel, weapons, and programs are kept to an absolute minimum. More guidance will follow as we continue to scrutinize the utilization of available resources closely.

As part of this effort, and in consultation with Admiral Crowe, I have directed Derek Vander Schaaf, the DoD Deputy Inspector General to conduct a review of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified and Specified Commands Headquarters and Headquarters support activities, to include Component Commands. The primary objective of the review should be to reduce manpower levels and overhead costs. Particular attention should be given to overlapping responsibilities, duplication of functions, and excessive layering of organizational echelons.

Specifically included should be:


- Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- U.S. Atlantic Command
- U.S. Central Command
- U.S. European Command
- U.S. Pacific Command
- U.S. Space Command

- Strategic Air Command
- U.S. Forces Command
- U.S. elements of North Atlantic Treaty Organization activities headquarters.

The Study Team will consist largely of individuals from the IG staff. In addition, the Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Comptroller) and (Force Management and Personnel) should each designate one representative to serve as Team Members. The Chairman, JCS and Secretary of each Military Department should designate a point of contact to assist in obtaining data and handling scheduling matters.

The review should begin at once. All DoD Components should cooperate and provide personnel, funding, and other support to Mr. Vander Schaaf, as necessary. They also will provide him access to records, files, tapes, and other data that he considers relevant. I expect a report of findings and recommendations to be submitted to me no later than February 1, 1988.

Any questions on this initiative should be directed to Mr. Vander Schaaf.



## PRINCIPAL STUDIES CONSULTED

Chairman's Special Study Group. The Organization and Function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. April 30, 1982.

Cushman, John H. Command and Control of Theater Forces: The Korea Command and Other Cases. April 1985.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration (OSD Study Team) Management Study of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. October 1978.

Locher, James R. III. Defense Organization: The Need for Change, Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate. October 16, 1985.

Odeen, Philip A. Toward A More Effective Defense, Final Report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. February 1985.

President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, A Quest for Excellence, Final Report. June 1986

Steadman, Richard C. Report to the Secretary of Defense on the National Military Command Structure. July 1978.

\_\_\_\_\_. Manpower Survey of the Joint Staff, Draft Report of Findings and Recommendations. November 27, 1987.

In addition, a wide variety of documentation was furnished by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the various Unified and Specified Commands and their Component Commands.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

COMMANDS AND ORGANIZATIONS VISITED

A. Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joint Staff	Washington, DC
-------------	----------------

B. U.S. Atlantic Command

Norfolk, VA

U.S. Army Atlantic

Fort McPherson, GA

U.S. Atlantic Fleet

Norfolk, VA

U.S. Air Force Atlantic

Langley AFB, VA

U.S. Forces Caribbean

Key West, FL

U.S. Special Operations

Command, Atlantic

Norfolk, VA

Commander, Naval

Activities Caribbean

Roosevelt Roads,  
Puerto Rico

Caribbean Joint Intelligence

Center

Key West, FL

Joint Air Reconnaissance

Control Center

Key West, FL

Supreme Allied

Commander Atlantic

Norfolk, VA

Training Command, Atlantic

Norfolk, VA

Naval Surface Forces, Atlantic

Norfolk, VA

C. U.S. Central Command	MacDill AFB, FL
U.S. Army Central	Fort McPherson, GA
U.S. Navy Central	Pearl Harbor, HI
 D. U.S. European Command	 Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany
U.S. Army Europe	Heidelberg, Germany
U.S. Air Force Europe	Ramstein AFB, Germany
U.S. Navy Europe	London, England
U.S. Special Operations	
Command Europe	Stuttgart, Germany
Allied Forces Southern Region	Naples, Italy
Commander, Sixth Fleet	Gaeta, Italy
 E. U.S. Pacific Command	 Camp Smith, HI
U.S. Army Western	
Command	Fort Shafter, HI
U.S. Pacific Fleet	Pearl Harbor, HI
U.S. Pacific Air Forces	Hickam AFB, HI
U.S. Forces, Japan	Yokota Air Base, Japan
U.S. Forces, Korea	Seoul, Korea
U.S./Korea Combined	
Forces Command	Seoul, Korea
United Nations Command	Seoul, Korea

Eighth U.S. Army	Seoul, Korea
Training Command Pacific	San Diego, CA
Naval Surface Forces, Pacific	San Diego, CA
Naval Submarine Forces, Pacific	Pearl Harbor, HI
Naval Air Forces, Pacific	San Diego, CA
Data Processing Service Center, Pacific	Pearl Harbor, HI
Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific	Pearl Harbor, HI
Logistics Command, Pacific	Pearl Harbor, HI

F. U.S. Southern Command                      Not Visited\*

\*Material Furnished to the Study Team

G. U.S. Space Command	Peterson AFB, CO
U.S. Army Space Activity	Peterson AFB, CO
U.S. Naval Space Command	Dahlgren, VA
U.S. Air Force Space Command	Peterson AFB, CO

H. U.S. Special Operations Command              MacDill AFB, FL

I. U.S. Transportation Command*	Scott AFB, IL
Military Traffic	
Management Command*	Washington, DC
Military Sealift Command*	Washington, DC
Military Airlift Command*	Scott AFB, IL
*Briefing held in Washington, DC	
J. Forces Command	Fort McPherson, GA
First Continental U.S. Army	Fort Meade, MD
K. Tactical Air Command	Langley AFB, VA
L. Strategic Air Command	Offutt AFB, NE
Joint Strategic Target	
Planning Staff	Offutt AFB, NE
M. North Atlantic Treaty Organization	
U.S. Delegation and U.S. Mission	Brussels, Belgium
N. North American Aerospace	
Defense Command	Peterson AFB, CO



## STUDY TEAM MEMBERS

Vander Schaaf, Derek J., Chairman

Bowers, John V., Col, USAF

Carpenter, Lorraine F.

Davey, John R.

Freeman, William H., Jr.

Geyer, Harlan M.

Haley, Curtis W., Col, USAF

Henry, Hal B.

House, David A.

Keeney, Donald R.

Kendall, Michael J.

Kent, Philip C.

Kirkland, Gregory G., LTCOL, USAF

Lieberman, Richard D.

Nemetz, Robert A.

Parmentier, Michael

Sanders, Charles E.

Scanland, Roger L.

Scheflen, Kenneth C.

Trahan, Leonard Jr.

Weintrob, Lawrence H.

Young, Shelton R.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

FY 1988 AUTHORIZED END STRENGTH OF HEADQUARTERS OF  
UNIFIED, SPECIFIED AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENT COMMANDS  
APPEARING ON EXHIBIT PB-22, FY 1988/9 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET  
SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS JANUARY 1987

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN

END STRENGTH

FY 1988

ARMY PB-22

Forces Command	1,560
Military Traffic Management Command	325
CONUS Armies (1st through 6th)	2,185
USAREUR	1,196
Eighth Army	597
U.S. Army Japan	297
WESTCOM	368
All Unified Commands (excluding REDCOM)	1,094
International Military Headquarters	1,500
Panama	120
Unified Transportation Command	<u>74</u>
TOTAL	9,316

NAVY PB-22

Military Sealift Command	558
Space Command	97
Central Command	34
CINCPAC Fleet	671
Data Processing Service, Pacific	33

COMSUBPAC	333
COMNAVLOGPAC	149
COMNAVAIRPAC	435
COMNAVSURFPAC	375
COMTRAPAC	59
CINCUSNAVEUR	295
Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific	368
Fleet Marine Forces, Europe	28
Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic	399
Fleet Operational Control, Cental, Europe	98
CINCLANTFLT	456
COMSUBLANT	407
COMNAVAIRLANT	435
LANTCOM OPP Support Facility	213
COMSURFLANT	443
COMTRALANT	46
International Military Headquarters	1,022
Unified and Specified Commands	<u>1,592</u>
TOTAL	8,546

#### AIR FORCE PB-22

International Military Organizations	400
Unified Commands (less Readiness Command)	1,321
Specified Commands	5,416
Combatant Commands	<u>6,477</u>
TOTAL	13,614

RECAP - PB-22 JUSTIFICATIONS

Joint Chiefs of Staff	1,656
Army	9,316
Navy	8,546
Air Force	<u>13,614</u>
	33,132

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

PERSONNEL IN HEADQUARTERS  
UNIFIED, SPECIFIED AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENT COMMANDS  
(FY 1988 Authorized Strength)

Page 1

COMMAND ELEMENTS	OFFICERS	ENLISTED	CIVILIANS	TOTAL
<b>A. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF</b>				
Headquarters, Joint Staff	902	393	332	1,627
Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff	174	59	20	253
Joint Warfare Center	17	3	20	40
Joint Doctrine Center	14	3	2	19
Worldwide Military Command and Control System - Management Office	38	4	24	66
SUBTOTAL FOR A. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF				2,005
<b>B. U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND</b>				
Headquarters, U.S. Atlantic Command	184	132	72	388
Airborne Command Post	32	18	1	51
Cruise Missile Support Activity	4	16	23	43
Special Operations Command, Atlantic	8	6	1	15
Defense Analysis Center	32	76	12	120
Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Azores	13	10	6	29
Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Caribbean	52	46	1	99
Caribbean Joint Intelligence Center	8	12	1	21
Joint Airborne Reconnaissance Control Center	7	48	0	55
Headquarters, Iceland Defense Forces	22	26	8	56
Headquarters, U.S. Army, Atlantic (See Forces Command)				
Headquarters, U.S. Atlantic Fleet	148	169	139	456
Headquarters, Submarine Forces, Atlantic				366
Headquarters, Surface Forces, Atlantic				384
Headquarters, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic				384
Headquarters, Construction Battalion, Atlantic	20	19	18	57
Training Command, Atlantic				41
Operations Support Facility				189
Fleet Intelligence Center, Europe/Atlantic				346
Fleet Ocean Surveillance Intelligence Center Detachment				35
Headquarters, Commander Naval Activities, Caribbean	14	42	16	72
Headquarters, Commander, South Atlantic	14	13	0	27
Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic				
				346
Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces, Atlantic (see Tactical Air Command)				
SUBTOTAL FOR B. U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND				3,580

COMMAND ELEMENTS	OFFICERS	ENLISTED	CIVILIANS	TOTAL
<b>C. U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND</b>				
Headquarters, U.S. Central Command	360	306	28	694
Central Command Special Activities	11	5	4	20
Central Command Intelligence Activity	51	51	0	102
Central Computer Support Systems Element	17	53	0	70
Special Operations Command, Central	19	10	0	29
Headquarters, U.S. Army, Central (Third U.S. Army)	159	120	56	335
Headquarters, U.S. Navy, Central	22	10	5	37
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Central (Headquarters, 9th Air Force including Combat Operations Staff)	194	167	31	392
<b>SUBTOTAL FOR C. U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND</b>				<b>1,679</b>
<b>D. U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION</b>				
Headquarters, U.S. European Command	373	144	147	664
European Command Special Activities	59	51	29	139
Data Services Center	36	93	19	148
Joint Intelligence Center	26	81	6	113
Live Oak (Berlin)	8	13	1	22
Silk Purse (Airborne Command Post)	33	28	1	62
Special Operations Command, Europe	17	10	2	29
North Atlantic Treaty Organization School	15	19	2	36
European Command Contact Office, Turkey	8	1	8	17
Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Spain	10	2	14	26
Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR)	358	124	613	1,095
USAREUR Field Operating Activities (including Intelligence Center)	132	223	539	894
Headquarters, V Corps	144	350	480	974
Headquarters, VII Corps	163	423	568	1,154
Headquarters, 7th Army Training Command	93	115	169	377
Headquarters, 21st Support Command	165	262	550	977
Headquarters, 200th Theater Army Materiel Management Center	66	127	622	815
Headquarters, 1st Personnel Command	44	227	192	463
Headquarters, 7th Medical Command	93	104	136	333
Headquarters, U.S. Navy, Europe	114	86	47	247
Fleet Operational Control Center, Europe	10	74	0	84
Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center, Europe	21	26	0	47
Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Europe	13	15	0	28
Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE)	418	319	212	949
USAFE Combat Operations Staff (EUROPS)	213	194	43	450
USAFE Personnel Center	27	80	43	150



PERSONNEL IN HEADQUARTERS  
UNIFIED, SPECIFIED AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENT COMMANDS  
(FY 1988 Authorized Strength)

Page 3

COMMAND ELEMENTS	OFFICERS	ENLISTED	CIVILIANS	TOTAL
<b>D. U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION</b>				
USAFE Inspection and Safety Center	61	61	13	135
Civil Engineer Region Europe	21	22	49	92
7455th Tactical Intelligence Wing	207	539	66	812
7000th Munitions Squadron	11	43	2	56
7000th Special Activities Squadron	18	11	8	37
7200th Management Engineering Squadron	24	118	52	194
Headquarters, 3rd Air Force and Combat Operations Staff	42	41	17	100
Headquarters, 16th Air Force and Combat Operations Staff	45	30	19	91
Headquarters, 17th Air Force and Combat Operations Staff	93	54	25	172
<b>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</b>				
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic	87	162	0	249
Western Atlantic (WESTLANT)	8	5	0	13
Iberian Atlantic (IBERLANT)	11	10	0	21
Ocean Atlantic (OCEANLANT)				4
Regional Operating Center, Atlantic (ROCLANT)	8	153	0	161
U.S. Mission to NATO (OSD)	16	5	28	49
U.S. Delegation to NATO Military Committee (OJCS)	20	15	11	46
Military Agency for Standardization	7	0	3	10
Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee	3	2	1	6
International Staff	0	0	17	17
International Military Staff	33	21	0	54
NATO Communications and Information Systems Agency	17	5	1	23
NATO Early Warning and Control Programs Management Agency	13	1	0	14
NATO Airborne Early Warning	163	320	0	483
NATO SHAPE Support Group (Brussels)	3	37	79	119
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE)	170	186	0	356
SHAPE Regional Signal Group	11	204	0	215
SHAPE Communication Security	3	25	0	28
SHAPE Integrated System Support Center	4	4	0	8
SHAPE International Headquarters and Support Command	26	85	0	111
SHAPE NATO Integrated Comm. Systems Central Operating Authority	5	12	0	17
SHAPE ADP Support Group	10	18	0	28
SHAPE Counterintelligence Activity	10	16	0	26
NATO Programming Center, Glons	9	14	0	23
U.S. National Military Representative, SHAPE	3	19	2	21
Mobile Land Force	4	3	0	7
Headquarters, Allied Forces North	48	107	0	155
Headquarters, Allied Forces Central	83	522	0	605
Headquarters, Allied Forces South	138	605	0	743

COMMAND ELEMENTS	OFFICERS	ENLISTED	CIVILIANS	TOTAL
D. U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION				
Headquarters, Channel Command	14	5	0	19
SUBTOTAL FOR D. U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION				15,649
E. U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.N. COMMAND, KOREA				
Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command	340	234	115	689
Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC)	124	197	87	408
Joint Casualty Resolution Center	6	13	7	26
Airborne Command Post	34	14	1	49
Cruise Missile Support Activity	9	17	25	51
Pacific Command Special Activities	9	1	7	17
Headquarters Support Activity	7	44	10	61
Information Systems Support Group	16	49	26	91
Special Operations Command, Pacific	17	5	1	23
Headquarters, U.S. Army Western Command	132	90	305	527
U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii	73	592	2,381	3,046
Theater Intelligence Center (U.S. Army Intelligence & Security Cmd)	7	16	26	49
U.S. Army Readiness Group Headquarters	20	28	5	53
IX Corps (Reinforcement)	6	6	93	105
Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Fleet	190	279	100	569
Headquarters, Naval Air Forces, Pacific	114	113	167	394
Headquarters, Naval Submarine Forces, Pacific	98	147	53	298
Headquarters, Naval Surface Forces, Pacific	101	160	103	364
Training Command, Pacific	25	32	11	68
Logistics Command, Pacific	46	43	27	116
Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific	86	321	47	454
Data Processing Service Center, Pacific	19	95	28	142
Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific				285
Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces (including Combat Operations Staff)	451	414	263	1,128
Headquarters, 13th Air Force (including Combat Operations Staff)	56	52	17	125
Headquarters, 313th Air Division	25	84	59	168
Headquarters, 326th Air Division, Pacific Islands Defense Region	21	30	4	55
548th Reconnaissance Technical Group	40	264	6	310
6004th Management Engineering Squadron	10	53	25	88
6007th School Squadron	1	19	1	21
6008th Tactical Air Control Flight	28	14	12	54
Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan	75	45	56	176
Headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan/IX Corps	69	67	196	332
Headquarters, U.S. Navy, Japan	29	46	18	93

PERSONNEL IN HEADQUARTERS  
UNIFIED, SPECIFIED AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENT COMMANDS  
(FY 1988 Authorized Strength)

Page 5

COMMAND ELEMENTS	OFFICERS	ENLISTED	CIVILIANS	TOTAL
<b>E. U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.N. COMMAND, KOREA</b>				
Headquarters, 5th Air Force (including Combat Operations Staff)	101	100	34	235
Headquarters, United Nations Command and Republic of Korea/U.S. Combined Forces Command	146	91	38	275
Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Korea	112	109	64	285
Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army, Korea	127	156	294	577
Headquarters, U.S. Naval Forces, Korea	23	59	0	82
Headquarters, 7th Air Force (including Combat Operations Staff)	88	79	18	185
SUBTOTAL FOR E. U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.N. COMMAND, KOREA				12,074
<b>F. U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND</b>				
Headquarters, U.S. Southern Command	197	127	56	380
Special Operations Command South	6	6	0	12
Joint Task Force BRAVO	6	0	0	6
Intelligence and Analysis Center	26	17	4	47
Southern Command Special Activities	3	2	0	5
U.S. Army, South	88	70	56	214
U.S. Navy, South	42	27	0	69
U.S. Air Force, South (12th Air Force Headquarters)	94	76	21	191
12th Air Force Combat Operations Staff	53	28	7	88
SUBTOTAL FOR F. U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND				1,012
<b>G. U.S. SPACE COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND</b>				
Headquarters, U.S. Space Command	183	57	51	291
Combat Operations Staff, U.S. Space Command	194	132	16	342
Army Space Agency	35	3	4	42
Navy Space Command	44	13	46	103
Headquarters, Air Force Space Command	323	158	228	709
Space Combat Operations Staff (U.S. Air Force)	301	348	255	904
1st Space Wing	47	46	13	106
2nd Space Wing	66	50	25	141
3rd Space Wing	32	121	80	233
Headquarters, North American Aerospace Defense Command	85	27	21	136
Combat Operations Staff, North American Aerospace Defense Command	105	84	11	200
Regions, North American Aerospace Defense Command	17	7	0	24
Headquarters, 1st Air Force (Tactical Air Command)	41	39	13	93

Attachment 6

COMMAND ELEMENTS	OFFICERS	ENLISTED	CIVILIANS	TOTAL
-----				
G. U.S. SPACE COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND				
1st Air Force Air Defense Combat Operations Staff	50	76	7	133
	-----	-----	-----	-----
SUBTOTAL FOR G. U.S. SPACE COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND				3,457
H. U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND				
Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations Command	118	47	76	241
Command Support Element	6	65	30	101
U.S. Army Special Operations Command	129	192	150	471
U.S. Navy Special Operations Command	13	12	2	27
U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command (Headquarters, 23rd Air Force)	101	108	20	229
23rd Air Force Combat Operations Staff	41	34	11	86
	-----	-----	-----	-----
SUBTOTAL FOR H. U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND				1,155
I. U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND				
Headquarters, U.S. Transportation Command (FY1989)	175	121	92	388
Headquarters, Military Traffic Management Command	86	15	503	604
Eastern Area	45	18	515	608
Western Area	29	55	410	494
Transportation Engineering Agency	8	0	97	105
Transportation Terminal Command, Europe	17	25	22	64
Headquarters, Military Sealift Command	41	39	428	508
Sealift Command, Europe	7	13	37	57
Sealift Command, Atlantic	17	29	458	504
Sealift Command, Pacific	16	23	401	443
Sealift Command, Far East	11	17	93	121
Headquarters, Military Airlift Command	612	505	570	1,687
Military Airlift Command Combat Operations Staff	276	354	195	825
Headquarters, 21st Air Force	70	56	36	162
21st Air Force Combat Operations Staff	41	78	5	124
Headquarters, 22nd Air Force	62	62	50	174
22nd Air Force Combat Operations Staff	36	71	4	111
Headquarters, Air Weather Service	153	63	42	258
Headquarters, Aerospace Audio Visual Service	15	18	47	80
	-----	-----	-----	-----
SUBTOTAL FOR I. U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND				7,317
J. FORCES COMMAND				
Headquarters, Forces Command	395	136	1,078	1,609

PERSONNEL IN HEADQUARTERS  
UNIFIED, SPECIFIED AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENT COMMANDS  
(FY 1988 Authorized Strength)


Page 7

COMMAND ELEMENTS	OFFICERS	ENLISTED	CIVILIANS	TOTAL
<b>J. FORCES COMMAND</b>				
Resource Management Operating Agency	0	1	204	205
Worldwide Military Command Control System	8	70	40	118
Headquarters, First Army	101	55	261	417
Headquarters, Second Army	98	57	217	372
Headquarters, Third Army (see U.S. Army, Central under CENTRAL COMMAND)				
Headquarters, Fourth Army	106	42	232	380
Headquarters, Fifth Army	99	41	216	356
Headquarters, Sixth Army	106	54	212	372
SUBTOTAL FOR J. FORCES COMMAND				3,829
<b>K. TACTICAL AIR COMMAND</b>				
Headquarters, Tactical Air Command	766	598	399	1,763
Tactical Air Combat Operations Staff	134	147	64	345
SUBTOTAL FOR K. TACTICAL AIR COMMAND				2,108
<b>L. STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND</b>				
Headquarters, Strategic Air Command	1,035	897	508	2,440
Strategic Air Combat Operations Staff	337	217	38	592
544th Strategic Intelligence Wing	235	941	52	1,228
3904th Management Engineering	29	196	90	315
3905th Field Printing Plant		26	9	35
Headquarters, 8th Air Force	144	141	49	334
8th Air Force Combat Operations Staff	32	40	2	74
Headquarters, 15th Air Force	133	139	46	318
15th Air Force Combat Operations Staff	41	42	3	86
SAC Air Divisions (CONUS, Guam and Europe)				223
SUBTOTAL FOR L. STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND				5,645
GRAND TOTAL				59,510

ATTACHMENT 6  
Page 7 of 7

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

# COMMANDERS' AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (U)



**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**



## THE JOINT STAFF

### Stated Mission

The Joint Staff is under the exclusive direction of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is headquartered at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. The Joint Staff performs such duties as the Chairman prescribes and under such procedures as the Chairman prescribes. The Joint Staff is subject to the authority, direction and control of the Chairman. As discussed later, although the Joint Staff was recently reorganized in response to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, there is no current statement of missions and functions.

### Background

Formal, post-World War II establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) involved several deliberate restrictions. These were that the JCS would serve only as advisors and not as commanders, and that the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) would be limited in both the number of personnel assigned and the length of their tenure. This clearly reflected a strong desire not to establish an all-powerful general staff akin to the German General Staff. The continued existence of separate Services within the Department of Defense (DoD), and the fact that each of the Joint Chiefs also served as professional head of his respective Service, created a structure that only served to ensure that Service disagreements (usually referred to as "inter-Service rivalry") would continue to be heard and resolved by political authorities, instead of some supreme military body.

The need for reform of the JCS structure has been a topic of political discussion and academic comment since the establishment of the British/American Combined Chiefs of Staff during World War II. The primary criticisms were:

- The JCS could not function as a decision-making body, absent unanimous consent of the Services--hence, JCS consensus reflected the lowest level of committee agreement.
- The organization fostered inter-Service rivalry, ensuring that Service interests, vice national interests, were paramount.

- It was extremely difficult for any coherent national strategy to come from the JCS, because of both the inter-Service rivalry and the lack of a single uniformed authority with the power to impose necessary decisions on the Services.

- Advice for the JCS, prepared by the staff of the OJCS, took too long to prepare and was not concise.

- The existence of too many staffs (i.e., the OJCS and the Service headquarters staffs) led to micro-management and unnecessary delays in the staffing actions.

- Neither the JCS nor the Unified Commands had the authority to challenge the Services, who pushed for their own agendas--i.e., modernization generally took precedence over readiness.

- Negotiated agreements between the Services (inter-Service "log rolling") below the civilian policy-making level resulted in poor advice and diminished civilian control.

- There was insufficient power and influence from the Secretary of Defense, who was too dependent on the advice and counsel of the Service Chiefs, who in turn were pre-negotiating decisions on key issues.

During the past 38 years, in an attempt to correct the deficiencies, about 20 major reorganization studies have been chartered. Despite the known problems, however, except for President Eisenhower's 1958 amendments and the recently passed Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization of 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), few major changes have been made. During this review, special emphasis was placed on how well the Joint Staff had accommodated the mandates of the Act.

In the past, the OJCS "served" the JCS. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Chairman) had little responsibility or authority and had almost no personal staff. Further, the infamous OJCS coordination process was cumbersome and ineffective, resulting in watered-down positions that the Services unanimously could agree to, but only after long periods of debate. The OJCS claimed, and perhaps actually believed, that it was serving the needs of the Unified Commanders. However, the OJCS did not speak officially for the Unified Commanders and, in

fact, generally backed Service positions over those of the Unified Commanders-in-Chief. In essence, the OJCS acted to protect the prerogatives of the Services and not those of the Chairman or the Unified Commanders.

The Congress passed the Act with the intention to "... provide for more efficient use of defense resources...and otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense." (10 U.S.C. 111)

The Act makes the Joint Staff exclusively responsible to provide advice and counsel to the Chairman, rather than to the Joint Chiefs. In addition, the Unified and Specified Commanders and the Chairman were given an increased role in the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) process. The Unified Commanders can now independently review Service Program Objective Memoranda (POMs), and can nominate issues and provide their comments directly (in person) to the Defense Resources Board (DRB). That is, they can advise the DRB on how well the Services are satisfying their needs. Further, they can put their own representatives on issue drafting teams.

The Chairman and the Unified Commanders-in-Chief now have the authority to organize their staffs as they deem appropriate to best accomplish their missions. In fact, during 1987, the new Joint Staff reorganized itself with the intent of accommodating these recent changes.

### Organization and Manpower

The Joint Staff is comprised of the Offices of the Chairman and the Director; the Secretariate; the Directorate For Information and Resource Management; and eight functional directorates: Manpower and Personnel (J-1), Intelligence (J-2), Operations (J-3), Logistics (J-4), Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), Command, Control, and Communications (J-6), Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), and Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment (J-8). There are also seven specialized Field Operating Activities (FOAs); however, only three are pertinent to this study and are included in the table below. A fourth, the Joint Strategic Planning Staff, is discussed separately in the next section of this Appendix.

<u>Joint Staff</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Chairman's Office	32	31	20	83
Director's Office	8	6	8	22
Secretariat	7	4	54	65
Directorate for Information and Resources	28	143	24	195
J-1, Manpower and Personnel Directorate	27	11	20	58
J-2, Intelligence		Not Applicable		
J-3, Operations Directorate	290	142	33	465
J-4, Logistics Directorate	70	7	23	100
J-5, Strategic Plans and Programs Directorate	146	17	49	212
J-6, Command, Control and Communications Directorate	108	15	41	164
J-7, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate	83	11	27	121
J-8, Force Structures, Resource, and Assessment Directorate	<u>103</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>142</u>
Subtotal	<u>902</u>	<u>393</u>	<u>332</u>	<u>1,627</u> <sup>1/</sup>

<sup>1/</sup> The Act authorized up to 1,627 military and civilian positions. The Joint Staff manning is frequently adjusted between officer, enlisted and civilian positions to accommodate needs. The Directorate for JCS support (normally J-2) is a Defense Intelligence Agency organization, and is not carried on the Joint Staff books.

<u>Joint Staff Field Operating Activities</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Joint Warfare Center	17	3	20	40
Joint Doctrine Center	14	3	2	19
Worldwide Military Commands and Control System Management	<u>38</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>66</u>
Sub-total	<u>69</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>125</u>
Total	<u>971</u>	<u>403</u>	<u>378</u>	<u>1,752</u>

#### Management Support Contracts

The Study Team did not have sufficient time to review support contracts managed by the Joint Staff.

#### Observations

A reorganization of the Joint Staff was effected throughout 1987 to implement the requirements of the Act. The new Joint Staff organization has not completely adjusted to that reorganization. Not unexpectedly, the Study Team was able to observe that problem situations continue to exist within the organization, as they do in all organizations of this size.

There appears to be general agreement that the Joint Staff coordination process has been improved because, among other things, an action no longer requires unanimous Service agreement before issue packages can be presented to the Chairman and the JCS for a decision. The process has improved on paper. The actual Joint Staff staffing/coordination structure is, however, still basically the same as the old system that was in place prior to the Act--a system designed to serve the corporate JCS, not the Chairman.

A key author of the Act, in a recent discussion with Study Team members, made a strong point that (1) the Joint Staff needs to change philosophically, (2) that the decision process inside the Joint Staff must be speeded up, (3) that the Service headquarters are still too powerful in comparison, and (4) the

Unified Commanders need to be more involved in programming and budgeting. There was a clear signal that the framers of the Act are not satisfied with the progress to date.

The recent draft report, "Manpower Survey of the Joint Staff," provided an assessment of the manpower needs of the reorganized Joint Staff. Perhaps more importantly, a recent draft report by a flag officer, experienced in Joint Staff matters, pointed out inefficiencies in the basic organizational structure and management processes that were reconfirmed by this review. The authors of the draft report pointed out that:

- the old coordination process "lives on;"
- the Joint Staff administrative process is "still geared primarily toward handling JCS (not Chairman) actions;"
- there appears to be duplication of analytical functions in several areas; and
- the rank structure is too top heavy.

The Study Team found that, at the lower Joint Staff levels, there is no consensus or clear understanding of how the Act should or ought to be implemented. Furthermore, there has not been enough time and thought given to communicating upper management intentions and expectations to the operating staff. There is a lot of misunderstanding and confusion about what roles and relationships are expected between the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Unified Commands, the Service headquarters, and the supporting and component commands. As a result, a significant portion of the Joint Staff is not sure where and how it is supposed to integrate into the new system. Because of this void, the tendency is to revert back to the procedures the staff knows best--"the old way."

Senior management, both inside and outside the Joint Staff, has expressed concern that insufficient attention appears to have been given to the impact any changes in the Joint Staff charter would exert on the mission statements, manpower requirements, and working relationships with headquarters management structures throughout the DoD.

Regardless of these factors, the Joint Staff has essentially been allowed to reorganize itself. Furthermore, a senior staff member stated that this was the way Congress wanted it done. The officer clearly and emphatically made the point to the Study Team that the Joint Staff and only the Joint Staff would decide how to reorganize itself.

The changes initiated thus far by the Joint Staff appear to be in good faith and in the right direction. Unfortunately, the changes only have amounted to incremental adjustments to previously existing policy, procedures, and documents and have not been sufficient to reverse the ways that personnel in the Defense establishment view the Joint Staff. Furthermore, some changes that were made appear to have added management layers, dispersed and fragmented responsibilities, and complicated and confounded relationships, and made command span-of-control more, and not less, cumbersome.

It appears that the Joint Staff initiated the reorganization before fully understanding its new role and mission and before objectives, internal and external relationships, management processes and responsibilities had been carefully considered in light of the Goldwater/Nichols Act. Neither a new Joint Staff charter nor a mission statement has been prepared.

The question also must be raised as to whether the Joint Staff can be an objective judge of its own strengths, flaws, and needs. In any case, at the current rate of change, it will literally take years to bring the Joint Staff into line with congressional direction and intent--a pace that may not prove to be acceptable.

- Joint Staff Organization. Far too many offices within the Joint Staff are still competing for internal and external "turf" as a result of the reorganization. The result is that there are many unnecessary and overlapping tasks.

Virtually every office visited has a role in preparing a specific part of virtually every contingency plan, strategic plan, or force assessment, yet the office of primary responsibility appeared not to exert enough control to ensure that all parts of the documents were internally compatible. For example, the latest reorganization of the Joint Staff split responsibilities for the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) documents between two Directorates--J-5 (Strategic Plans), and J-8 (Force Structure)--yet J-3 (Operations) and J-7 (Operational Plans and Interoperability) also remain major players in JSPS development. There is clearly overlapping and duplication. The acquisition function is also split between J-7 and J-8, with involvement by J-4 and J-6. These divisions of labor are not completely clear and chances for redundancy are great.

Now that the Joint Staff works exclusively for the Chairman, there is no cogent reason to need another staff agency within the Chairman's own office to provide him advice and counsel that is separate from, and frequently in conflict with, the advice and counsel of the Joint Staff. Providing guidance to the Chairman, other than directly from the Vice-Chairman or the Director, is dysfunctional and creates confusion, especially in those situations where the actions of the Chairman's Assistant conflict with those of the Director. The fact that the Joint Staff members interviewed still consider this group as the most effective means of accessing the Chairman is, in itself, an indictment of the Joint Staff staffing process. The Joint Staff has not yet divorced itself from the old way of doing things. Instead, it has tried to attach its new role and responsibilities to the old OJCS structure. Unfortunately, the Joint Staff is still focused, to a great extent, on the Service Chiefs, not the Chairman.

Until a clear break is made with the old OJCS structure and procedures and a totally new charter is developed for the Joint Staff, the well-established distrust between the Joint Staff and the other DoD headquarters management organizations will likely remain. The various DoD organizations also must be comfortable with the new charter before they are able or willing to modify their own structures to interface effectively with the Joint Staff.

- Internal Procedures. The Joint Staff coordination process was and still is strictly governed by several Memoranda of Policy (MOP), such as MOP 132, "Coordination and Approval Procedures for Joint Actions." There has been at least one significant change, however. An action no longer requires unanimous Service agreement before an issue can be presented to the Chairman or the JCS for a decision. While this is clearly an improvement over the previous system requirement for unanimous Service agreement, the Study Team questions why so many Joint Staff actions still have to go to the Chairman for a decision at all. As such, the system remains cumbersome and slow.

The old terminology and philosophy still persists--to "gain consensus" among the Services and among the Service Chiefs (exclusive of the Chairman). It appears that far too many decisions are still being presented to the Chairman and the Service Chiefs in the traditional way--i.e., to gain unanimous agreement among equals, even though the roles of the Chairman and the Joint Staff have changed dramatically because of the Act.



The Study Team concurs with the findings of the draft report, "Manpower Survey of the Joint Staff." The Joint Staff administrative chain is still geared primarily toward handling corporate JCS actions and is "overly layered, tedious, time consuming and laborious." The Study Team also agrees that the "flimsy/buff/green/red stripe" route for JCS papers essentially remains in effect--the papers are simply now referred to as "predraft/draft/final/red stripe." While the "predraft" does not require Service coordination, most Joint Staff action officers interviewed advised the Study Team that Service coordination was nonetheless obtained as a "matter of protocol." The MOP 132/133/158 formal coordination processes (plus at least two informal processes), while somewhat revised, are still cumbersome and involve a give-and-take that dilutes the quality of the decisions and confuses the participants at all levels.

Coordination and approval procedures found in MOP 132, even though recently revised to make the process less awkward, still places strong emphasis on a tedious, all-encompassing, lock-step approval process whenever there are divergent views. There are, of course, always divergent views, so the staff officer and his/her superiors understandably lean toward using the most complicated option, to include the Chairman and Service Chiefs approvals. The MOP 132 also uses such unenlightening terms as "silent assent," "agenda addressal," and "top-down guidance" (the latter representing an extremely bureaucratic process for asking the Chairman what he thinks). Clearly, MOP 132 generates a poorly constructed, tedious, "stubby pencil" process that was built on distrust among Joint Staff agencies and the parochial interests of the Services. It was designed to obstruct rather than facilitate communication. There also continues to be a misplaced fear of the Chairman and the front office. All such idiosyncrasies must vanish if the Joint Staff is to function as intended under the Act.

In addition to numerous levels of review, the Study Team was told that each review level required a "clean final copy." Therefore, at each level of review, the document under coordination is normally returned to the action officer with comments and corrections. The action officer then sees to it that a new "clean final copy" goes on to the next higher level of review--thus diluting the advice by hiding the differing opinions. The situation needs to be corrected to reduce the number of offices, decision layers (frequently a function of too many senior officers) and individuals that are involved in the coordination of any specific issue. In addition, any changes in a document should be retained with the document so the Chairman and others will know what positions were taken and what was

changed, added or deleted at each level of review. This would also assist the Chairman in recognizing those Joint Staff offices that are best reflecting his overall guidance and where he needs to provide additional guidance.

A single staffing procedure, similar to that used by the Military Departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), must be adopted. This process is simple, flexible and eminently fair. It is generally much more timely and responsive, and automatically includes those offices of coordinating responsibility (OCR) that need to be involved at an appropriate level of involvement. It also excludes those offices that should not be involved.

It is easier to obtain senior management coordination or approval when management has a concise summary of the issues and options. Frequently one staff officer can move the coordination through several levels of the hierarchy simultaneously--even to the extent of obtaining flag officer approval, if there is a mood of mutual trust, and the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) has done its homework.

Old terminology should also be scrapped and be replaced in order to avoid any appearance or inference that vestiges of the old system remain. For example, the JCS Pub 2, "Unified Action Armed Forces" should state precisely how the Joint Staff will provide advice and counsel to the Chairman and Vice Chairman. (It currently does not.) The name of the document should also be changed (e.g., "JSR 2" or "Joint Staff Reg 2"). The title might be changed to "Joint Activities and Performance of the Armed Forces of the United States."

The MOP guidance for coordination and staffing procedures must be replaced with one, vice the current three (or more), lock-step procedures, and given a new image and name.

- Joint Staff Relationships with Others. In trying to bring the Joint Staff into compliance with the Act, there does not appear to have been a concerted effort to measure the impacts on relationships with headquarters management structures throughout the DoD. The failure to clarify the desired division of work in the past has lead to situations where the OSD and the Services are both performing roles and functions assigned to the Joint Staff, and vice versa. This is a direct result of the Joint Staff ability to "insulate" itself from the rest of the Defense establishment.

This situation came about because, prior to the Act, the JCS/Service/Joint Staff system was essentially a "closed" system, with virtually all contact between the Services and the Joint Staff being handled through organizations that essentially existed to handle Joint Actions (e.g., Navy OP-06 and Air Force XO). Although the Services themselves interface across the board with the OSD, they restricted most contact with the Joint Staff to their planning organizations.

The main obstacle to non-Joint Staff offices that want access to Joint Staff information is MOP 39, "Release of JCS Papers and Information." The MOP 39 specifically states that it "is not a denial document." Nonetheless, for years it has been used to avoid releasing Joint Staff controlled information to anyone "not responsive" to the Joint Staff. As such, it is a policy that survives from a time when the Joint Staff served the Services rather than the Chairman.

There are no official estimates of the actual amounts of time and effort consumed by MOP 39 denials of information requests. Nonetheless, the amount of time wasted and ill will produced by MOP 39 is enormous. Inspector General records indicate that as far back as August 1968, MOP 39 had been used to deny access to its auditors. Even under the auspices of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (PL 95-452), this situation has continued, often resulting in extensive delays. More recently, in connection with an audit of engineer support in the Republic of Korea, MOP 39 was used to deny access to engineering data for six months. Other organizations throughout the OSD cited similar examples of delays and denials directly related to MOP 39. It is interesting to note that contractors working for the Joint Staff often have access to information that is denied to the OSD staff. Clearly, the various OSD offices cannot provide timely and quality information to the Secretary of Defense if they are denied access to information being used to advise the Chairman. Conversely, the Chairman cannot do his job properly if the Joint Staff refuses to communicate with its counterparts in the OSD.

The MOP 39 authorizes only two individuals in the OSD to have access to Joint Staff documents, the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In fact, for the OSD staff to gain access to documents denied by MOP 39, either the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense must personally request the information in writing. Indeed, these procedures are in direct contradiction to DoD Directive 5158.1, which mandates that "all elements of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall cooperate fully and effectively with appropriate offices of the Office of the Secretary of Defense."

With the establishment of the new J-7 and J-8 Directorates, and the role of the Chairman as representative of, and spokesman for, the Unified and Specified Commanders in validating and prioritizing their requirements and supporting them in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process, the need to work with the Services and the OSD in other ways is even more essential. Nevertheless, the procedures that outsiders (i.e., outside the Joint Staff) must go through to obtain Joint Staff documents and other information for legitimate reasons still borders on the absurd. The rules for giving access to Joint Staff documents and guidance are deliberately obstructive and need to be simplified in order to facilitate and improve communications and cooperation.

In addition, the physical access to the Joint Staff is unnecessarily complex. There does not appear to be a positive relationship between the level of security provided and the sensitivity of the information that is secured. Some of the most sensitive agencies are outside the current security perimeter, while many routine, nonsensitive agencies are inside. Communication is frustrated when a Service or OSD counterpart action officer must wait for an escort to a Joint Staff area, whose sensitivity parallels that of the visitor's own work area.

Easier and more effective ways to work with functional counterparts throughout the Defense establishment must be developed. A more "open" system of interface between the Joint Staff, the OSD, the Services headquarters, the Unified Commanders, and the supporting and component commands must be developed.

- Contribution of the Joint Staff to the PPBS. The Joint Staff does not have a clear understanding of its role in the PPBS process, especially with regard to providing programming support to the Unified and Specified Commands. Joint Staff officers appear to be under the impression that they should provide PPBS assistance to the Unified and Specified Commands. In actuality, those staffs are working directly with the appropriate OSD offices (and only peripherally with the Joint Staff).

Importantly, several Joint Strategic Planning Process documents (i.e., the Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis (JSPDSA), the Joint Strategic Planning Documents (JSPD), the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM) and others) are being revised and rescheduled to support the PPBS process. Of particular interest is the Joint Staff decision to produce a fiscally constrained JSPD. This decision should result in the

JSPD becoming a basis for the Defense Guidance scenarios, and provide the Joint Staff the potential to generate a meaningful JPAM for use in reviewing Service Program Objective Memoranda (POM). To the extent that these documents influence the process, this will be an improvement. Nonetheless, there is no compelling argument that Joint Staff documents, such as the JPAM, should be viewed as truly "joint" products as opposed to being viewed as Service positions--in the case of the JPAM, it is a Service evaluation of their own POMs. This problem could be partially alleviated if MOP 39 did not prevent the OSD staff from obtaining the analysis that supports these documents.

The Joint Staff planning, programming, budgeting role is clearly less than the current management structure provides for, and a lot of time, manpower authorizations and funds are being wasted.

- Operational Plans and Execution Policy. In responding to the mandates of the Act, the Joint Staff created two new directorates: the J-7, to handle all operations plans, interoperability and integration, and the J-8, to handle force structure, resources and new assessments. Strategic plans and policy remain under J-5, logistics responsibilities are under J-4, and manpower and personnel plans and policy remain under a small J-1 Directorate (58 total authorizations). It really does not matter how many directorates or divisions or branches are created, so long as the span of control is not violated. (The Joint Staff apparently uses the "10-10-10" rule--no more than 10 subordinates at any level of supervision, so perhaps eight directorates is acceptable.) It also should be understood that all agencies plan (even J-3), so the comments in this section address the generic planning process and not just those specific directorates or branches that have the word "plan" in their name.

It is reasonable to expect that the recent reorganization of the Joint Staff should have been based on a careful study of the processes and relationships that would most effectively answer the mandates of the Act. In the case of operational plans and execution policy, however, this appears not to have been the case. Responsibilities must not be fragmented, lines of communication must be identified and facilitated, and there must always be an OPR. Further, and perhaps most important of all, there must be a positive working relationship between the OPR and the variety of other agencies that express interest in being an OCR.

It takes more thought and manpower to develop operational plans and execution policy than it does to maintain them. Most plans and policy that support national security have evolved and been in existence over a period of years. (For example, mobilization plans and policies have been receiving strong emphasis since 1978.) The record does not support Joint Staff policy that periodically these documents must be completely rewritten or totally revalidated (usually about a two-year cycle). In reality, these documents only require a careful adjustment to accommodate new needs and resources, plus lessons learned from exercises and real-world contingencies. Changes are made incrementally. Almost never do off-the-shelf plans or execution policy need to be totally rewritten. (New plans did need to be prepared for Southwest Asia and Central Command, but even those plans had a large number of established documents on which to draw.)

The OPR has a legitimate obligation to ensure the document effectively reflects current strategy and to initiate document changes as frequently as necessary to keep the document current and viable. That role involves ensuring that interested agencies (the OCRs) have ample opportunities to propose language and make any input they feel is appropriate for their needs. Once all interested parties have given their comments, the OPR correlates, negotiates and integrates the changes, summarizes their impact on a Staff Summary Sheet, or similar cover/transmittal sheet, and begins coordination. The nature of the change dictates the timing and extent of the coordination process--not the other way around. (See the sub-headings, "Internal Procedures" and "Relationships with Others," for a more detailed discussion of needed improvements in the coordination process.)

Modern word processing technology and page-in, page-out procedures, simplified, by-exception, coordination approval processes and, above all, trust in fellow officers, make even the most complicated plan and detailed policy document relatively easy to maintain.

Most importantly, the manpower saved in preparing and coordinating the plan or policy change is remarkable, while the quality of the product improves substantially. One officer can function as OPR for several related documents, and can also coordinate on and be involved in several others. For example, there are numerous directorates in the Joint Staff that are legitimately concerned with mobilization of the Armed Forces--or should be (e.g., the Personnel Plans and Policy Division (J-1); the National Military Command Center (J-3); the Logistics Planning Division (J-4); the Strategy and Policy Divisions (J-5),

at least two branches in J-6; virtually all of J-7; at least the Force Development, Force Program and Integration, Capabilities Assessments, and Program Budget Analysis Branches of J-8).

For mobility, the list of participants is similar, although different OCRs frequently surface in spite of the fact that mobilization and mobility are integral parts of the same basic transition-movement process. In fact, one must assume that virtually every division in the Joint Staff has at least one branch involved in these issues, some of which appear to be too involved in the minutiae of field operations and implementing procedures--e.g., Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) detail and the Joint Deployment System (JDS) detail. There are, of course, also the Services and the Unified Commanders. The greater the number of OCRs, the more important it is that the number of officer(s) who actually integrate the inputs remain small. One officer per plan to represent the OPR is enough; the OCRs should use the skills of one officer to make inputs to several related plans or policy proposals. In turn, the officer who is OPR should be the OCR for other related plans.

It also appears that, while operational planning responsibilities have been concentrated under the J-7 Directorate, vestiges of those efforts remain in the original directorate (e.g., J-3). The Study Team further observed that some planning shops in J-4 and J-7 were also involved in execution plans at a level of detail that is inappropriate for the Joint Staff.

The current Joint Staff structure appears to break down in three specific areas: (1) awkward, outdated coordination procedures, (2) unrealistic guidelines for developing and maintaining plans and policy, and (3) an imprecise understanding both within and without the Joint Staff as to exactly what is the new Joint Staff role in operational planning and policy development. Simply put, the current rules generate too much effort in proportion to the incremental changes (as important as they may be) that are frequently involved in maintaining documents. The process is still based on unanimous consensus building, a process wherein documents simply do not surface in final form without total agreement on even the most subtle change. The Act, on the other hand, gives the Joint Staff an opportunity, actually a mandate, to develop cost-effective, time-sensitive, efficient procedures.

Clearly, if efficient procedures are implemented, the number of required manpower positions can be reduced, while the quality and timeliness of products should increase. There are numerous historical examples to support the contention that the more people involved, the more complex both the document and the coordination process becomes. One or two people have managed major plans and policy documents, with the support of an efficient and timely coordination processes.

Comparable improvements in other DoD Agencies have achieved substantial manpower savings. At least 200 authorizations (up to 400 if it is done correctly) should become excess throughout the Joint Staff.

- Manpower and Joint Positions. Given its new charter and the assumption that the Service headquarters will continue to provide information and expertise, the Joint Staff is too large, too layered, and has too many senior officers. The Act does not require that the Joint Staff have 1,627 authorizations (this is a ceiling), nor is it reasonable to think that Congress did not expect these authorizations to be formally identified as officer, enlisted and civilian.

Far too many colonels are reporting to Navy captains, who are reporting to colonels. Such circumstances can only create difficulties and unnecessary competition, when cooperation should be the operative word. An excessive number of senior NCOs performing nonsupervisory or technical work are also in evidence. Ways need to be found to reduce the number of O-6 and senior NCOs billets.

On the surface, it also appears that there are numerous officer positions in the Joint Staff that are not "Joint." If the incumbent tasks do not have a "Joint" aspect, they should be considered for elimination from the Joint books. At the same time, there are numerous staff positions in the Service headquarters that require constant interface with the Joint Staff and joint issues, and should be considered for addition to the "Joint" books.

Manpower surveys currently conducted by the J-1 Directorate are based on the existing organizational charter of the Joint organization. Insufficient consideration is being given to looking at whether the work is also being done in another Joint command, supporting command, or component command agency. The J-1 needs to ensure that overlapping or layered activities do not exist, either internal or external to the agency being surveyed. To do this requires not only a zero based approach to manpower



surveys, but expanding the surveys to assess similar functions in other components. Manpower surveys should be increasingly dependent on the use of manpower and functional experts from throughout the DoD, not just from the Services.

## Recommendations

A-1. Establish an independent, external to the Joint Staff, project team to set new directions, develop a charter and recommend the context for a complete reorganization of the Joint Staff that will best serve the Chairman and bring the organization into compliance with the Act. The team should report to the Secretary of Defense and/or the Chairman and be comprised of individuals who are knowledgeable of DoD organizational structures and staffing relationships, plus the Act. Current active duty members of the officer corps, particularly those currently assigned to the Joint Staff or a Service headquarters, or who otherwise represent special interest biases, should be excluded. As a part of its charter, the special external project team should:

- Examine how resources and warfighting decisions should be made.

- Propose precise roles, missions, and functions of each headquarters management structure.

- Eliminate layering and redundancy, with strong emphasis placed on complementarity, cost-effectiveness, and timeliness.

- Consider alternative functional and organizational arrangements, and how information technology can best facilitate and favor new, efficient, and timely management and command decision processes. The review should not be constrained by tradition.

- Clarify the involvement of the Joint Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands and the supporting Services commands in the PPBS. Joint Staff documents that have supported the PPBS in the past (i.e., the JSPDSA, the JSPD, the JPAM and others that support the Joint Strategic Planning Process) need to be rejustified in light of the new roles of the CINCs and the Chairman.

- Decide what missions and tasks are best performed by each DoD component: the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, the supporting commands, the Services headquarters staffs, field operating activities, etc.

- Identify redundant and parochial organizations, including manpower authorizations, charters and contracts. Propose ways to consolidate responsibility (e.g., for the Joint Staff, reduce the number of directorates, management levels, and/or branch sizes).

- Propose options for the Service headquarters to modify, combine, and consolidate their organizations to complement the Joint Staff.

A-2. Once the Joint Staff has reorganized under its new charter, direct the Secretaries of the Military Departments to revise the organizational and management structures of their respective headquarters staff to ensure complementarity with the Joint Staff in functional relationships, responsibilities, size and process.

A-3. Immediately after the Special External Team has made its recommendations and a new charter has been proposed and approved, initiate a new manpower requirements survey of the Joint Staff, ensuring that manpower positions are eliminated and the grade structures lowered whenever responsibilities are reduced or eliminated.

A-4. Eliminate the functions in the Office of the Chairman. Eliminate one flag officer position (Assistant to the Chairman), plus his immediate staff of two (retain the flag writer position), the Chairman's Staff Group (9 positions), the Chairman's Administrative Office (8 positions), for a total of 20 billets eliminated. Transfer the remaining functions to the Director, Joint Staff, or retain them as special staff to the Chairman, as appropriate. (Eliminate a total of 20 billets.)

A-5. Transfer the control and scheduling of issues to be presented to the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the preparation of decision papers, and the training of action officers and briefers, to the Director, Joint Staff.

A-6. Modernize Joint Staff plans and policy management procedures, substantially reducing its planning and policy development staff, and concentrating its efforts on those

documents and responsibilities for which they have primary responsibility under the Act, thereby setting an example for the Unified Commanders and the Military Departments.

A-7. Eliminate at least 250 authorized billets from the Joint Staff, particularly targeting the various planning areas.

A-8. Change plans management procedures to emphasize a maintenance by exception policy and cease micro-management of plans and procedures that are primarily under the charter of another agency.

A-9. Abolish MOP 39 and direct the Joint Staff to follow DoD Directive 5158.1 in its release of documents to the OSD; establish similar procedures for releasing Joint Staff documents to the Services.

A-10. Abolish MOP 132 and, instead, adopt an efficient, effective simple, flexible coordination process. Incorporate the use of modern technology and institutionalize the process in a DoD directive. (It is suggested that the implementation philosophy of the Air Force Deputate for Personnel be considered as a point of departure.)

A-11. Establish DoD standards for joint support activities in war-gaming, joint doctrine, interoperability, etc., ensuring that inappropriate or redundant systems are eliminated or phased out. Direct that no new contracts for the establishment of automated war-gaming systems (for either assessments or training) be awarded and current contracts be placed on hold (where possible) until Joint Staff guidance can be provided to ensure compliance with common objectives and interoperability. (Such guidance is currently in preparation within the Joint Staff.)

A-12. Develop criteria for identifying which positions in the Joint Staff are not "joint" and which positions on the Service headquarters staffs are "joint."

A-13. Establish new manpower and organizational survey and evaluation criteria and procedures that account for the tasks each agency is to perform, using a zero base approach. At the same time ensure that the similar functional efforts of other agencies are accessed and accounted for, and that the opportunities for layering and overlapping of tasks and charters is eliminated.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## THE JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF

### Stated Mission

The Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) is located at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, and the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (SAC), serves as the director. The Vice Director and day-to-day Manager of JSTPS activities is always a Navy Vice Admiral. The JSTPS was created by the Secretary of Defense in August 1960. Its mission is to prepare and maintain, on a day-to-day basis, a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) of targets selected for attack in a nuclear war and a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) for the attack of these targets by committed and coordinated forces. As an additional related task, the staff prepares and maintains the Nuclear Weapons Reconnaissance List (NRL) with its associated Elint Tab and the Airborne SIOP Reconnaissance Plan, which consolidates the SIOP reconnaissance plans of appropriate Unified and Specified Commands and national agencies. The JSTPS is responsive to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

The staff is composed of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps officers, and enlisted personnel and civilians, who are assigned directly to the JSTPS. In addition, a number of personnel assigned to the Strategic Air Command (SAC) perform dual-duty with the JSTPS. To assure a unity of strategic effort, senior officer representatives from the Unified and Specified Commands (Atlantic, Europe, Pacific, and the SAC) and the Supreme Allied Commands (Atlantic and Europe) are located with the JSTPS and participate in its work, representing their respective Commanders-in-Chief. As a result of agreements reached at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Council meeting in Ottawa, Canada, in the spring of 1963, officers and personnel from other NATO nations joined the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) representative to the JSTPS.

By planning for all the strategic weapon systems that would be used by the United States in case of war, the JSTPS assures integrated operation of the strategic nuclear strike forces. These forces include all of the SAC bombers and missiles, all Navy submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and such nonstrategic nuclear forces as may be committed to the plan by the Unified Commanders. In addition, the NATO strategic nuclear forces are coordinated and deconflicted by the JSTPS.

## Organization and Manpower

The JSTPS is managed on a daily basis by the Vice Director. In addition to a small administrative and advisory special staff, it has three major directorates--the National Strategic Target List Directorate, the Force Employment Plans Directorate, and the Analysis, Concepts, and Systems Directorate with authorized manpower, as follows:

<u>Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			<u>Total</u>
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	
Office of Director	-- Breakdown Not Available--			7
Joint Secretariat	-- Breakdown Not Available--			30
National Target List Directorate	-- Breakdown Not Available--			104
Force Employment Plans Directorate	-- Breakdown Not Available--			164
Analysis, Concepts and Systems Directorate	-- Breakdown Not Available--			<u>95</u>
	-- Breakdown Not Available--			400
(Dual-hatted from the Strategic Air Command)	-- Breakdown Not Available--			(147)

- National Strategic Target List Directorate. This Directorate has responsibility for developing and maintaining, on a day-to-day basis, a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) of targets selected for attack in a nuclear war, in accordance with Defense guidance. Some of the functions include the requirements to develop and maintain the National Target Base, the National Desired Ground Zero List (NDL), the authoritative list of all SIOP desired ground zeros. It also allocates all strategic nuclear weapons committed to the SIOP and the secure Reserve Force in order to achieve the objectives set forth in Joint Staff guidance. It develops mathematical models to measure quantitatively enemy defensive capabilities and the threat posed to SIOP forces and conducts attrition analyses to determine probability to penetrate by SIOP forces. The Directorate also develops and maintains the Nuclear Weapons Reconnaissance List (NRL) and the Electronic Intelligence Tab to the NRL. Finally, the National Strategic Target List Directorate develops and maintains the SIOP Reconnaissance Plan in support of the SIOP.

- Force Employment Plans Directorate. This Directorate is charged with developing and maintaining the SIOP, using committed and coordinated forces, in accordance with guidance from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, developing and maintaining the nuclear reserve war plans, and coordinating and processing of general war plans data. The Directorate assigns specific weapons to targets identified for attack by the NSTL Directorate, conducts individual strike planning and strike integration to optimize tactics and defensive countermeasures, develops detailed launch/strike timing plans, and publishes and distributes SIOP documents and data.

- The Analysis, Concepts, and Systems Directorate. This Directorate is charged with supporting the SIOP production process with analysis of nuclear weapon employment guidance, management of technical assessments of weapon effects and planning processes, formulating and coordinating concepts, strategies and plans to improve SIOP responsiveness, survivability, and adaptability, and enhancement of weapons effectiveness. The Directorate is also responsible for damage analysis, constraints management, fatality estimates, war game analysis and simulation, review of SIOP effectiveness, and for analysis support to nuclear force commanders. Further, it is the single point of contact for the acquisition and management of all data automation support, including definition of requirements. The Directorate also has the responsibility for interface with the Strategic Weapons Systems Program office to ensure JSTPS support and interface requirements are considered during development.

To accomplish its mission, the JSTPS has approximately 264 officers, 111 enlisted and 25 civilian, or a total of 400 authorizations. This includes about 147 dual-hatted positions from the SAC. The dual-hatted personnel are assigned to the JSTPS from the SAC and normally have a unique expertise demanded for development of the SIOP. For example, there are large numbers of personnel from the SAC Deputy Chief of Staff Strategic Planning and Analysis and the 544th Strategic Intelligence Wing.

In addition to dual-hat support from the SAC, the JSTPS receives support from other SAC agencies--i.e., intelligence, science and research, and contracting. It also receives minor support from the Naval Surface Weapons Center at Dahlgren, Virginia, which involves providing software models representing the capabilities of different sea launched missiles. The JSTPS reviews the package and subsequently forwards a target data package to the Naval Surface Weapons Center, which eventually goes to the Fleet. There are no specific Naval Surface Weapons Center personnel devoted exclusively to the JSTPS project.

In the FY 1988-FY 1992 Joint Manpower Program, the JSTPS requested 21 new authorizations. Fourteen were approved by the Joint Staff. In its FY 1989-1993 submission, seven additional spaces have been requested, but no action has been taken on that request by the Joint Staff. It is also important to note that the present organizational structure of the JSTPS is a result of a 1986 reorganization, managed by the present Vice Director, JSTPS, and approved by the Director. The reorganization was the result of a study that concluded the staff had fragmented responsibilities, duplication of effort and required realignment to meet future planning requirements. The organization was realigned using existing authorizations in the near term and a projection for additional straight (nondual-hatted) JSTPS billets in the long term.

### Management Support Contracts

The JSTPS has \$18.5 million in ongoing contracts to deliver strategic mission planning software to automate the SIOP planning process and to develop a dynamic planning capability.

### Observations

Throughout the Study Team visit to the JSTPS and in all the literature provided, one resounding theme emerged. The personnel requirements of the JSTPS are driven to a large extent by a desire to compress the SIOP planning time to counter the hardening and increased mobility of potential targets. As a result, the JSTPS maintains the SIOP by making constant adjustments throughout the year and produces a revision annually. The process is extremely complex and there are two or three versions in various stages of development at any one time.

This frenzy to increase production and reduce planning time has resulted in millions of dollars worth of contracts to automate the planning process. While \$18.5 million was quoted to the Study Team, subsequent review of all of the SAC contracts in support of the JSTPS would indicate that the long-term cost to automate and support the planning process greatly exceeds the quoted figure. For example, there is one contract with an estimated value of \$95.8 million with the Federal Data Corporation for the Triad Computer System (TRICOMS), which is used to support SAC and the development of the SIOP. Likewise, another contract, with an estimated value of \$5.9 million, with Vanguard Research, Inc., provides on-site software management,



software maintenance, and implementation of software modifications for the Strategic War Planning System (SWPS). There are also other contracts with the Academy for Interscience Methodology and the Science Applications International Corporation with contract values of near \$5 million.

It is recognized that new weapon systems entering the inventory over the last decade have increased the JSTPS workload in scope and complexity. It is, nonetheless, time to reassess the timing requirements and address national guidance issues that are driving personnel needs and automation costs. Consideration should be given to updating the SIOP less frequently, perhaps only every 18 to 24 months, and with more frequent updates or the adding additional options only at the specific direction of the Secretary of Defense.

From FY 1980-FY 1988, the straight (nondual-hatted) JSTPS officer staff increased from 130 authorizations to 171 authorizations. During this same timeframe, there have been extensive efforts, with associated costs, to automate the process. While some of the automation is not yet on-line, it is the Study Team conclusion that automation of the planning process is a consumer, not a saver, of manpower. This situation requires close monitoring by Command officials to ensure future savings in manpower are forthcoming.

In a 1987 justification message to the Joint Staff concerning growth of officer billets, the JSTPS cited a need for additional resources for ground launched cruise missile (GLCM) planning in support of Supreme Allied Command, Europe, and the Commander in Chief, European Command. In view of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement recently concluded, there are potential savings in GLCM manpower spaces in the near term. Reductions must occur in the GLCM planning billets as the GLCMs are phased down.

The 147 dual-hat positions in the JSTPS constitute approximately 38 percent of the work force. The JSTPS could not accomplish its nuclear war planning mission without this resource. It is also important that the JSTPS remain joint, independent, and nonparochial. Therefore, the Task Force applauds the 1986 JSTPS internal study and review conducted to eliminate duplication and to ensure billets were filled by the most qualified personnel regardless of Service. However, in subsequent years, the study and reorganization resulted in manpower increases rather than reductions. For example, 21 new billets were requested in the FY 1988 Joint Manpower Document. This, coupled with millions of dollars poured into automating the SIOP planning process without corresponding reductions in personnel, leads to the inescapable conclusion that a zero based

manpower survey of manpower requirements is needed. While integrating new weapon systems into the SIOP and reacting to the changing threat increases the workload, the Study Team is not convinced that there has been an equitable tradeoff between automation and manpower needs.

### Recommendations

Al-1. Conduct an immediate manpower survey of the JSTPS. (The Study Team was unable to identify that any Joint Staff or Air Staff zero-based Manpower Survey has been conducted on the JSTPS.) In the interim, hold up the 14 positions approved in the FY 1988 Joint Manpower Program (JTD25), with the exception of the five billets that have been filled. Disapprove the seven billets requested in the FY 1989 Joint Manpower Program (JTD26) until the results of the zero-based Manpower Survey are known. This will result in a savings of 16 billets.

Al-2. Give immediate consideration to revising the SIOP less frequently--an 18 to 24-month cycle is suggested. Limit more frequent updates or adding additional options to the specific direction of the Secretary of Defense.

Al-3. Eliminate the 14 GLCM manpower billets in the JSTPS, as the GLCM system is phased down (seven by the end of FY 1988; and the other seven by the end of FY 1989 or sooner).

## U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND

### Stated Mission

The U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) is one of eight United States Unified Commands, with headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. The USLANTCOM mission is to deter military attacks against the United States and to protect our Atlantic Ocean sea lines of communications. The USLANTCOM provides support to U.S. Allies, ensures access to resources and markets, and to critical areas for political, economic and military reasons. Once fighting starts, the USLANTCOM mission is offensively oriented sea control.

The USLANTCOM was established on December 1, 1947. Its area of responsibility is the Atlantic Ocean, from the North Pole to the South Pole, and includes the Caribbean Sea; the Pacific Ocean west of Central and South America; the Norwegian, Greenland, and Barents Seas; and the waters around Africa, extending to the Cape of Good Hope.

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (CINCUSLANT), has a joint staff of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard personnel. The command is organized into component, subordinate, and special commands. The three component commands provide the USLANTCOM air, ground and maritime forces. The only permanently assigned forces, however, are those of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet (USLANTFLT). The other components--the U.S. Army Forces Atlantic (Forces Command) and the U.S. Air Force Forces Atlantic (Tactical Air Command)--provide forces for operations, exercises, and emergencies, when directed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Army and Air Force components actively develop and coordinate joint plans with the USLANTCOM staff.

The sub-unified commands of the USLANTCOM are the U.S. Forces Caribbean, with headquarters in Key West, Florida; the U.S. Forces Azores, with headquarters at Lajes Field, Azores; and the Iceland Defense Force, with headquarters in Keflavik, Iceland.

There are two special commands, the Joint Task Force 120 and Joint Task Force 140. When activated, these commands assist in planning and conducting operations in specific areas designated by the CINCUSLANT, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Commander, Joint Task Force 120, is also the Commander, U.S. Second Fleet, homeported in Norfolk, Virginia. The Commander, Joint Task Force 140, is also the Commander, U.S. Forces Caribbean.

The strategic deterrent force of fleet ballistic missile submarines is under the direct command of the CINCLANT, when operating in his area of responsibility.

### Organization and Manpower

The U.S. Atlantic Command is comprised of the Commander-in-Chief's immediate staff, the Deputy and Chief of Staff, an Office of the Special Assistant for International Affairs and an Office of the Advisor for Trident/Poseidon Operations, as well as "J" oriented directorates, as follows:

Headquarters U.S. Atlantic Command	FY 1988 Authorized Manpower			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Commander and Immediate Staff	6	9	0	15
Other Supporting Staff	12	24	10	46
J-1, Manpower and Personnel	2	0	1	3
J-2, Intelligence	29	36	28	93
J-3, Operations	52	31	4	87
J-4, Logistics	15	7	3	25
J-5, Plans and Policy	38	13	4	55
J-6, Command, Control and Communications	25	12	19	56
J-7, Inspector General and Comptroller	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>
Subtotal	184	132	72	388

In addition to the designated headquarters staff, the USLANTCOM has the following direct reporting support organizations in the Norfolk area:

Airborne Command Post	32	18	1	51
Atlantic Defense Analysis Center (LANTDAC)	32	76	12	120
Special Operations Command (SOCLANT)	8	6	1	15
Cruise Missile Support Activity (CMSA)	<u>4</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>43</u>
Subtotal	<u>76</u>	<u>116</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>229</u>
Total	<u>260</u>	<u>248</u>	<u>109</u>	<u>617</u>

The USLANTCOM and the USLANTFLT were a single organization until February 1986. At that time, the Secretary of the Navy directed that the organizations be split. Although the organizations were separated, many "dual-hatted" billets remain. There are 133 USLANTFLT authorized "dual-hat" billets accomplishing USLANTCOM missions. Of the 133, 48 are officers, 41 are enlisted and 44 are civilians. This efficient use of billets is applauded, and greater use of "dual-hatting" should be encouraged by all Unified Commanders where feasible.

### Observations

The USLANTCOM has 142 billets dedicated to operations planning, management, exercising and coordinating. They are augmented by 37 "dual-hatted" billets assigned to the same functional responsibilities at the USLANTFLT. These mission-oriented directorate staffs are supported by 56 command, control and communications dedicated billets and at least two other command and control related supporting activities. These supporting activities are the Atlantic Command Defense Analysis Center (LANTDAC) with 120 authorized billets (32 officers, 76 enlisted and 12 civilians) and the Atlantic Command Operations Support Facility (a USLANTFLT organization), with 189 authorized billets (22 officers, 131 enlisted and 36 civilians).

In reviewing the missions and functions of the Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic (SACLANT), the U.S. Atlantic Command, the Air Force, Atlantic (USAFANT) and the Army, Atlantic (USARLANT), it became apparent that each of these organizations also have large staffs dedicated to operational planning, commanding, etc., much of which appeared to be duplicative in nature. In addition, answers provided in response to Study Team questions clearly indicated confusion. Responsible personnel failed to provide a significant distinction between responsibilities and functions or an explanation of value added by each organization. This apparent confusion might well become an impediment to clear lines of command, control and communications during hostilities. Detailed side-by-side comparison of planning accomplishments would likely show significant duplication of effort.

Widespread overlap appears to exist at the J-3 Operations and J-5 Plans and Policies Directorates (N-3 and N-5 of the USCLANTFLT). Discussion during Study Team visits indicated that 100 billets at the USLANTCOM could be deleted by eliminating duplicate operations and planning organizations.

The Intelligence Directorate is heavily duplicated at all levels. The USLANTCOM J-2 Directorate has 93 authorized billets, the USLANTFLT has 31 authorized intelligence management billets, and these two organizations are, in turn, supported by the 120 authorized billets of the LANTDAC, the 346 authorized billets of the Fleet Intelligence Center Europe and Atlantic, and the 35 billets authorized at the Fleet Ocean Surveillance and Intelligence Center. The organizations are further supported by USLANTCOM subordinate Unified Command-managed intelligence gathering and analyzing activities.

In addition to the budgetary diseconomies associated with the duplication in the intelligence arena, a potential problem associated with such duplication is conflicting interpretation and conflicting or counteracting reaction to identical intelligence input.

The Command, Control and Communications Directorate (J-6) is an area that utilizes many personnel and automated data processing (ADP) resources. On the surface, the USLANTCOM would appear to have a relatively small J-6 group. As previously discussed, however, there is an organization under the USLANTFLT, the Atlantic Command Operations Support Facility, which consists of 189 authorized billets. It operates ADP, communications and "command post" type equipment primarily for USLANTCOM and its subordinate organization headquarters. Every organization visited seemed to have its own "mini" equivalent to a J-6 directorate, and seemed to be asking for additional billets, additional facilities and additional equipment. Concise explanations, rationale, or justification for the expanded and enhanced facilities was not presented. The enhanced facilities might well be "nice to have." They no doubt would probably provide some increased capabilities, would be more convenient, and would be more "high tech" than current operations. It does not, however, appear they would necessarily be either more productive or more effective. The Study Team looked at these projects with the aim of (1) using current resources and/or obtaining needed support from another activity operation, and (2) the reallocation of intended or requested resources. It was concluded that both were possible and practicable.

Communications and ADP equipment also seemed to be a target for enhancement and modernization. To some extent, more automation could be expected to result in saved billets. In reality, however, the opposite has been the case. The Study Team found that, with increased ADP and communication facilities, there were direct manpower increases. The general theme

presented to the Study Team was that, with all the new sources of data, higher speeds of communication, and increased threats, more analysts, operators and "data fusers" were needed. The identification of a need for enhanced data fusion seems to drive requirements for additional ADP, improved software and more data handling billets. It appeared, however, that in the USLANTCOM each subordinate organization had its own agenda and was moving in its own direction, without much regard for standardization and interoperability. This is not only wasteful, it will lead to confused command, control and communication during time of conflict and hostilities.

### Recommendations

B-1. Eliminate a total of 100 J-3 and J-5 operations, operational planning, and other planning billets that duplicate efforts of supporting organizations, the Service components and the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic structure.

B-2. Merge the U.S. Atlantic Command J-2 directorate with the Atlantic Defense Analysis Center, the Fleet Intelligence Center Europe and Atlantic, and the Fleet Ocean Surveillance and Intelligence Center under the control and in support of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, and eliminate 150 billets. In addition, eliminate duplicate equipment and related maintenance.

B-3. Transfer the USLANTCOM Operations Support Facility (currently operated by the USLANTFLT) to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, and eliminate 25 billets due to duplicate watch standers.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**



## UNITED STATES FORCES CARIBBEAN

### Stated Mission

The United States Forces Caribbean (USFORCARIB) is a subordinate Unified Command under the U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) and is geographically located in Key West, Florida. The Commander, U.S. Forces Caribbean (COMUSFORCARIB), coordinates activities of the U.S. Forces in an assigned area of responsibility (AOR) on all matters of joint concern. The COMUSFORCARIB represents the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (CINCUSLANT), and provides additional support, as required, in the AOR. The USFORCARIB mission includes the following:

- Planning and operational control of joint exercises--both command post exercises (CPXs), such as PROUD SCOUT, PATRIOT PRIDE; and WINTEX CIMEX, and field training exercises (FTXs), such as TRADE WINDS, UPWARD KEY, SOLID SHIELD, and OCEAN VENTURE.

- Planning and coordination of peacetime presence and training, both domestic and international.

- Planning and operational control of "show-of-forces," as required, and contingency operations, as the need arises in the AOR.

- Assuming the responsibilities of the Commander, Joint Task Force 140 (CJTF140), when activated and so designated.

The USFORCARIB has also evolved into some "implied" additional tasks, as follows:

- Planning and execution of humanitarian and civic action programs in the AOR, directed toward accomplishing security development objectives. These responsibilities include the direction and coordination of the use of funds designated for this purpose.

- Planning, coordination and execution of security assistance and military assistance within the AOR, in cooperation with the U.S. State Department programs.

- Planning, execution and fostering the Regional Security System program.

The COMUSFORCARIB also serves as the Commander, Joint Air Reconnaissance Control Center (JARCC), Key West, and the Commander, Caribbean Joint Intelligence Center (CARIBJIC), Key West.

### Organization and Manpower

In addition to the entirely separate organizations of the JARCC and the CARIBJIC, the USFORCARIB accomplishes its mission with the following organization:

<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>				
<u>U.S. Forces Caribbean</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Commander and Immediate Staff	6	1	1	8
J-1, Administrative Personnel	2	5	0	7
J-2, Intelligence	3	5	0	13
J-3, Operations	15	15	0	30
J-4, Logistics	4	3	0	7
J-5, Plans	14	4	0	18
Command and Control/ Communications and Computer	<u>3</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>16</u>
Total	<u>52</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>99</u>

### Management Support Contracts

No noteworthy support contracts were identified.

### Observations

The COMUSFORCARIB and his dedicated staff have blended a combination of self-help projects associated with both physical facilities and technical equipment (along with a relatively generous budget of the last few fiscal years) into an effective organization. This organization is dedicated to the preservation of peace, development of security, and the awareness of the always present threat in the designated AOR. The COMUSFORCARIB and his staff are a well respected "Sub-Unified Command" under the U.S. Atlantic Command.

The evolution and development of the USFORCARIB in 1981, however, has resulted in a layering of mission, functions and responsibilities. Although the command functions with relative efficiency during peacetime, the layering clouds the lines of communication in the AOR and could confuse the lines of authority and control during hostilities. The actual operations and functions of this command appear to be duplicative of similar or identical operations and/or functions accomplished elsewhere within the U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM). Unique USFORCARIB functions are minimal, possibly only related to public relations. It would seem such functions could be accomplished within existing resources and facilities of the USLANTCOM. Consequently, not only has the layering created the potential for impeding and frustrating command and control, it has resulted in excessive staffing.

In May 1985, the House Armed Services Committee requested that the Secretary of Defense provide a study explaining why the USFORCARIB should not be disestablished. In November 1985, the Department replied with a long discussion presenting the rationale to retain the Command. The Study Team does not accept the conclusion of that study.

Exclusive of the JARCC and the CARIBJIC and the JARCC, which are separately addressed (see Appendices B2 and B3, respectively), the primary mission-oriented elements of the USFORCARIB are J-3 and J-5. Together, however, they account for only about half of the assigned billets. Effectively, this means that about 50 billets are administrative and supportive in nature. These headquarters administrative and support functions are of the type that are regularly accomplished by, and could be provided by, existing support organizations of the U.S. Atlantic Command, at currently assigned billet levels--if the functional elements of the USFORCARIB (i.e., J-3, Operations, and J-5, Plans) were colocated with the USLANTCOM organization. In addition to the economies associated with the elimination of unneeded support billets, colocation would promote greater rapport with upper echelons of command and clearer lines of communication, command and control during periods of hostilities. Since the USLANTCOM has a large complement of operations managers and planners, many of which already devote their time to the Caribbean AOR, it would seem that the USFORCARIB J-3 and J-5 functions could be accomplished within existing resources at the USLANTCOM.

Disestablishment of USFORCARIB is even further indicated by the acknowledgement of top level personnel, who stated that the COMUSFORCARIB would only retain command and control during "invitational" contingencies, such as noncombatant evacuations, during peacetime exercises, in connection with DoD aspects of security assistance, training and security development. In a period of greater hostilities, higher echelons than the USFORCARIB would take command and control, including command and control of the Caribbean Joint Task Force 140. Unified Command organizations should be operated, equipped and staffed as closely as possible to how they would operate during hostilities. Therefore, the USFORCARIB should be disestablished.

It is also reasonable to expect the existing USLANTCOM staff to plan, coordinate and execute joint exercises (both Command Post Exercises and Field Training Exercises), including those intended to maintain a peacetime presence, provide peacetime training, and provide a show of force, when appropriate and necessary. All of the forces, equipment and other resources actually exercised in the AOR are provided by military components beyond the USFORCARIB. Humanitarian and civic action programs, as well as security and military assistance programs and the Regional Security System Program, have been accomplished by resource augmentees beyond the assigned staff of the USFORCARIB and can be continued as such, even after disestablishing the USFORCARIB and merging its J-3 and J-5 functions into the USLANTCOM. The planning and coordination of these activities should be accomplished within the existing USLANTCOM resources.

Plans for "invitational" contingencies, such as noncombatant evacuation operations, already exist and, unlike combatant offensive and defensive operational plans, they generally do not change frequently or significantly. Therefore, the existing USLANTCOM staff should be able to keep these plans current with minimal effort.

Employment and deployment plans for hostile operations in the Caribbean AOR seem to be currently accomplished separately, and then coordinated by USLANTCOM organizations, as well as USFORCARIB organizations. Elimination of the duplicate effort would achieve budgetary efficiencies and would optimize command, control and communications during actual operations by reducing layers of command that will either get in the way or be ignored during hostilities.

### Recommendation

B1-1. Disestablish the USFORCARIB, merge all of its missions and functions into existing USLANTCOM resources, and eliminate 99 billets.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## CARIBBEAN JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER

### Stated Mission

The Caribbean Joint Intelligence Center (CARIBJIC) is a newly formed subordinate organization under the U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM). It is authorized and funded by General Defense Intelligence Programs (GDIP) and is located at Key West, Florida. The CARIBJIC provides tailored intelligence to support the U.S. Forces Caribbean (USFORCARIB), while also inputting Cuba/Caribbean area intelligence into the DoD intelligence community. As part of this function, the CARIBJIC supports the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) by developing, processing and analyzing PARPRO imagery.

### Organization and Manpower

The CARIBJIC accomplishes its mission with the following authorized billets:

<u>Caribbean Joint Intelligence Center</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Director and Staff	1	2	0	3
Collection and Analysis	5	3	0	8
ADP and support	1	3	1	5
Exploitation	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>
Total	<u>8</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>21</u>

Significant additional billets (almost triple) and new "high-tech" equipment have been requested for FY 1989-FY 1992 to staff and operate this organization. In addition to military personnel costs, the CARIBJIC FY 1987 operating costs were about \$750,000. (This figure includes about \$400,000 of automated data processing (ADP) support contracts and equipment.)

### Management Support Contracts

Besides the ADP contract mentioned above, there are no other significant support contracts.

## Observations

Identical data gathering is ongoing at various GDIP activities. All input provided by the CARIBJIC could, therefore, be effectively accomplished remotely, within available resources. The Caribbean area of responsibility intelligence tailoring could be effectively and more efficiently accomplished at other existing locations. The Study Team could not identify a necessity for a GDIP facility in Key West, Florida.

The CARIBJIC appears to be a redundant facility and hence unnecessary. Since disestablishment of USFORCARIB has been recommended (see Appendix B1), which currently administratively supports and effectively directs the CARIBJIC, the Study Team concluded that the CARIBJIC functions and responsibilities could be accomplished within existing resources at other existing GDIP activities.

## Recommendations

B2-1. Disestablish the Caribbean Joint Intelligence Center and accomplish its mission at other existing intelligence gathering and analyzing activities (eliminate 21 billets). (Disapprove requested increased CARIBJIC billet authorizations and equipment for FY 1989-FY 1992.

B2-2. Relocate the expensive CARIBJIC equipment to other GDIP activities to avoid buying duplicate equipment.



## JOINT AIR RECONNAISSANCE CONTROL CENTER

### Stated Mission

The Joint Air Reconnaissance Control Center (JARCC) is another subordinate organization of the U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) CINCLANT and USFORCARIB. It is located at Key West, Florida. The primary JARCC mission is to provide an advisory service to peacetime aerial reconnaissance programs for Cuba and vicinity. The JARCC uses a variety of airborne and ground assets, generally owned by other activities, to collect and monitor data. The JARCC does not plan, request, command or direct reconnaissance missions. Rather, it provides a remote advisory role to various active reconnaissance operations.

### Organization and Manpower

To accomplish its mission, the JARCC is structured, as follows:

	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Office of the Director and				
Administrative Staff	1	5	0	6
Operations and Training	1	0	0	1
Operations Crew	5	13	0	23
Special Operations Center	0	5	0	5
Security	0	2	0	2
Electronic Equipment Maint	<u>0</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>18</u>
Total	<u>7</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>55</u>

### Management Support Contracts

The JARCC is in the process of acquiring and installing \$68 million of additional sensory and communications equipment. The JARCC will also need at least an additional \$20 million to upgrade current equipment to process the additional input resulting from the new equipment. The JARCC personnel did not know whether they could provide "fusion" of additional information after the new sensory and processing equipment is installed.

## Observations

It appears that the primary JARCC operation is currently functioning only on a part-time basis--i.e., as required or requested. Although the communications, surveillance and intelligence operations are staffed and monitored continually, the JARCC operations appear to duplicate other Department of Defense intelligence and surveillance activities, as well as early warning networks such as those operated by the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). An example was discussed during the Study Team visit. If hostile aircraft are launched and detected by the JARCC, the JARCC would request the NORAD to launch potential intercept aircraft. The Director, JARCC, acknowledged, however, that the NORAD would detect the requirement to launch concurrently with the JARCC, since that command receives identical information at the same time. The NORAD command structure would also provide "follow-on" command functions.

The Study Team learned that most JARCC operations are accomplished by use of a complex network of remotely located sensory equipment. Thus, this part-time, albeit primary, function of the JARCC could be accomplished even more remotely--i.e., at the USLANTCOM or the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Accomplishing the mission elsewhere--by using equipment and communications networks and watch standers, evaluators, and administrative support already available at these other locations--would result in elimination of 30 billets and reductions of equipment and communication costs.

It would appear that the JARCC mission could be effectively accomplished by using additional duties of existing staff at the USLANTCOM. A manpower reduction could thus be accomplished without degradation of effectiveness. The Study Team suggests the transfer of the remaining 25 JARCC billets to USLANTCOM to accomplish this and other functions. Although the lines of communication and authority are relatively clear, relocation of JARCC activities to the USLANTCOM should further enhance overall command and control.

## Recommendations

B3-1. Disestablish the Joint Air Reconnaissance Center at Key West, Florida, and transfer its mission to the U.S. Atlantic Command, using additional duties of the existing USLANTCOM staff,

augmented by no more than 25 billets of the current JARCC staff (eliminate 30 billets).

B3-2. Cancel the procurement of additional equipment or deliver it for more efficient use to other related activities.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## COMMANDER IN CHIEF ATLANTIC FLEET

### Stated Mission

The U.S. Atlantic Fleet (USLANTFLT) is headquartered at Norfolk, Virginia and is the Navy Component of the U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM). The USLANTFLT mission is to be prepared to deter and resist aggression in the area of responsibility assigned to the Fleet. This mission includes conducting operations to ensure control of the sea and air, providing combat-ready naval forces, maintaining the security of the U.S. Atlantic Command, and supporting the operations of allied and other national commanders.

Within the USLANTFLT there is only one numbered fleet--the U.S. Second Fleet. There are six type commands reporting to the Second Fleet: the Naval Surface Force, the Naval Air Force, the Submarine Force, the Fleet Marine Force, the Atlantic Training Command, and the Construction Battalion Command.

The Commander, U.S. Second Fleet, directs the employment of those Armed Forces having a mission to engage in combat or to provide integral support to a combat operation. Type commanders provide administrative and logistic support and readiness training for their respective units.

The USLANTFLT continues to provide training, readiness, administrative and logistic support to its ships during extended operations in the Mediterranean, when they are under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe.

The USLANTFLT numbers about 312 ships, 2,350 naval aircraft, and about 283,000 personnel. It provides the forces for the Second Fleet in the Atlantic, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and a portion of the U.S. naval contingent in the Indian Ocean.

The USLANTFLT periodically provides naval forces for the joint operations and exercises with the Army and Air Force components of the Unified U.S. Atlantic Command. The U.S. Atlantic Fleet forces also join those from other nations in forming the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Striking Fleet Atlantic, and exercises regularly with other NATO navies.

## Organization and Manpower

The USLANTFLT has 456 billets (148 officers, 169 enlisted, and 139 civilians) authorized to accomplish its headquarters management responsibilities. Of these, 133 are "dual-hatted" to, and perform work for, the USLANTCOM. In addition to the 456 billets, there are 107 billets assigned to the USLANTFLT that are "dual-hatted" and perform work for USLANTFLT. These strengths are exclusive of the 1,579 authorized management billets of the type commanders. Excluded also are the 189 authorized billets of the Operations Support Facility the 346 billets authorized to the Fleet Intelligence Center Europe/Atlantic (FICEURLANT), and the 35 billets authorized for the Fleet Ocean Surveillance and Intelligence Center (FOSIC), discussed in the USLANTCOM narrative (see Appendix D). The USLANTFLT Headquarters is organized, as follows:

Headquarters U.S. Atlantic Fleet	FY 1988 Authorized Manpower			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Commander and his immediate staff	5	18	0	23
N-1, Manpower and Personnel	6	10	16	32
N-2, Intelligence	14	17	0	31
N-3, Operations	39	49	10	98
N-4, Logistics	28	17	30	75
N-5, Plans and Policy	6	5	3	14
N-6, Command, Control and Communications	5	4	13	27
N-7, Management/Inspector General	2	3	12	17
N-8, Cryptology	7	5	0	12
Other Support Organizations	<u>36</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>127</u>
Subtotal	<u>148</u>	<u>169</u>	<u>139</u>	<u>456</u>

### Fleet Support Activities

Operations Support Facility	--Breakdown Not Available--	189
Fleet Intelligence Center Europe/Atlantic	--Breakdown Not Available--	346
Fleet Ocean Surveillance and Intelligence Center	--Breakdown Not Available--	35
Type Commands Management	--Breakdown Not Available--	<u>1,579</u>
Subtotal	--Breakdown Not Available--	<u>2,149</u>
Total	--Breakdown Not Available--	<u>2,605</u>

## Management Support Contracts

The USLANTFLT has 12 existing management assistance-type support services contracts. These contracts cost approximately \$4 million annually and provide about 19 manyears of effort, as well as equipment and materials. The contracts are generally the type that are self-perpetuating from year-to-year. They are the kind of projects that are done by contract because of resource restraints. The Command could not adequately explain to the Study Team the need for these contracts, their accurate cost, their deliverables or estimates of completion dates. The Command subsequently provided additional documentation. After review of the additional documentation, the Study Team concluded that nine of these contracts, costing about \$2.8 million annually, should be discontinued.

## Observations

Apparent layering and duplication of intelligence, operations, plans, logistics and command, control, and communication is discussed as part of the USLANTCOM narrative (see Appendix B).

The USLANTFLT, operationally, has six type commands.

<u>Headquarters</u> <u>USLANTFLT Type Commands</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Naval Surface Force				
Atlantic	--Breakdown Not Available--			384
Naval Submarine Force				
Atlantic	--Breakdown Not Available--			384
Naval Air Force Atlantic	--Breakdown Not Available--			366
Naval Construction Battalion				
Atlantic	--Breakdown Not Available--			57
Fleet Marine Force Atlantic	--Breakdown Not Available--			347
Atlantic Training Command				
Atlantic	--Breakdown Not Available--			41

The first five of the six type commands appear appropriate. In light of the training programs within the Navy, however, both those under the Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET), as well as the on-the-job training accomplished by individual Navy organizations (including the active fleets), the need for the TRALANT is questionable. Although the TRALANT is comprised of

only 41 billets, its mission--to support other "type commanders" in training war fighters--is duplicative. More than 90 percent of its training dollars come from the CNET. Since the TRALANT represents only 4 percent of the CNET annual program, most of the TRALANT operations should be absorbed and managed by the CNET.

The USLANTFLT assigned strength has been relatively constant and is expected to remain the same through FY 1992. It should be noted, however, that Joint Staff manpower studies, as well as external USLANTFLT studies, concluded that the CINCLANTFLT should be increased to over 700 billets. The Study Team review failed to disclose any justification or a need for these 250+ additional billets. The USLANTFLT organization, therefore, must be watched closely so it does not grow to the higher manning level. This is of particular interest since the USLANTFLT readily attempts to draw comparisons to the larger end strength of U.S. Pacific Fleet (see Appendix E2). The USLANTFLT current estimate of FY 1988 operating budget for its headquarters is about \$6.8 million, exclusive of military personnel costs. About \$4.3 million of that is civilian personnel related. That figure has been relatively constant over the past years and is also expected to remain relatively constant.

#### Recommendations

B4-1. Disestablish the Atlantic Training Command and eliminate 41 billets. The Fleet-unique, non-school house courses should be transferred to the respective type commanders and handled within existing resources. The remainder of the TRALANT courses should be transferred to the CNET for management and administration.

B4-2. Eliminate (disapprove) any outyear end strength growth for USLANTFLT.

B4-3. Discontinue all support contracts, except "Tactical Telephone Switchboard," "USLANTCOM Architecture Plan," and "Joint Operational Tactical Study (JOTS)" (\$2.8 million in contract reductions).

B4-4. Designate a centralized manager, within existing resources at the Navy or Office of the Secretary of Defense levels, to coordinate all "JOTS" efforts.



## NAVAL ACTIVITIES CARIBBEAN

### Stated Mission

The Naval Activities Caribbean (NAVACTSCARIB), located in Puerto Rico, is another subordinate activity to the U.S. Atlantic Fleet (USLANTFLT). The Commander, Naval Activities Caribbean (COMNAVACTSCARIB), coordinates and conducts operations of U.S. Naval activities in the Caribbean area. In addition, the COMNAVACTSCARIB coordinates "other matters" in support of United States foreign policy objectives. As such, the COMNAVACTSCARIB plans for, and must be prepared to, coordinate and conduct operations in defense of the Caribbean. These responsibilities include hostilities, national emergencies and disasters. The COMNAVACTSCARIB also acts as the Commander, Fleet Air Caribbean, reporting to the type Commander, Naval Air Atlantic (COMFAIRCARIB).

### Organization and Manpower

To accomplish its mission, the NAVACTSCARIB/FAIRCARIB is structured, as follows:

<u>Naval Forces Caribbean</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Commander	1	0	0	1
Personal Staff and Other	1	3	1	5
Officer in Charge San Juan				
Detachment	1	0	1	2
Economic Development Advisor	0	0	1	1
Chief of Staff	1	0	0	1
Advisory Staff	4	0	4	8
Administration	0	7	3	10
Intelligence	1	6	1	8
(Including Special Security Operations and Special Intelligence Communications)				
Operations	4	26	1	31
(Including Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Center, Operations Control Center, and Communications)				
Logistics	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Total	<u>14</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>72</u>

## Observations

It appears that, with the exception of the Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Center (ASWOC), the NAVACTSCARIB responsibilities are all relatively low priority peacetime-oriented coordinating activities. These include coordinating U.S. Naval activities, coordinating "other matters," coordinating logistics support and coordinating supply support, all of which could be readily accomplished by a combination of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet (USLANTFLT), the Naval Air Station (NAS), Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, and the Armed Forces Weapons Training Center (AFWTC), Puerto Rico. The Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Center (ASWOC) operations are not full-time and can be run by its current director or by additional duty of the Director, AFWTC. The NAVACTSCARIB is a holdover from the days when the Navy used a "Naval District Commandant" to coordinate naval administrative activities in various parts of the country. This system was dropped within the Continental U.S. over a decade ago, and there is no apparent reason for its continuance in Puerto Rico.

During hostilities in the Caribbean basin, the COMNAVACTSCARIB is unlikely to have even limited command and control authority. Command would likely be assumed by the type commands, the 2nd Fleet or USLANTFLT. Even in peacetime, the actual authority of the COMNAVACTSCARIB is questionable. For example, during the on-site visit by the Study Team, an ASW operation was ongoing. The JARCC had been supporting the operation, but it unilaterally withdrew its support. Likewise, the Director, ASWOC, and the COMNAVACTSCARIB also desired to curtail operations but could not, without approval of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCUSLANTFLT), who was not readily available. This example indicates the confusion of actual delegation of responsibility and authority.

It appears that the original and primary function of the NAVACTSCARIB was and still is a show of presence in Puerto Rico. The COMNAVACTSCARIB also serves as host for visiting dignitaries from Caribbean and Latin American nations. The importance of this role should not be minimized. It is, however, a role that can be effectively accomplished by assigning these responsibilities to the U.S. Commander, South Atlantic (COMSOLANT), as an additional duty to his UNITAS responsibilities. In his absence, during the UNITAS 6 month deployment, temporary duty flag officers could be rotated for this "public relations/economic cooperation" mission. Temporary duty flag officers could be adequately supported by the Commander, AFWTC, and the Commander, NAS, Roosevelt Roads. As an alternative, if flag level

continuity were deemed politically necessary, a junior flag officer and minimal staff (not exceeding 4 billets) could be permanently assigned in Puerto Rico. That officer and staff could draw support from other Navy and DoD activities in Puerto Rico.

The NAVACTSCARIB organization has evolved over the years from an apparent public relations need and as a convenience, if not a luxury. All of its missions and functions, with the exception of the ASWOC, can be accomplished elsewhere, within current resources. Doing so would also remove a layer in the chain of command, thus eliminating a potential impediment to clear lines of command and control.

### Recommendations

B5-1. Disestablish NAVACTSCARIB and accomplish its planning, coordinating and operational missions with a combination of NAS, Roosevelt Roads; Armed Forces Weapons Training Center, Puerto Rico; and the type commanders, 2nd Fleet Commander and U.S. Atlantic Fleet Command (eliminate 41 billets).

B5-2. Accomplish the "public relations" role of the COMNAVACTSCARIB by using the Commander, Southern Atlantic, and flag officer augmentees, possibly keeping a junior flag officer, and a small staff (not more than 4 billets) in Puerto Rico for public and military relations purposes.

B5-3. Accomplish the ASWOC function with the current staff of 31 billets, supported and commanded by the Director, AFWTC.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## U.S. SOUTH ATLANTIC COMMAND

### Stated Mission

The U.S. South Atlantic Command (USSOLANT) is located in Puerto Rico. The USSOLANT is an activity of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet (USLANTFLT). Together, they plan, execute, command and operate the annual 6 month joint naval exercise with the Nations of South America. The program, referred to as UNITAS, is intended to interoperate with the South American Nations in multinational exercises.

### Organization and Manpower

The USSOLANT is an organization comprised of the Commander (a rear admiral) and his staff of 14 officers and 13 enlisted. The entire USSOLANT organization deploys to the UNITAS circuit. During the annual 6 month exercise, the USSOLANT organization is augmented by between 14 and 20 billets of various specialties.

### Observations

While there is no operational necessity for the USSOLANT to be located in Puerto Rico, annual operating costs would be similar wherever it is located.

During the nondeployment months, the Commander, U.S. South Atlantic, could, however, effectively function as the "good will" public and military relations ambassador to Puerto Rico and other Caribbean and Latin American Nations, replacing the Commander, Naval Activities Caribbean (COMNAVACTSCARIB). In his absence, during the UNITAS operations, these responsibilities could be met by temporary duty flag officers.

### Recommendation

B6-1. During nondeployment, the Commander, U.S. Southern Atlantic, should assume the "good will" function currently supported by the Commander, Naval Activities, Caribbean.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

### Stated Mission

The United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), with headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida, is the Unified Command responsible for preserving U.S. national interests in the Persian Gulf region. The USCENTCOM mission is, as follows:

- preserve and protect U.S. and friendly access to Arabian Peninsula oil resources;
- assist friendly nations to provide their own security and contribute to regional defense;
- deter or counter Soviet aggression; and
- protect the security of moderate friendly states in the region.

The U.S. Central Command, with origins in the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, was established on January 1, 1983. The USCENTCOM assigned area of responsibility (AOR) includes 19 countries on the Arabian Peninsula, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. It is a region characterized by diversities in language, religion, natural resources and geography. Total population in the AOR is over 356 million.

With its headquarters some 7,000 air miles from the region, the key to meeting the CENTCOM mission is the ability to project rapidly and control forces into the theater. Forces and their equipment must be made available through a combination of sealift and airlift, pre-positioning and political-military cooperation with the region countries.

Within the context of strategic planning for global war, the USCENTCOM is planning for the employment of some 390,000 air, ground, naval, marine and special forces personnel. With no headquarters in-theater and the absence of essential infrastructure, the planning for deployment, reception, beddown and war fighting is challenging.

The source for war fighting forces is each component element of the U.S. Central Command. The Army, Navy and Air Force components of the USCENTCOM are responsible for providing and

commanding required ready forces; preparing operational, contingency and exercise plans; planning for combat support and logistics, and establishing requirements for Military Department funding (see Appendices C1, C2 and C3, respectively).

In most Unified Commands, components have national missions that moderate slightly in the transition to war. The Central Command components, unlike others, are war fighting, forward deployable, theater headquarters. Their peacetime mission is to plan the way they will fight.

The USCENTCOM has developed a theater campaign plan in consonance with its part of the global strategy. It is the job of each Service component to develop and coordinate its portions of the theater campaign plan over the full spectrum of force structure planning, requirements determination, sustainability, funding, training and war fighting.

### Organization and Manpower

The U.S. Central Command is organized in the traditional Unified Command joint structure to accomplish its mission. There are 694 people authorized from the four Services in management headquarters positions. The Service representation was the most balanced the Study Team observed.

<u>USCENTCOM</u> <u>Headquarters</u>	<u>FY1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
J-1, Personnel	17	27	4	48
J-2, Intelligence	34	24	2	60
J-3, Operations	78	47	2	127
J-4/7, Logistics and	66	25	2	93
Security Assistance	15	4	2	114
J-5, Plans	38	15	0	53
J-6, Computer Systems	31	51	1	83
Other Special Staff (Medical, Legal, Public Affairs, etc.)	<u>79</u>	<u>115</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>209</u>
Subtotal	360	306	27	694



<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>FY1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			<u>Total</u>
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	
USCENTCOM Special Activities	11	5	4	20
USCENTCOM Intelligence Activity	51	51	0	102
USCENTCOM Computer Support Systems Element	<u>17</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>70</u>
Subtotal	<u>79</u>	<u>109</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>192</u>
Total	<u>439</u>	<u>415</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>886</u>

These 192 support activity headquarters authorizations are included in the Study Team assessment of the 886 total CENTCOM positions.

- Intelligence Support Activity. This support activity is embedded within the J-2, Intelligence Directorate. The headquarters and intelligence support activity staffs are wholly integrated and are both engaged in production, targeting, analysis, crisis action, mapping and charting, indications and warning and planning.

- Computer System Support Element. The computer support is also an embedded activity in the J-6, Computer Systems Directorate. It is a support activity responsible for command and control operations, computer maintenance and intelligence software and operations.

- Twenty-four Hour Watch Standers. The Study Team identified ten 24-hour watch stander positions, within the USCENTCOM management activities, supported by a 5 to 1 manning (i.e., a total of 50 watch standers). There were two watch stander positions each for the Command Post, the Joint Reconnaissance Center, the Worldwide Military Command and Control System, the intelligence message traffic, and the indications and warning.

- Security Assistance. Political-military cooperation with regional nations is imperative for region stability.

Security Assistance personnel in joint manpower positions are assigned to 13 countries in the USCENTCOM AOR, as follows:

<u>Security Assistance</u>	
Bahrain	6
Djibouti	3
Egypt	55
Jordan	18
Kenya	10
Kuwait	3
Oman	5
Pakistan	25
Saudi Arabia	82
Somalia	11
Sudan	7
United Arab Emirates	8
Yemen	<u>10</u>
Total	<u>243</u>

Some 450 additional military and civilian contractors provide training and maintenance on U.S. systems. In most central region countries, these security assistance people are the U.S. military presence. In wartime, they are the infrastructure on which military and coalition warfare will be built. It is important to note that these positions are reimbursed or directly paid from the Military Assistance Program (MAP) or Foreign Military Sales (FMS) surcharge, under provisions of the Arms Export Control Act. Manpower adjustments and costs do not affect the Defense Department budget.

These 243 security assistance people are managing almost \$1.7 billion annually in FMS credits, MAP, and international military education and training (IMET). Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar are FMS cash sales.

- Special Operations, Central (SOCCENT). The Special Operations Forces (SOF), which are made available to the USCENTCOM, are commanded by Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT)--a subordinate Unified Command under USCENTCOM. It is located with the U.S. Central Command at MacDill AFB, Tampa, Florida. The SOCCENT prepares SOF support to operations and

contingency plans and participates in joint exercises. Authorized SOCCENT manpower for the period FY 1986 through FY 1999 is, as follows:

Special Operations Forces, Central	Authorized Manpower				
	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990
Officer	18	18	19	19	19
Enlisted	5	9	10	10	10
Civilian	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	<u>23</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>29</u>

#### Management Contract Support

Contracted activities include equipment purchases for command and control information systems (including hardware and software maintenance), data base design and maintenance for large scale computer models to support war gaming and simulation (\$950,000 in FY 1988). A Theater Intelligence Architecture Program ties intelligence needs to war fighting. (A counterpart is found in the U.S. European Command.) In FY 1988, only \$3.1 million of the \$9.6 million is funded in support of management contracts. The remaining unfunded requirement is being considered for reprogramming support in the FY 1988 Air Force budget.

#### Observations

United States policy toward sub-Saharan Africa has been characterized as benign neglect or based on "nonpolicy." More accurately, policy has been episodic and tended to focus on hot spots. Much of this is explained because sub-Saharan Africa was perceived to be of relatively small importance in the scheme of U.S. foreign interests. Although not vital to U.S. interests, Africa's importance is now increasing. Its central location, natural resources, market potential, ports and air fields, proximity to major shipping lanes, and constant state of instability garnered the U.S. attention. It is, however, attention and interest that has not been translated into identifiable policy.

In the absence of foreign policy strategy, military programs, particularly security assistance programs, are usually

ill-defined, disjointed, underfunded, and are seldom linked to economic programs. Even though over 60 percent of security assistance is economic (U.S. Agency for International Development), the military sales portion receives most of the attention and criticism. Military security assistance funding for sub-Saharan Africa has decreased significantly over each of the last three years.

The demands of the region put the USCENTCOM in daily touch with the challenges and give it the potential of establishing meaningful international relationships. The U.S. Central Command is accustomed to dealing with the differences in Third World nation priorities, language, culture, economic conditions, and social mores. The USCENTCOM is currently responsible for six countries in Africa: Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, and Djibouti. The U.S. Central Command manages the bulk of the security assistance funding on the Continent--\$1.3 billion in FY 1987. If security assistance is seen as a necessary ingredient to enhancing cooperative defense and region stability, then the U.S. military establishment must help forge a cohesive strategy. Unifying the sub-Saharan African countries under the U.S. Central Command would be a major step.

The combined manpower staffing of the U.S. Central Command and its component headquarters staffing is, as follows:

	<u>FY 1988</u>
U.S. Central Command	886
Special Operations Central	29
Army Central Command	335
Air Force Central/9th Air Force	392
Navy Central	<u>37</u>
Total	<u>1,679</u>

There is no question that the region is of vital national interest to the United States. Since formation of the U.S. Central Command in 1983, increase emphasis has not come without significant manpower costs. In the Air Force alone, over 600 manpower positions have been added in support of the Southwest Asia workload. Many are deployed in-theater, while others are responsible for supplying, storage maintenance and security of preposition materials and base assets. Many others are members of mobile units that must be available immediately. Ninety percent of these authorizations are in direct support of the Air Force Central air component role. The remainder, however, went to headquarters staffs or liaison positions at the Tactical Air

Command, the Military Airlift Command, the Strategic Air Command and the Air Staff.

Large numbers of staff officers and organizations are engaged in planning at both the Unified Command and Service levels. There is a sense that planning has become an end unto itself. For example, within the principal staff elements of personnel, operations, intelligence, plans, logistics and communications-electronics at the USCENCOM and the Service components, there are 541 identifiable planning positions. Each individual (sometimes an entire staff directorate) is involved in some phase of combat or combat support planning.

The division of labor among the components and between the U.S. Central Command and the Joint Staff appears well defined. However, the USCENCOM role in the planning process is less clear and less appreciated by the Service components. The Service components resource the operations plans; ensure force readiness and training; work the supplies, ammunition, beddown issues; travel to the region to work host nation and security assistance programs and problems; and plan for force deployment, reception and employment. From their perspective, the USCENCOM planning is simply the collating of component products to fashion a unified product.

Closer examination revealed an important role at the unified staff for theater campaign strategy development and assurance of a comprehensive and unified approach to war fighting. The major issue, however, is how much USCENCOM staff is required to fulfill this vital role. What is sufficient in peacetime to ensure that adequate numbers and skills are available for war?

As noted above, the U.S. Central Command is planning a major upgrade in its command and central information systems. The Study Team could find no evidence that critical elements of information and requisite crisis interaction was delayed or lost with the current configuration. Although less than optimum in physical configuration, the present command post (with the FY 1988 improvements) should meet requirements until a theater location is established for the USCENCOM headquarters.

## Recommendations

C-1. Expand Central Command area of responsibility to include all sub-Saharan Africa plus Egypt.

C-2. Consolidate the Operations (J-3) and the Plans and Policy (J-5) Directorates and configure for war. Include the newly formed Programs and Budget (POM issues) Office. This will permit the full spectrum of concept development, strategy, operational and contingency plans, implementation, force allocation and resources, and execution to interact in a single organization. While some manpower savings can be achieved, the greater payoff is in improved work flow and systemic integration of related functions. (Eliminate 34 billets)

C-3. Combine the special fusion cell with the Intelligence Directorate (J-2). There is inherent duplication with a special cell and possible loss of valuable information through a perception of "separateness." (Eliminate two billets)

C-4. Eliminate the Special Assistant for Command and Control Information Systems and put the function into the J-6 Directorate. The majority of the actions have already been completed to design the architecture, program the resources and acquire the hardware. (Eliminate one colonel position)

C-5. Suspend immediately the command center action, including the Booze-Allen and Mitre contracts for functional description and technical analysis (\$750,000). These two contracts, plus \$8.2 million in FY 1990 military construction, are unfunded additional requirements.

C-6. Pursue vigorously an in-theater location for the USCENTCOM headquarters.

## UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL

### Stated Mission

The Third U.S. Army is the U.S. Central Command Army component responsible for executing the land battle. The U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) is headquartered at Fort McPherson, Atlanta, Georgia, and is under the operational command of USCENTCOM. As a major subordinate command of Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), the Third U.S. Army responds within the Army chain on matters related to organization, resourcing, training, and force readiness (also see Appendix J on FORSCOM). The Headquarters, USARCENT, is tasked directly by and responds directly to the USCENTCOM. The USCENTCOM exercises full command and operational control over Army forces transferred during contingency or war to USCINCCENT.

### Organization and Manpower

The peacetime headquarters is composed of 222 active duty military and 56 civilian authorizations. Long tour Army Guard and Reserve (AGR) personnel (57) are an integral part of the staff. When forward deployed during a contingency, the headquarters is augmented with 73 dual-hatted FORSCOM personnel and an additional 472 Reserve and mobilization fills. All 278 active component and DoD civilian positions are in the management headquarters program element.

<u>Army Central Headquarters</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Personnel	9	5	6	20
Intelligence	13	15	3	31
Operations & Plan	34	19	11	64
Logistics	40	12	7	59
Civil Affairs	5	2	1	8
Comptroller	7	1	5	13
Information				
Management	23	32	11	66
Other Staff	<u>28</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>94</u>
Total	<u>159</u>	<u>120</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>335</u>

The following chart shows the USARCENT headquarters in both peacetime and war augmentation manning posture.

Active Component	222
Active Guard and Reserve (AGR)	57
DoD Civilian	<u>56</u>
Subtotal	<u>335</u>
Dual-Hatted	73
Reserve Component	376
Mobilization Fills	<u>96</u>
Subtotal	<u>545</u>
Wartime Total	<u>924</u>
(Civilians not included)	

The Third Army headquarters was not reduced in the Military Department 10 percent reduction mandated by the 1986 Reorganization Act. Instead, the FORSCOM elected to absorb the reduction based on a manpower staffing study that validated an additional 66 spaces in Third Army.

The USARCENT is responsible for force requirements development and planning for in-theater employment and support of Army forces. The Commander, U.S. Army Central, assists in requirements determination and monitors over \$27 billion in Army programs supporting the CINCCENT Integrated Priority List.

#### Management Support Center

The U.S. Army Central has two headquarters support contracts, valued at \$2.4 million and \$715,000, for Automated Decision Support and Management Information System Support, respectively. Both appear well-defined and have anticipated termination dates.

#### Observations

This is a lean theater Army headquarters. The headquarters strength has remained constant since FY 1985. A FORSCOM manpower survey identified workload requiring an additional 66 authorizations, which was used to absorb the headquarters reduction.



Southwest Asia sustainment programs for prepositioning, intermediate staging facilities, petroleum distribution, water projects, and port operations keep the operations and logistics staffs busy and traveling about 40 percent of the time.

There are no 24-hour posts being manned at the USARCENT for command post, Worldwide Military Command and Control Systems, or indications and warning functions. Manpower economies have been achieved because of the colocation with the FORSCOM.

Recommendations

None

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## UNITED STATES NAVY CENTRAL COMMAND

### Stated Mission

The U.S. Navy Central Command (USNAVCENT) is headquartered at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Its mission is to prepare the naval supporting operations, contingency and exercise plans for the U.S. Central Command. The USNAVCENT, as the naval component, will command and have operational control of naval forces assigned to the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) during hostilities.

The USNAVCENT peacetime responsibilities include logistics support and administration of naval ships in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). To assist this effort, the USNAVCENT exercises command of the administrative support unit located in Bahrain. These 112 permanent Navy positions are not, however, assigned to USCENTCOM. Their job is to provide a supply point, postal, personnel, and administrative support to naval forces.

The USNAVCENT also has responsibility for the Mideast Force (MIDEASTFOR) in Bahrain, commanded by a two star admiral. His staff of 78 people has been the traditional United States "presence" in Southwest Asia.

### Organization and Manpower

The small USNAVCENT staff of 37 people is organized into six major functional areas:

<u>Navy Central Headquarters</u>	<u>FY1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Comptroller	0	0	3	3
Administrative	1	5	0	7
Intelligence	3	1	0	4
Operations	6	2	0	8
Logistics	5	1	0	6
Plans and Policy	5	1	0	6
Special Staff	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>
Total	<u>22</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>37</u>

This small group of people attempts to work the full range of U.S. Central Command issues from the Navy component perspective.

They develop deployment data; work the range of plans; determine and track equipment and forces requirements; develop Program Objective Memoranda (POM) inputs to the Department of the Navy; and work the full spectrum of sustainability issues.

### Observations

The Persian Gulf escort operation highlighted two major problems--(1) the awkwardness of the naval command structure and (2) command and control associated with current AOR sea boundaries. The operational control of naval forces operating in the Central Command region was initially not relinquished by the U.S. Pacific Fleet. It took formation of a Joint Task Force Middle East and extending the AOR sea territory into the Gulf of Oman (which is currently in the U.S. Pacific Command AOR) to ensure clear, operational control by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command. In making the boundary change, the Joint Staff temporarily cleared up the command and control issue by employing the principle of flexible geographic area boundaries.

The Joint Staff review of Unified and Specified Command missions and responsibilities (including geographic boundaries), failed to capitalize on the Gulf experience to provide a permanent solution. The latest Unified Command Plan (submitted September 24, 1987) reaffirms that the USCENTCOM AOR includes only those bounded sea areas (Persian Gulf and Red Sea), which normally would support operations ashore. The U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) responsibility for open ocean operations and defense of sea lines of communication (SLOC) remain.

In taking this position, the Joint Staff effectively ignored several prior decision factors for determining area boundaries, as well as the Gulf escort operation experience. As drawn, boundaries between the USCENTCOM and the USPACOM cut potential as well as existing hostility zones and fail to include critical theater support facilities (Diego Garcia) and the SLOCs. Essentially, the Unified Command Plan designated U.S. Pacific Command AOR is in violation of the basic and essential rule that all forces within a Unified Commander's area of responsibility should be under his operational control.

To help resolve the command problems and rectify the USNAVCENT and the MIDEASTFOR rank inversion, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command (CINCUSCENT) "dual-hatted" the Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander as Commander, Mid-East Force. The MIDEASTFOR staff will soon be abolished and a permanent JTF staff established in Bahrain.

In Pearl Harbor, the USNAVCENT, the Navy component of the USCENCOM, is not exercising operational control of forces assigned to USCENCOM. When coupled with the small USNAVCENT size and limited ability to provide the CINUSCENT with visibility into Navy requirements, Navy POM inputs, and the Navy Integrated Priority List programs, it raises a serious question about the USNAVCENT usefulness. If the Unified Command concept is to be validated, the USNAVCENT must be given the responsibilities, authority, proper location, and staff to execute its mission.

### Recommendations

C2-1. Redraw the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. As described elsewhere in the report (see Appendix D), the land mass that includes sub-saharan Africa and Egypt should be given to the U.S. Central Command (now in the U.S. European Command AOR). The sea boundaries of the USCENCOM area of responsibility should be expanded to encompass an area roughly 20° west latitude and east to 75° east latitude. The eastern sea boundary should begin at the India/Pakistan border and proceed south and east of Diego Garcia.

C2-2. Designate the Commander, Joint Task Force, Middle East, as USNAVCENT. Move the USNAVCENT headquarters and staff to Norfolk, Virginia. Direct the U.S. Atlantic Fleet to assist the USNAVCENT by providing intelligence analysis, data automation, force deployment data, and other support requirements which effect economies and ensure USNAVCENT viability.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## UNITED STATES AIR FORCE CENTRAL

### Stated Mission

The Air Component of the United States Central Command (USCENTAF) is the Ninth Air Force. It provides command and control of air forces to conduct contingency operations. The USCENTAF is a forward deployable headquarters, based in the United States at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina. The USCENTAF Commander is also the Ninth Air Force Commander. The Ninth Air Force is an intermediate headquarters responsible for the command, administration, and supervision of forces assigned by the Air Force Tactical Air Command (see Appendix K). The Central Command Air Component role is one of several missions assigned to the Ninth Air Force.

The USCENTAF is also responsible to the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) for determining requirements for and executing material prepositioning programs in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) (i.e., \$18.6 billion in the FY 1990-1994 Five-Year Defense Plan). The USCENTAF is also the Department of Defense Executive Agent for the logistics and administrative support of the USCENTCOM and its subordinate joint commands.

### Organization and Manpower

The manpower authorizations of the Ninth Air Force and the USCENTAF are combined and usually referred to as "dual-hatted." There are a total of 392 positions involved in planning, requirements development, conducting exercises, prepositioning programs, intelligence, training, resourcing and readiness of forces. There have been 150 authorizations added to the Ninth Air Force staff over time to support additional workload associated with Southwest Asia.

<u>USAF Central/ Ninth Air Force</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			<u>Total</u>
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	
Command	7	8	2	17
Operations	92	40	8	140
Logistics	41	62	8	111
Intelligence	18	14	1	33
Personnel	2	7	2	11
Inspection	18	13	2	33
Other Staff	<u>16</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>47</u>
Total	<u>194</u>	<u>167</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>392</u>

In order to enhance and identify functions and positions dealing with the readiness of combat forces, the U.S. Air Force Headquarters has established a separate manpower accounting category. The Combat Operations Staff (COS) is a specialized mission, that centralizes combat planning, intelligence, logistics, and personnel functions. These are designated by the Air Force as nonmanagement headquarters. The Ninth Air Force Combat Operations Staff (NAFCOS) is constituted to focus on combat operations/combat planning and readiness functions supporting national tasking and the Central Command. The NAFCOS has 191 FY 1988 authorizations, many of which have both the Ninth Air Force and Air Component responsibilities, as follows:

	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>
Ninth						
Air Force	255	228	225	123	223	201
NAFCOS	<u>102</u>	<u>163</u>	<u>186</u>	<u>186</u>	<u>191</u>	<u>191</u>
Total	<u>357</u>	<u>391</u>	<u>411</u>	<u>409</u>	<u>414</u>	<u>392</u>

The forward deployable element of the USCENTAF headquarters numbers 285 authorizations. Approximately 250 of these are sourced from the Ninth Air Force/USCENTAF peacetime staff.

The Commander, USCENTAF, has the 4448 Mobility Support Squadron (56 people) and the 4401 Air Postal Squadron (20 people) to support both missions. The 4448 Mobility Support Squadron provides supply and contracting support for theater prepositioning programs. It is a mini-standard base supply system, with the war reserve material, readiness spares support, and bare base asset requirements.

The 4401 Air Postal Squadron is operating at five locations in the AOR, performing peacetime mail distribution and other responsibilities as it would during conflict.

#### Management Support Contract

There are no management support contracts.



## Observations

The Ninth Air Force/USCENTCOM staff appears reasonably sized for its workload. The magnitude of prepositioning assets; the forward deployment of airborne communications; host nation support with 13 sovereign nations; logistics support in the absence of any infrastructure; and separation by 7,000 air miles from the AOR is a demanding environment. Economies have been achieved by borrowing support from the 363 Wing at Shaw Air Force Base for several headquarters support activities, such as public affairs and the comptroller.

The Study Team observed that 24-hour manning is not present in the Indications and Warning or the Worldwide Military Command and Control System operations, as was observed elsewhere. There are three watch stander positions in the command post and another in the Southwest Asia Analysis Team (SWAT). Manpower has not increased over time, even given the emphasis on the Gulf escort operation. The SWAT is an inter-disciplinary group drawn from the USCENAF staff and the NAFCOS. With three 24-hour watch positions in the Command Post, however, a watch officer is not required in SWAT, even as additional duty.

## Recommendations

None

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

### Stated Mission

The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) is a Unified Command, reporting through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense. The USEUCOM is located in Stuttgart, Germany, and is responsible for operational command of all U.S. forces in the European theater. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command, (CINCUSEUR) is dual-hatted as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

The USEUCOM primary mission is to provide combat-ready forces to support U.S. commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. This includes war planning for both conventional and nuclear operations. The USEUCOM also plans for unilateral and multilateral contingencies, and is responsible for theater-wide coordination of intelligence activities. In addition, the USEUCOM is responsible for security assistance actions, the military assistance advisory groups and offices of defense cooperation in the USEUCOM geographic area of responsibility. While the central focus of USEUCOM is Europe, its area of responsibility extends from the north cape of Norway to the southern tip of Africa. All of Africa, except Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti, is within the USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR). The noted exceptions are within U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility.

### Organization and Manpower

In accomplishing its U.S. national interest and NATO responsibilities, the USEUCOM has organized its personnel into 11 components, which are accounted for in 11 separate Joint Manpower Program documents. The USEUCOM components and associated manning are, as follows:

<u>U.S. European Command &amp; Associated Components</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Headquarters U.S. European Command	373	144	147	664
Data Services Center (Data processing services required to support the Worldwide Military Command and Control System and other systems)	36	93	19	148
Joint Intelligence Center (Electronic intelli- gence and other source support to U.S. and NATO forces)	26	81	6	113
Silk Purse (Airborne Command Post Watch Team)	33	28	1	62
NATO School (U.S. personnel assigned to operate the NATO School)	15	19	2	36
Special Operations Command Europe (Plans and conducts unconventional war- fare and other special operations)	17	10	2	29
U.S. National Military Representative, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) (Provides liaison among the SHAPE, the DoD and the U.S. Government Agencies)	3	19	2	24

<u>(Continued)</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Live Oak (The U.S. element of quadrapartite govern- ments engaged in special plans and operations for Berlin)	3	13	1	22
Joint U.S. Military Group, Spain (Implements the 1982 Agreement of Friend- ship, Defense and Cooperation)	10	2	14	26
USEUCOM Contact Office, Turkey (U.S. Defense Representative)	3	1	3	17
Special Activities (Defense Cooperation in Armaments (39); the Stars and Stripes newspaper (26); the USEUCOM Logistics Coordination Cells (23); Collection Manage- ment Offices (15); the Special Security Office (12); and Other (24)	59	51	29	139
Total	<u>588</u>	<u>461</u>	<u>231</u>	<u>1,280</u>

A breakout of Headquarters USEUCOM manning is, as follows:

<u>Headquarters U.S. European Command</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Command Group	14	14	5	33
Special Assistant for Security Matters	7	1	3	11
Protocol Office	3	2	3	8

<u>(Continued)</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Political Advisor	0	1	1	2
Inspector General	5	1	1	7
Legal Advisor	3		3	6
Comptroller Office	2	1	8	11
Command Chaplain	1	0	0	1
Command Surgeon	6	1	3	10
Public Affairs Office	9	3	3	15
J-1, Personnel and Administration	17	30	21	68
J-2, Intelligence	73	30	25	128
J-3, Operations	61	25	10	96
J-4, Logistics	80	16	33	129
J-5, Plans and Policy	59	12	17	88
J-6, Command, Control and Communications Systems	<u>33</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>51</u>
Total	<u>373</u>	<u>144</u>	<u>147</u>	<u>664</u>

#### Management Support Contracts

The Headquarters USEUCOM reported management and support service contracts of \$13.9 million in FY 1987 and \$17.1 million in FY 1988. A review of information provided to the Study Team indicated all appeared to be adequately justified. Major ongoing efforts to develop and implement the USEUCOM Intelligence Support System (EISS) and the Theater Intelligence Architecture Program should result in opportunities for manpower savings theater-wide. Most of the \$3 million in increased FY 1988 funding is due to EISS implementation.

<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>
	<u>(Millions)</u>	
J-2, Intelligence	\$4.9	\$8.2 (increase due to EISS implementation)
J-2, Intelligence (Joint Intelligence Center)	.4	.3
J-3, Operations	.4	.2
J-4, Logistics	.3	.7
J-5, Plans and Policy	.8	1.1
J-6, Command, Control and Communications Systems	<u>6.6</u>	<u>6.6</u>
	\$13.9	\$17.1

The Study Team identified a number of issues. The Headquarters USEUCOM and some of its colocated supporting organizations have significant roles in war and are, therefore, considered high value targets and vulnerable at their present Stuttgart, Germany, location. In a NATO conflict, U.S. forces within the three component commands under USEUCOM, the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), the U.S. Navy Europe (USNAVEUR), and the U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE), are "chopped" (transferred) to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Some USEUCOM personnel transit to the Airborne Command Post and provide command and control, while others from an alternate command post in the United Kingdom assume the role of ensuring that critical logistical support is provided to U.S. forces. The USEUCOM personnel also perform the critical missions of establishing priorities and allocating incoming U.S. forces and managing U.S. nuclear weapons. The Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) continues to provide intelligence support to the U.S. and NATO forces, while the Special Operations Command, Europe, conducts unconventional warfare behind enemy lines.

To improve the survivability of these organizations and to ensure a smooth transition from peace to war, there are plans to move the USEUCOM Headquarters and its critical colocated supporting organizations, such as the Data Services Center and the Special Operations Command Europe, from Stuttgart, Germany, to various locations in the United Kingdom. As facilities become available, Headquarters USEUCOM plans to move elements of its staff to its wartime location, known as the Alternate Support Headquarters (ASH) and perform its peacetime mission. Other elements of Headquarters USEUCOM could be moved to the building presently occupied by USNAVEUR in London (see Appendix D2).

The Joint Intelligence Center planned move, with an initial operating capability in FY 1994, is more ambitious. The JIC is currently staffed with 113 billets to provide electronic intelligence support. As part of the move, the USEUCOM has plans to increase the JIC staffing to 422 billets by transferring 30 billets from its Intelligence Directorate and obtaining about 230 additional billets from other U.S. intelligence centers in the United States and Europe. An additional 50 billets are required to provide necessary automated data processing and communications support. The additional intelligence billets will include a variety of intelligence disciplines and specialties (such as photo interpreters and analysts) so that the JIC will be an all-source intelligence center. All-source intelligence centers are desirable because one type of intelligence can validate another. For instance, a reconnaissance photo can validate the location of a radar emitter reported by an electronic intelligence analyst.

The Study Team fully supports moving the organizations to a wartime location because survivability is increased and the transition from peace to war is smoother. By being in its wartime location and operating on a daily basis, the needed logistical and communications support will be in-place and functioning. Also, through daily operations and exercises, necessary improvements will be more readily identified, funded and implemented. The Study Team also supports the planned augmentation to the existing JIC from existing intelligence resources, because an all-source intelligence center is necessary for effective wartime operations.

- Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR). In peace and war, the SOCEUR is a separate command subordinate to the USEUCOM. In a NATO war, the USSOCEUR "chops" (transfers) to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), who assumes operational command of U.S. Special Operations Forces in-theater. The Commander, USSOCEUR, currently reports to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, USEUCOM, through the J-3, Operations Directorate. The USSOCEUR is responsible for planning special operations throughout the USEUCOM AOR, and for planning and conducting peacetime joint/combined special operations and training exercises, as directed. The Commander, USSOCEUR, also exercises operational control over all in-theater and dual-based U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (i.e., part of unit is in the U.S.) and all in-theater U.S. Air Force Special Operations Forces. In addition, the Commander is responsible for establishment of a Special Operations Joint Task Force, which is self-sustainable and capable of rapid response. The USSOCEUR wartime mission includes intelligence reporting, evasion and escape, guerrilla warfare, and offensive action.



The SOCEUR peacetime and wartime roles have been established at USEUCOM staff levels; however, there was some confusion regarding the new U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) role, mission, and command channel for contingency operations involving in-theater and U.S.-based special operations personnel. Later discussion with the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, USSOCOM, established that he does not intend to have operational control over any special forces units in a Theater Unified Command AOR, unless specifically directed by the National Command Authority.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Unified Command Plan (UCP) designates the area of responsibility for each of the Unified and Specified Commands. The USEUCOM geographic AOR is largely a result of World War II and subsequent decolonization of Africa. As such, the USEUCOM AOR encompasses the largest land area of any Unified Command--13 million square miles and 77 countries.

While Europe is the USEUCOM primary area of emphasis, significant resources are being expended in support of U.S. interests in Africa. For instance, the Personnel and Administration Directorate (J-1) and other personnel activities on-base are responsible for supporting the 34 military personnel assigned to Security Assistance Offices (SAO) in Africa and other military assigned to diplomatic missions. The Intelligence Directorate (J-2) maintains liaison with the Defense Attache Offices (DAO) and the JIC maintains Electronic Order of Battle data for Africa. While the USSOCEUR plans for contingency operations, Operations Directorate (J-3) personnel support operations and plans in Africa. (Chad is a recent example of operational support.)

The Logistics Directorate (J-4) provides logistical support for U.S. interests in Africa and supports the SAOs, including the writing of its Officer Efficiency Reports (OER). Within the Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5), individuals are involved in contingency planning, host nation support and other types of agreements. In summary, the Study Team estimates that 17 billets are specifically identified as directly related to Africa.

Geographic responsibility for Africa (except for those countries bordering on the Mediterranean) should be transferred to the USCENTCOM in order to provide uniform policy and operations in Africa and further reduce NATO Ally fears that the U.S. plans and executes military operations from within their sovereign territory. (Egypt would remain a USCENTCOM responsibility.) Presently, the responsibility for Africa is split between the USEUCOM and the USCENTCOM. As previously stated, the USEUCOM AOR includes all of Africa, except Egypt,

Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti. The USEUCOM AOR would continue to include Europe and the Middle East. The proposed realignment would consolidate plans and operations in Africa, provide more uniform U.S. policy and practices, and force the USEUCOM to focus on NATO/European matters and align its activities with the NATO command structure.

- Manning Trend. Headquarters USEUCOM total billets have been increasing since the 1970s. Based on available manpower data by directorate, the Study Team observed that from FY 1980 to FY 1988 the headquarters staff has grown by 122 billets (FY 1980--542 billets; FY 1988--664 billets). The greatest increase occurred in the Command Staff (33 billets), the Intelligence Directorate (32 billets) and the Plans and Policy Directorate (24 billets). The primary USEUCOM support activities (the Joint Intelligence Center, the Data Services Center and the Special Operations Command, Europe) had a net manpower increase of 66 billets during this same time period (FY 1980--224 billets; FY 1988--290 billets). The largest increase occurred in the Data Services Center (67 billets).

Although not directly comparable, the Study Team noted that the total reported headquarters billets at the USEUCOM Component Commands have decreased. The USAREUR, for example, has established Organization Review Teams to evaluate all functions being performed. The objective is to determine which functions are unnecessary, duplicative or should be performed by another activity. In 1986, the USAREUR Organizational Review Team identified a 363 billet manpower savings within Headquarters USAREUR, field operating activities and subordinate commands. These manpower savings were being achieved concurrent with increased missions and workload.

The USEUCOM, on the other hand, has not established an Organizational Review Team to identify areas where layering and duplication can be avoided. The USEUCOM relies on a manpower survey team from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to evaluate its organizational structure, grade structure and billet requirements. The USEUCOM missions and functions are evaluated in near isolation by the Joint Staff manpower survey team. For example, during the 1984 manpower survey of the USEUCOM, the team identified a net increase of 30 billets for Headquarters USEUCOM due to increased work load and missions; and a net increase of 46 billets for the USEUCOM support activities. (Few reductions in manning were identified because the survey team bases its review on existing work load instead of a zero-sum basis.)

On a horizontal basis within the Headquarters USEUCOM and the USEUCOM support activities, the Joint Staff manpower team did identify some functions that should be combined and/or realigned. For instance, the team recommended that the relationship between the Intelligence Directorate and the European Defense Analysis Center (currently the JIC) be examined, in conjunction with the Theater Intelligence Architecture Program, to determine whether further efficiencies can be obtained. Within the Personnel Directorate (J-1), however, the manpower team recommended increases in staffing to provide appropriate personnel support to all members assigned to the USEUCOM.

During the Study Team visit, it was also noted that directorate personnel were handling military personnel records for USEUCOM Army personnel. This type of function should not be performed within the confines of Headquarters USEUCOM. The military personnel records function and the seven related billets should be transferred to the nearest 1st Personnel Command activity.

In 1986, in response to congressional, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff taskings, the USEUCOM attempted to identify areas of layering and duplication. A team was established to perform a functional analysis of the USEUCOM Headquarters and the three Service component commands (the USAREUR, the USNAVEUR, and the USAFE). A data base of functional tasks with 14 groups was developed; however, the analysis was incomplete. The Study Team reviewed the data base and identified 768 functions being performed at one or more headquarters. Unfortunately, the refinement and consolidation process resulted in unusable, flawed manyear data. The Study Team was, therefore, unable to use the functional analysis data base to identify specific manpower reductions. (This subject is separately addressed earlier in this report.)

To identify fully areas of layering and duplication, the USEUCOM missions and functions should also be compared through vertical organizations. The missions and functions performed by the USEUCOM should be compared with those being performed by Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR) and the USEUCOM component commands (the USAREUR, the USNAVEUR, and the USAFE). For instance, the Study Team found that the host nation support function is being performed by all the forementioned organizations. Within the SACEUR, the Logistics and Manpower Division coordinates on logistical agreements, including host nation support matters. In accordance with the NATO Mutual Support Act, the USEUCOM (in coordination with the Service component commands) negotiates mutual support agreements. The

Services and the USEUCOM are separately responsible for negotiating implementing arrangements within specified functional areas (such as medical, transportation, and rear area operations). Further, within Germany, the USAREUR serves as the USEUCOM Executive Agent for implementation of wartime host nation support. This includes negotiating requirements and coordinating USAREUR and USAFE planning with Germany. In summary, host nation support negotiations and agreements are being performed in multiple organizations at multiple organizational layers.

The Study Team observed similar layering in other functional areas, such as wartime and contingency planning, logistics, and intelligence. Within the support area, the Study Team also observed multiple layering. For example, policy related to quality of life issues and programs is being written at all levels from the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of Personnel Management and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, down to the Corps level.

- 24-Hour Positions. At the USEUCOM, the Task Force identified about 180 billets for positions manned 24 hours daily. The positions identified included the Command Center, Message Center, the Data Services Center, the Indications and Warning (I&W) Watch Center, Joint Intelligence Center Watch, and the communications support personnel. Of this number, approximately 80 billets were identified in support of command and control and watch positions in the Command Center, the Indication and Warning (I&W) Watch Center, and the Joint Intelligence Center Watch.

With existing communication networks within Europe and between Europe and the United States, it appears that four I&W Watch Centers in Europe are overly redundant. The four I&W Watch Centers all receive the same message traffic for analysis. While there certainly is a need for redundancy, four I&W Watch Centers is nonetheless excessive, given existing communications. The I&W functions should either be consolidated at two locations, with a savings of about 35 billets or, for non-duty hours, be limited to two I&W Watch Centers with I&W analysts on-call, should the need arise.

For the Command Center and Joint Intelligence Center Watch at the USEUCOM, it appears that the number of billets manned 24 hours can be decreased by 25, resulting in a savings of 20 personnel. To accomplish this, personnel would be placed on rotating, on-call roster and required to remain within the vicinity of headquarters communications (telephones and portable beepers) so they can respond to an emergency or crisis situation.

- Joint U.S. Military Group, Spain. The mission of the Joint U.S. Military Group (JUSMG), Spain, is to implement the military portion of the 1982 Agreement of Friendship, Defense and Cooperation, except those matters pertaining to security assistance. The JUSMG is the point of contact between the U.S. Forces in Spain, the U.S. Embassy in Spain, and appropriate elements of the Spanish Government and Spanish military. The JUSMG also provides policy/guidance to U.S. forces in Spain concerning the Status of Forces and other treaty/agreement matters and prepares and processes all matters concerning operations of the U.S. forces in Spain. Finally, the JUSMG acts as the senior military advisor to the Chief, Diplomatic Mission, Spain.

In addition to the 26 JUSMG personnel, there is colocated within Madrid a Security Assistance Office (SAO) with the mission of assisting Spain in the training of personnel and acquisition of equipment necessary for the modernization of its armed forces. The authorized manning for the SAO is 24 billets. The SAO manning is augmented by four billets to manage and implement Defense Cooperation in Armaments programs.

In summary, there are 54 DoD personnel in Spain directly involved with implementation of bilateral and multilateral Defense Cooperation agreements, including security assistance and Defense Cooperation in Armaments programs. These personnel also provide direct liaison between the U.S. Diplomatic Mission and the Spanish military establishment. Given the dollar magnitude of the security assistance program and the overlapping liaison and country-to-country agreement implementation functions, significant savings can be achieved by consolidation of these two colocated organizations, with a potential savings of 23 billets.

- USEUCOM Contact Office, Turkey. The mission of the USEUCOM Contact Office (USECOF) is to represent the Secretary of Defense and the CINCPAC as the single, U.S. military point of contact with the U.S. Diplomatic Mission, other U.S. and host country agencies, and the host country defense establishment. The USECOF also ensures that appropriate action is taken concerning foreign criminal jurisdiction matters and protects the rights of U.S. Forces and their dependents subject to prosecution or imprisonment in Turkey.

In addition the 17 USECOF personnel, there is a SAO providing a direct liaison between the U.S. Diplomatic Mission and host nation defense establishment. As in Spain, the SAO assists Turkey in the training of personnel and acquisition of U.S. equipment and spares necessary for the modernization of the

armed forces. The authorized manning for the SAO is 66 billets. The SAO manning is augmented by five billets to manage and implement Defense Cooperation in Armaments programs.

In summary, there are 88 DoD personnel in Turkey providing a direct liaison between the U.S. Diplomatic Mission and the Turkish military establishment. The USECOF has a mission that is redundant with and could be absorbed by the SAO. The senior military representative within the SAO could be dual-hatted as the Secretary of Defense and USEUCOM official representative. In addition to advising and reporting to the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission, the senior military representative with the SAO already keeps the USEUCOM informed on security assistance and other military matters. The USEUCOM has "control" over the SAO personnel because appraisals (e.g., officer evaluation reports) are written by USEUCOM personnel. The Study Team estimates merging the USECOF and the SAO would save 17 billets.

#### Recommendations

D-1. Program the funding necessary to relocate the Joint Intelligence Center, Special Operations Command Europe, and the Headquarters USEUCOM to survivable locations in the United Kingdom.

D-2. Direct the Services to augment the Joint Intelligence Center from existing intelligence resources.

D-3. Redraw the U.S. European and the U.S. Central Command areas of responsibility within Africa to give the U.S. CENTCOM all sub-Sahara Africa plus Egypt, transfer 17 billets from the USEUCOM to CENTCOM, and update the Unified Command Plan to reflect the revised AORs. (No reduction--a transfer of 17 billets).

D-4. Transfer the Army military personnel records and the seven related billets from Headquarters USEUCOM to the 1st Personnel Command.

D-5. Consolidate the Indications and Warning Centers in Europe (eliminate 35 billets).

D-6. Reduce the number of 24-hour billets, within the Command Center and Joint Intelligence Center Watch, through reliance on an on-call roster for 24-hour watch positions (eliminate 20 military billets).

D-7. Consolidate the Joint U.S. Military Group, Spain, with the Security Assistance Office and reduce the combined manning by 23 billets (eliminate 23 billets).

D-8. Abolish the USEUCOM Contact Office (USECOF), Turkey, and direct the senior U.S. military representative within the Security Assistance Office to assume the USECOF function (eliminate 17 billets).

D-9. Evaluate the present layering of responsibilities relating to host nation support, logistical support, wartime and contingency planning and intelligence support within the USEUCOM, the SACEUR and the components. This evaluation should examine the feasibility of consolidating these functions at the USEUCOM, with associated reductions in staffing at the Service component commands.

## U.S. ARMY EUROPE AND THE SEVENTH ARMY

### Stated Mission

The U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) mission is to prevent war by training combat-ready forces in-theater and providing and sustaining, in coordination with host nations, the capability to receive, equip, arm, maintain, and supply U.S. mobilization forces, while ensuring quality of life support to U.S. personnel stationed in-theater. The USAREUR is headquartered at Heidelberg, Germany.

### Organization and Manpower

In the performance of the USAREUR mission, V and VII Corps are organized to provide combat-ready forces and the 7th Army Training Center (7ATC) manages the necessary training areas. The 21st Support Command (SUPCOM) provides combat service support, integrated supply and maintenance, and receives, stores, and maintains theater war reserves. The SUPCOM also issues equipment required for mobilized divisions--i.e., Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS). The 200th Theater Army Materiel Management Center (TAMMC) exercises management and control of selected critical items, such as bulk fuel and munitions. The 1st Personnel Command provides support for personnel assignments, personnel and administrative operations, and personnel support services such as operation of the Army postal units. The 7th Medical Command manages health services for the U.S. Army Forces and dependents in-theater. Current authorized manning is, as follows:

<u>U.S. Army Europe</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
HQ V Corps	144	350	480	974
HQ VII Corps	163	423	568	1,154
HQ 7th Army Training Center	93	115	169	377
HQ 21st Support Command	165	262	550	977
HQ 200th Theater Army Material Management Center	66	127	622	815
HQ 1st Personnel Command	44	227	192	463
HQ 7th Medical Command	93	104	136	333
Subtotal	768	1,608	2,717	5,093



About 3,400 of the 5,093 personnel do not have a wartime mission (i.e., individuals are in manning Table of Distribution Allowance (TDA) billets with a peacetime support role). The following is an organizational breakdown of the Headquarters USAREUR and Field Operations.

<u>Hqs USAREUR and Field Operating Activities</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Command Group	23	22	40	85
Personnel	34	11	152	197
Intelligence	75	155	107	337
Operations	113	59	94	266
Logistics	59	14	54	127
Resource Management	24	12	192	228
Engineering	40	4	278	322
Chaplain	12	6	7	25
Inspector General	43	13	15	71
Judge Advocate	19	2	20	41
Provost Marshal	23	7	21	51
Public Affairs	5	5	20	30
Host Nation Support	13	4	55	72
Contracts	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>7</u>
Subtotal	<u>485</u>	<u>314</u>	<u>1,060</u>	<u>1,859</u>
Total	<u>1,253</u>	<u>1,922</u>	<u>3,777</u>	<u>6,952</u>

#### Management Support Contracts

The Headquarters, USAREUR, reported \$50 million in contract expenditures for FY 1987, of which only \$1.1 million was identified as management support efforts. Brief descriptions of the management support efforts provided to the Study Team appeared to justify the work.

#### Observations

The Study Team identified several issues:

- Headquarters Manpower. The Headquarters USAREUR (Army Management Headquarters Activity (AMHA)) manning authorization has decreased from 1,253 in FY 1985 to 1,095 in FY 1988. The command has made an effort to realign and reduce headquarters billets. During the period November 1985 to November 1986, an Organization Review Team (ORT) was formed

within the USAREUR to conduct a functional review of USAREUR Headquarters staff, as well as USAREUR major commands and field operating agencies. The ORT objective was to recommend deletion, reduction, consolidation and/or realignment of functions. At the conclusion of the study, 363 billets were identified as potential manpower savings.

Within the USAREUR Headquarters, the ORT identified a manpower savings of 67 billets. Most of the reduction, however, was due to realignment of functions. For example, 58 billets were transferred to the 5th Signal Command (a subordinate command of the U.S. Army Information Systems Command) for centralized control and management of information systems, audiovisual, and printing and publications. Resource Management Offices within various USAREUR staff elements were also eliminated and program budget functions were consolidated in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management.

The ORT also identified reductions in manpower at the USAREUR major commands. For example, the 21st Support Command plans to reduce its manning from 977 to 927 billets--a reduction of 50 billets. Field operating activity reductions were also identified. For instance, the Installation Support Activity Europe (ISAE), with 109 billets, was deleted and its functions either eliminated or transferred, with reduced manning, to another engineering division. The Study Team fully supports the USAREUR efforts to reduce headquarters manning.

As functions have been transferred from headquarters, the USAREUR has retained control over some of the functions by designating the activities Field Operating Activity Europe (FOA-E). From FY 1985 to FY 1988, the designated FOA-E manning increased from 394 to 542 billets. (The 109 ISAE billets are not included in the 542 billets.) If ISAE and the Organization Review Activity as field operating activities are considered, the total manning for FOA-E has decreased from 749 in FY 1985 to 623 in FY 1988.) Eleven of the 14 headquarters staff elements have manpower billets on two manning documents--the AMHA for policy and management functions and the FOA-E for operational functions.

Based on the Study Team's approach with respect to the types of functions and billets that should be identified as headquarters staff, instead of 1,095 billets, 1,859 billets were identified as headquarters staff. (The subject of what should constitute headquarters staff is separately discussed earlier in the report.) In previous years, the activities comprising the 1,859 billets were included in the headquarters manning document. In effect, headquarters reductions have been made by "sleight of hand." Activities providing management and staff supervision over programs, monitoring policy implementation, and planning and

organizing programs are clearly headquarters staff functions. For example, the Study Team included the 115 billets in the Community and Family Support Agency as headquarters because the offices are planning and organizing programs and providing management and staff supervision over program implementation, two levels of command above the individuals who are actually providing the community and family support. Similarly, 64 Inspector General positions are included since the purpose of inspections and investigations is to ensure policy is being properly implemented.

Within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, 71 billets for the Exercise Division, Army Continuing Education System (ACES), and the Command Center are similarly included. The Exercise Division primary function is planning and organizing the support needed for exercises, which are management functions. Similarly, the ACES billets are included because these individuals are providing guidance on and exercising oversight of the implementation of the various programs within the ACES. Although not designated as an FOA-E, 266 billets for the Intelligence Center (which provides data necessary for wartime planning) and 86 billets for the Organizational Review Activity (which provides oversight of headquarters staff to improve efficiency and ensure implementation of command goals and programs) are also included.

- 24-Hour Positions. Within the Headquarters USAREUR, the Study Team identified about 100 billets for positions manned 24 hours a day. The positions identified are located in the Command Center and Indications and Warning (I&W) Watch Center, as well as communications support personnel.

With the use of local telephone communications and portable beepers, it appears that the number of 24-hour manning positions in the Command Center and the I&W Watch Center can be reduced. The Study Team identified 5 billets that could be manned on an 8-hour versus 24-hour manning basis. Conversion to 8-hour positions will result in a savings of 20 personnel. To accomplish this, the I&W analysts and command center personnel would be placed on a rotating on-call roster and required to remain within the vicinity of headquarters communications so they can respond to an emergency or crisis situation.

- Base Operations Support. Substantial manpower savings can be achieved at the USAREUR major command level (V and VII Corps, 21st Support Command, and 7th Army Training Center) by eliminating the policy and management oversight responsibilities for Base Operations Support (BASOPS) from the major command headquarters management and support staff. The BASOPS functions are typically quality of life, community affairs, equal

opportunity and employment, family housing, military and civilian personnel management, physical security, facilities construction and support and medical services.

During the last few years, the concept of operating installations or communities has undergone radical change. Instead of overregulation by higher headquarters, more installations are being operated under the Model Installation Program. The implementing DoD Directive 4001.1, Installation Management, dated September 4, 1986, and Service implementing regulations confirm the management principle that installation commanders should be given authority commensurate with their responsibilities. Moreover, the DoD Directive states that headquarters staff activities "...shall be directed toward facilitating any installation commander's ability to accomplish the mission." The Study Team discussions with Model Installation Program personnel indicate that more than 40,000 requests for waivers from unnecessary regulations have been forwarded by installation commanders. Only 15 percent of the waivers have been disapproved at a higher headquarters. Most were requests for waivers of policies written at various intermediate levels below the Service headquarters. That most requests for waivers are granted--often over the objections of the staff--is powerful evidence that there is a substantial amount of unnecessary regulations that is stifling creativity at the installation level.

Within the USAREUR, the Study Team concluded that substantial manpower savings are achievable through implementation of the Model Installation Program concepts for BASOPS functions. Manpower savings are possible by minimizing layering of management and oversight and pushing authority and resource responsibility down to the lowest feasible levels. This is particularly true when the additional management layer is located at a "fighting command," such as the Corps, where commanders must devote time and resources to oversee housekeeping and support functions rather than to their primary mission. Since most of these services are delivered at the installation or community level, responsible commanders at the local level should be able to better establish priorities and allocate resources within their areas of responsibility. (This concept is separately discussed earlier in the report.)

Additional management staffs increase disruption and complicate the management tasks. Headquarters staffs are best at planning, coordinating, and supervising. Their management effectiveness is determined by how well subordinate commands implement their plans and programs. A single small staff at the Headquarters USAREUR can provide policy and guidance that commanders and managers at all levels can follow. Headquarters staffs typically:

- develop and issue policy/policy guidance;
- review and evaluate performance;
- allocate and distribute resources; and
- plan, program and budget.

Field organizations at the installation or community level typically:

- implement and execute policy;
- prioritize resource requirements;
- deliver services and products;
- request guidance and support, as needed; and
- provide data to higher headquarters.

The Study Team found that the middle layer of management (i.e., the Corps, the 21st Support Command, and the 7th Army Training Command) duplicates both the higher and lower headquarters. It usually provides only advice and recommendations, adds little value to the process, and is very likely counterproductive.

The functions under the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (DCSPER) provide an example of command layering within the USAREUR. Command layering appears at the V and VII Corps, the 21st Support Command and the 7th Army Training Command Headquarters. The implementers of the DCSPER functions are primarily located at the community level.

The DCSPER responsibilities include (1) developing policies, plans and programs for the management of military and civilian personnel and their families and (2) developing policy for and supervising programs to enhance quality of life for USAREUR personnel (equal opportunity, morale support activities, human resources development, community support programs and safety). In addition, the Commander, USAREUR, has a direct reporting Equal Employment Opportunity Office.

There are 19 organizational entities reporting to the DCSPER--including the 1st Personnel Command, which is the Theater Army Military Personnel Center. The DCSPER management headquarters/headquarters support staff totals are shown below, including headquarters and field operating activities:

<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
34	11	211	248

For the VII Corps, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Manpower (G-1) prepares personnel plans, recommends personnel policies,

and supervises the execution of approved personnel directives. Assigned areas of responsibilities include:

- developing and implementing VII Corps policy regarding community support services, morale support activities;
- officer personnel management;
- personnel plans and operations;
- programs and budget; and
- safety and human resource support.

The G-1 charter is virtually a mirror of that of the DCSPER, with a considerable amount of advising, assisting, and recommending to the VII Corps Commander or the communities. Also, the Commander, VII Corps, has a four-person Equal Employment Opportunity Office direct reporting unit, and the Chief of Staff has a 10-person Office of Civilian Personnel direct reporting unit. There are 86 management headquarters and headquarters support staff overseeing these functions.

It is at the community level where the support services overseen by the DCSPER and the G-1 are actually delivered. The important point is that this is where policy, guidance, advice, etc., must be turned into programs and services for the community members. This is where "quality of life" is delivered.

The need for additional oversight is questionable, at best. Marginal improvements in the quality of service can rarely be justified. New DoD management concepts, such as the Model Installation Program, have proven successful when local commanders are given increased authority and control of resources. Local commanders and managers are closest to the needs of the community and should be the most knowledgeable on how to meet them. Moreover, headquarters must promote and take advantage of state-of-the-art information management capabilities.

The Study Team noted that both in 1986 and 1987, the USAREUR did several organizational reviews to identify essential services and functions and recommend the most efficiently configured organization and staffing levels to accomplish its mission. One of the studies had the following tasking:

"Eliminate direct management of BASOPS products by UMC staff. For those products not essential to wartime mission, UMC will limit involvement to monitoring and influencing through appropriate MTOE (Modified Table of Equipment) staff element, while depending on other agencies for BASOPS/peacetime product support. Result of study must exceed simple repackaging of current work load and manpower."

The implied advantages of the tasking included eliminating a management layer, pushing resources and authority downward, achieving economies of scale in BASOPS products, and achieving higher grades and experience at the community level.

The UMC proposals ranged from creation of a Corps Regional Support Agency providing BASOPS products to an expansion of the 21st Support Command MTOE to a wartime focus, to transfer of approximately 45 to 50 percent of the command's current TDA billets to other levels, as a divestiture of BASOPS management and oversight. None of the various proposals were accepted due to perceived turbulence with changed operations and UMC and USAREUR staff perceived span of control problems.

The USAREUR study identified 700 personnel at Headquarters USAREUR, 1,100 personnel at the UMC, and 35,000 personnel at the 39 communities involved with BASOPS. The Study Team estimates that streamlining and use of the Model Installation Program concept could result in a savings of 550 billets.

#### Recommendations

D1-1. Reduce the number of 24-hour billets through reliance on an on-call roster for 24-hour watch positions (eliminate 20 billets).

D1-2. Realign the policy and management oversight responsibilities for base operations support from the USAREUR major commands to Headquarters USAREUR and the communities and eliminate 550 billets.

## UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES EUROPE

### Stated Mission

The U.S. Naval Forces Europe (USNAVEUR), with headquarters in London, England, is the naval component of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) exercises operational and administrative command and control of all U.S. Naval Forces within the USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR).

The USNAVEUR has three principal subordinate components, the Sixth Fleet, the Fleet Air Mediterranean (FAIRMED), and the Naval Activities United Kingdom (NAVACTSUK). The Sixth Fleet is a war fighting force that supports United States national interests in the Mediterranean and U.S. commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) southern region. At any given time, the Sixth Fleet may be composed of one or two carrier battle groups, submarines, patrol aircraft, marine amphibious forces and a complement of various support ships. The Commander, Sixth Fleet, is dual-hatted as Commander, Strike Force South, a subordinate component of the NATO Allied Forces Southern Region (AFSOUTH).

The FAIRMED provides logistics support to naval aviation units and overseas naval shore activities in the southern region. The Commander, Fleet Air Mediterranean (COMFAIRMED), is also the Commander, Maritime Air Forces, Mediterranean, a NATO command providing a maritime surveillance capability. In a second dual-hat to the Sixth Fleet, a similar maritime surveillance capability is provided for national interests.

The NAVACTSUK is responsible for providing logistics and administrative support to operational forces and shore contingents located in the United Kingdom and Northern Europe.

The USNAVEUR has two direct reporting management support activities. They are the Fleet Operations Control Center (FOCCEUR) and the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center (FOSIC). The FOCCEUR maintains command and control facilities, systems, and equipment for the USNAVEUR. The FOSIC is responsible for operational intelligence support and reporting Warsaw Pact naval and naval-related activities.



## Organization and Manpower

The USNAVEUR headquarters consists of a Commander-In-Chief, an immediate staff, a Deputy and a Chief of Staff. Staff offices and "N" designated directorates are identified, as follows:

<u>U.S. Naval Forces,</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
<u>Europe</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Command/Deputy/Staff	21	16	20	57
N-1, Administration	6	8	7	21
N-2, Intelligence	16	18	2	36
N-3, Operations	25	21	4	50
N-4, Support/Logistics	16	9	4	29
N-5, Plans and Policy	13	3	2	18
N-6, Communications	5	4	2	11
N-7, Facilities	5	0	6	11
N-8, Cryptology	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>14</u>
Subtotal	<u>114</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>247</u>

<u>Fleet Operations</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
<u>Control Center</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
	<u>10</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>84</u>
Subtotal	<u>10</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>84</u>

<u>Fleet Ocean</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
<u>Surveillance</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Intelligence Center</u>				
<u>London</u>				
	<u>21</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>47</u>
Subtotal	<u>21</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>47</u>
Total	<u>145</u>	<u>186</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>378</u>

## Management Support Contracts

The USNAVEUR did not identify any management support contracts.

## Observations

There are two principal issues that influence a review of the USNAVEUR. The first involves duplication of effort and the web of interrelationships between the USNAVEUR and the NATO AFSOUTH organization. The second deals with the relationship the USNAVEUR has with the U.S. Atlantic Fleet (USLANTFLT), the USLANTFLT type Commanders and the sea-going forces.

The Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces South (CINCSOUTH) is a four-star United States Navy flag officer. The CINCSOUTH is dual-hatted into the U.S. national structure as CINCUSNAVEUR. The Commanders of the two USNAVEUR operational subordinates--the Commander, Sixth Fleet, and the Commander, Fleet Air, Mediterranean--are dual-hatted into the AFSOUTH organization as subordinate Commanders (i.e., for STRIKEFORCESOUTH and for the Maritime Air Forces, Mediterranean, respectively). Aside from the additional dual-hats of the CINCSOUTH Executive Assistant and aide to the USNAVEUR, there does not appear to be any further sharing of resources, even though the missions of the U.S. European Command and the NATO structure overlap in the southern region.

A complete analysis of duplicative manpower and structure was not possible due to the lack of cooperation with the Study Team directed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). One case the Study Team did examine, however, was STRIKEFORCESOUTH. The Sixth Fleet has 12 officers and 15 enlisted personnel involved in developing plans and operations within the USNAVEUR AOR. The STRIKEFORCESOUTH has a total contingent of approximately 50 personnel, whose primary task is to develop plans and operations within the AFSOUTH AOR. At least 46 of the 50 billets assigned are U.S. Navy. There is little doubt duplication exists when 27 personnel are functionally responsible for an AOR that duplicates and exceeds the AFSOUTH AOR. There is no apparent reason for having 46 additional U.S. Navy resources on the STRIKEFORCESOUTH staff. This example gives a strong indication that significant U.S. manpower savings are likely through a study comparing the functions of the NATO and U.S. national command organizations in Europe.

Another issue involves the USNAVEUR/USLANTFLT relationship. The USNAVEUR has no real responsibility to train and ensure the readiness of assigned operational forces. The forces operating within the USNAVEUR AOR and under the direction of COMSIXTHFLT are, in fact, USLANTFLT assets. They happen to be assigned to USNAVEUR while operating in the Mediterranean region, but USNAVEUR must rely on the support provided to these forces by the USLANTFLT type commanders. The CINCUSNAVEUR is, in effect, a "middleman" whose subordinate shore-based assets can easily be transferred to the USLANTFLT. This calls into question the validity of maintaining a separate and distinct naval structure within the European theater.

The two arguments proffered in support of retaining the USNAVEUR structure were (1) a need to limit the USLANTFLT geographic span of control and (2) the potential conflict of trying to serve Commanders-in-Chief for both the Atlantic and Europe.

With respect to the first item, the Study Team noted that the U.S. Pacific Fleet (USPACFLT) AOR is significantly larger than that of USLANTFLT and, thereby, faces greater logistical and support requirements. The Study Team found no indication that Commander, USPACFLT, was unable to operate at an acceptable level due to geographic span of control.

With regard to the second point, the Study Team noted that the Army Forces Command and the Tactical Air Command must serve and supply forces to multiple Unified Commanders, as circumstances warrant. Since all direction is provided by the National Command Authority through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, it seems logical that any conflict between competing Unified Commanders for forces can be resolved in advance by the Chairman.

The Study Team concluded that the USNAVEUR, as it is presently configured, should be disestablished and the USLANTFLT designated as the the U.S. European Command Navy component command. A majority of the USNAVEUR 247 end strength can be eliminated (238 billets). The facilities currently used by USNAVEUR in London can accommodate that portion of the U.S. European Command Headquarters that will not be housed at the Alternate Support Headquarters (see Appendix D).

Disestablishment of the USNAVEUR raised several attendant issues involving the continued U.S. Naval flag officer presence within the AFSOUTH structure, disposition of the FOSIC and the

FOCCEUR operations, and lines of communications between the USEUCOM and the USLANTFLT.

The current assignment of a four star naval flag officer as Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Region (CINCSOUTH), along with the dual-hats of the COMSIXTHFLT and the COMFAIRMED, would remain intact. The current CINCSOUTH additional duty role within the U.S. national command structure within Europe would be discontinued. This arrangement would ensure continued U.S. control within the NATO southern region and permit a more efficient U.S. national structure within the European AOR.

The FOSIC should continue operation in its present location, under the command of the CINCLANTFLT. Upon stand-up of the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) at the Alternate Support Headquarters in 1994, the FOSIC can be consolidated into the JIC to provide further overhead manpower savings. Continued operation of the FOSIC in the near-term is, however, essential to U.S. interests in Europe.

The FOCCEUR currently provides a Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) remote to seven naval sites within Europe. This remote could be provided from Norfolk, VA, using existing USLANTFLT facilities and resources. Manpower savings associated with this action is 84 billets (10 officers, 74 enlisted).

The distance between USLANTFLT Headquarters in Norfolk, VA, and the U.S. European Command Headquarters in Vaihingen or London poses significant, but not unsolvable, coordination and communication problems. Should USLANTFLT become the naval component in Europe, a small group (8 officers and 1 enlisted) could be colocated with the European Command to facilitate communication and coordination between the USEUCOM and the USLANTFLT. Authorizations for these nine positions could be accommodated from residual USNAVEUR resources.

In summary, disestablishment of the USNAVEUR would result in a more efficient European Command structure and retention of U.S. control of the NATO southern region. Fleet readiness will also likely be enhanced, since the operational forces would be under USLANTFLT control, both in the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea.

Other than eliminating the USNAVEUR Headquarters, the Study Team concluded that other reductions are not feasible. The USNAVEUR has been reduced by 31 percent in assigned strength since 1972. This has forced the organization to man at efficient

levels and only those functions which are mission essential. If the Department of Defense remains committed to the concept of a separate and distinct naval headquarters presence in Europe, then the price of the commitment must be to support the USNAVEUR current manpower levels.

The Fleet Ocean Surveillance and Intelligence Facility (FOSIF), in Rota, Spain, should be examined in greater detail. The Study Team did not visit Rota, which precludes reaching a firm conclusion. The primary FOSIC mission is to collect intelligence data, primarily from national assets. That data are analyzed by the FOSIC and transmitted to fleet operational units. The FOSIF in Rota, Spain, appears to serve as a back-up operation to the FOSIC, in the event that the FOSIC is rendered inoperable for any reason. Since the FOSIF, Rota, appears to function strictly as a back-up operation, that function might just as easily be provided by the FOSIC detachment, at the USLANTFLT in Norfolk, VA. Should this observation prove true, the U.S. could save 51 additional billets.

### Recommendations

D2-1. Disestablish the U.S. Naval Force Europe Headquarters, transfer responsibilities to the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and eliminate 238 billets.

D2-2. Retain the FOSIC, London, for the near term, as a separate USLANTFLT unit; consolidate the FOSIC into the Joint Intelligence Center upon activation at the Alternate Support Headquarters in 1994.

D2-3. Eliminate the FOCCEUR and transfer the WWMCCS responsibilities to USLANTFLT in Norfolk, VA. (Elimination of 84 billets.)

D2-4. Establish a USLANTFLT 9-person liaison unit colocated with USEUCOM Headquarters.

D2-5. Retain the U.S. Navy four star flag officer billet as CINCSOUTH, continuing his AFSOUTH additional duty responsibilities for the SIXTHFLEET and the FAIRMED.

D2-6. Assess the Fleet Ocean Surveillance and Intelligence Facility in Rota, Spain, to determine if the operation is required or if the U.S. Atlantic Fleet could perform the same role within existing resources at Norfolk, VA.

## UNITED STATES AIR FORCES EUROPE

### Stated Mission

The United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE) is the air component of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). The USAFE mission is to plan, conduct, control, and coordinate offensive and defensive air operations under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command (CINCUSEUR). The USAFE is also an Air Force, major command with the attendant responsibilities for training, equipping, sustainment, and readiness of assigned forces.

The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Air Forces Europe (CINCUSUSAFE) is also an allied air commander within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) structure. As Commander, Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE), he directs the integrated employment of central region allied air resources in support of Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT).

During peacetime, as the USEAUCOM air component, the USAFE is principally involved in employment and contingency planning, host nation agreements, sustainability, sourcing the war fighting force, and ensuring its readiness.

### Organization and Manpower

The Study Team assessment focused on functions and the associated manpower involved in direction, control, planning, oversight, policy promulgation, program management, and resource allocation. Activities directly supporting headquarters and special mission staffs were also examined. These are activities/categories of manpower authorizations are usually referred to as management headquarters, management headquarters support, combat operations staff, or direct reporting units (DRUs).

The USAFE employs each of these categories of manpower in various organizational echelons to accomplish its mission. There are 979 management headquarters positions providing traditional advice and guidance to subordinate units in the functions of resource allocation, policy, mid- and long-range planning, safety, intelligence, logistics, operations and quality of life programs.

There are another 450 positions in the USAFE Combat Operations Staff (the EUROPS). The EUROPS staff on combat

readiness issues in a limited number of functions: logistics, operations, civil engineering, medical, and contingency planning. They operate the USAFE war headquarters or operations support center, the logistics readiness center, develop force deployment data and war materials requirements, report operational status of forces and equipment, and work medical logistics issues.

The EUROPS is a war fighting support structure that integrates functions needed for operational and employment planning for peacetime/contingency operations, and force beddowns. They work the substantive issues of mobility, evacuation, and operational orders. The Vice Commander, USAFE, is the dual-hatted EUROPS Director.

With the exception of the operations support center and logistics readiness center, these people are commingled with other members of the parent headquarters staff function. their identity as "special mission staff" is obscured and the manpower categorization (combat operations staff) becomes artificial.

The USAFE has three numbered air forces (NAF) with their own combat operations staffs. The 3rd, 16th, and 17th Air Forces (headquartered in the United Kingdom Spain, and West Germany, respectively) are responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and supporting tactical, reconnaissance, airlift, command and control, and electronic warfare systems. These NAFs provide direction and oversight to 64,000 personnel at 28 major installations in eight countries in the USEUCOM area of responsibility. Through the NAFs, the USAFE is responsible for overall command and operational control of 20 wings of tactical aircraft and the administrative and logistics support for an additional 29,000 personnel of the Military Airlift Command (MAC), the Strategic Airlift Command (SAC), the Electronic Security Command, and the Air Force Communications Command.

In addition, the USAFE is required to maintain and operate an aero-medical evacuation system, a command, control and communication system compatible with the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), a tactical air control system, an intelligence collection, exploitation, production, and distribution system to support national and NATO requirements, and an indications and warning (I&W) center to support the Department of Defense and the NATO command structure.

The Headquarters USAFE also employs direct reporting units (DRUs) for theater-wide missions, which have a restricted scope and functional focus. The DRUs are directly subordinate to the Headquarters USAFE and usually under the functional control of a Deputy Chief of Staff. The USAFE has 22 DRUs, 14 located at Ramstein Air Base. The Study Team examined each DRU mission and

its manpower, and determined that seven are extensions of Headquarters USAFE functions. In the case of all seven, direction, policy, oversight, and/or program management was evident. A recap of the USAFE positions considered in the Study Team assessment follows:

<u>Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Europe</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Operations	83	34	31	148
Engineering & Services	39	18	43	100
Intelligence	10	17	6	33
Logistics	67	76	30	173
Comptroller	31	27	31	89
Personnel	15	19	18	52
Plans & Programs	79	33	24	136
Other Staff	<u>94</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>248</u>
Subtotal	418	319	242	979

<u>USAFE Combat Operations Staff</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Operations	89	56	16	161
Engineering & Services	30	12	12	54
Logistics	70	113	12	195
Comptroller	4	3	1	8
Plans & Programs	9	5	1	15
Medical	9	2	1	12
Security Police	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>
Subtotal	213	194	43	450

<u>Direct Reporting Units</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Personnel Center	27	80	43	150
Inspection Center	61	61	13	135
Civil Engineer Europe	21	22	49	92
Intelligence Wing	207	539	66	812
7000 Munitions Support Squadron	11	43	2	56



(continued)	FY 1988 Authorized Manpower			
<u>Direct Reporting Units</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
7000 Special Activities Squadron	18	11	8	37
7200 Management Engineering Squadron	<u>24</u>	<u>118</u>	<u>52</u>	<u>194</u>
Subtotal	<u>369</u>	<u>874</u>	<u>233</u>	<u>1,476</u>

	FY 1988 Authorized Manpower			
<u>Numbered Air Forces</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
3rd Air Force Headquarters	32	35	13	80
3rd Air Force Combat Operations Staff	10	6	4	20
16th Air Force Headquarters	30	19	15	64
16th Air Force Combat Operations Staff	15	11	4	30
17th Air Force Headquarters	36	21	9	66
17th Air Force Combat Operations Staff	<u>57</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>106</u>
Subtotal	<u>180</u>	<u>125</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>366</u>
Total	<u>1,000</u>	<u>1,387</u>	<u>518</u>	<u>2,905</u>

Concern over the size and comparability of military staffs in Europe has been the subject of Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) action on each of the last three Defense Appropriation Acts (FY 1986-FY 1988). The USAFE has been reduced \$60 million to date, with another \$25 million reduction recommended by the SAC in FY 1988. These were nonspecific reductions aimed at the approximately \$1.1 billion annual U.S. Air Forces Europe operational and maintenance (O&M) budget.

The O&M account for management of headquarters has been approximately \$15 million over the last several years. In FY 1987, civilian pay and travel costs accounted for 81 percent, while supplies and equipment comprised the remainder.

### Management Support Contracts

Headquarters supporting contracts were in evidence, but each was paid from other program element dollars in Major Force Program II. A total of approximately \$17.1 million in contract dollars were supporting headquarters functions and responsibilities in FY 1987. The following are examples of contract services that support or are an extension of headquarters functions:

<u>Contracts Examples</u>	<u>Millions</u>
Force Level Automated Planning Systems	\$1.30
Automated Missions Planning	.05
Seven Task Orders to same Contractor for Architectural Drawings	.38
Test and Evaluation of Alarm Systems (SANDIA LABS)	2.17
Security Accreditation	.20
Systems Development Facility/TFC Integration (MITRE)	.17

### Observations

Many have questioned the need to assign large numbers of people to national headquarters in Europe during peacetime, when many of these same functions are already present within NATO organizations. This question is particularly pertinent when the U.S. headquarters does not have a direct combat mission.

The Headquarters USAFE wartime manpower is distributed in the following ways:

USAFE/NAF War Headquarters	74 percent
NATO Command Centers	7 percent
- HQ AAFCE	
- Allied Tactical Operations Centers	
- Sector Operations Centers	
- Allied Tactical Air Forces	
Main and Colocated Operating Bases	<u>19</u> percent
Total	<u>100</u> percent

Many combat support functions, such as medical, logistics, intelligence, intratheater movement of people and equipment remain a national responsibility. In its theater air component combat role, the bulk of the USAFE staff is required to provide intelligence analysis, medical support, evacuation of noncombatants, and the full spectrum of logistics and sustainability needs, as well as receive, beddown, and make ready the Continental U.S. (CONUS) augmentation.

Nineteen percent of the USAFE staff are designated advance party members. This is an interdisciplinary group responsible for the initial reception and beddown of deploying forces at some 70 main and colocated (allied) operating bases in the theater. They are the principal intermediaries between the local authorities and, often, the local population for supplementing host nation facilities, services, and power.

The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Air Force, Europe is dual-hatted as the Commander, Allied Air Force Central Europe (AAFCE). He is directly responsible to the Commander, Allied Forces Central Europe (always a German four star general), for maintaining an integrated air defense system for the Central Region. Upon hostilities, members of the USAFE staff augment Headquarters AAFCE operations centers throughout West Germany.

The AAFCE was formed in 1974 to centralize operational command and improve the integration of air resources in the European central region. Located at Ramstein Air Base, West Germany, it is staffed by 417 people from six NATO nations (Belgium, Canada, West Germany, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States). The Headquarters AAFCE peacetime functions include assessing the threat, establishing common air doctrines, determining policies and plans, standardizing procedures, tactics and training, and arranging air exercises. There appears to be substantial overlap with functions performance by the USAFE; however, the Study Team was denied access to the NATO organization.

In the strictest definition of management headquarters and headquarters support functions, Headquarters USAFE reveals a reasonably sized staff to accomplish its mission. A more realistic assessment of the special mission staffs and direct reporting units, however, indicates a large number of people performing extensions of headquarters functions. Collectively, these staffs represent about a 5.2 percent investment in headquarters to tactical forces commanded. The history of USAFE headquarters staffing shows a steady decrease since 1975. Over 540 authorizations have been reduced from management headquarters positions during the period FY 1975 - FY 1988. The Study Team was not able to determine if these were realigned into the

EUROPS, the DRUs or the NAFs; staffing increases in these support organizations, however, suggest such a possibility.

The USAFE sustained a 153 authorization reduction in the DoD Reorganization Act mandated action. These positions were lost as end strength reductions to the U.S. Air Force.

The USAFE is in the process of realigning manpower spaces from the headquarters (i.e., the Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and the Inspector General) to establish two new DRUs. The European Personnel Center will have a restricted scope not involving policy issues. They will provide command-wide oversight, guidance and evaluation of quality force programs, education, assignments and civilian personnel programs. The total positions allocated to the headquarters personnel function before the realignment was 182. The new DRU, plus headquarters positions, equals 202. Increased workload or new functions were not identified to justify the additional staff of 20 authorizations.

The Study Team identified excessive layering and duplication of personnel and functions associated with DoD mandated "special people programs"--i.e., drug, alcohol, personnel policy, etc. Usually, these functions are no more than focal points or conduits to flow Department policy to the field activities actually doing the work. There is little or no value added by these functions.

Similarly, the Military Personnel Center and the Headquarters USAF generate policy over the full spectrum of military and civilian personnel programs. Although specific theater applications and interpretation are needed, large staffs in assignments, civilian personnel, education and personnel programs are not warranted.

Prior to establishing the USAFE Inspection and Safety Center (ISC), the manpower allocated to the Inspector General function totalled 114 spaces. The ISC will use 135 people for centralized inspection and safety control and monitoring, and coordination with NATO inspection teams. There are also 10 headquarters staff. Again, the attendant workload does not justify an additional 31 positions for inspections.

In June 1988, the 7055 Operations Squadron is scheduled for dissolution. The Study Team did not consider this a direct reporting unit with headquarters functions. The anticipated distribution of 7055th resources is, however, predominantly to the EUROPS and the 17th Air Force staffs. The function--to train, standardize, and evaluate non-U.S. NATO strike units to U.S. standards for loading special weapons--could easily be

absorbed by one of three existing organizations. Clearly, the AAFCE has a charter to ensure allied standardization. The USAFE also has 44 people in the EUROPS and 56 people in the 7000 Munitions Support Squadron for training, standardization and evaluation.

The 7000 Special Activities Squadron (SAS) was established to support planning and execution of Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) deployment. This is a direct reporting unit, with functional ties back to the USAFE staff in operations, logistics and security police. The USAFE will be intimately involved in planning and implementing provisions of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. However, the staff elements mentioned above are adequately staffed to fulfill these requirements.

Several staff agencies, within the operations, logistics intelligence civil engineering, plans and operations functions, and security police are involved with various aspects of GLCM planning, maintenance, employment, security, facilities, and support. The USAFE needs to be actively identifying the workload and associated manpower, which will be greatly reduced during the GLCM phase-down. The Study Team concluded that an immediate reduction of 35 spaces should be applied, with anticipated additional savings in the USAFE NAF headquarters and combat operations support staffs.

- 24-Hour Positions. Among the WWMCCS, the I&W, the Intelligence Data Handling System Operations Support Center (OSC), the Logistics Readiness Center (LRC), European Distribution System (EDS) Command and Control, the Tactical Fusion Center and the Combat Operations Intelligence Center, there are at least a dozen 24-hour seven day posts. The WWMCCS and Intelligence Data Handling Systems are both Air Force Communications Command operations. There are another 65 Military Airlift Command (MAC) authorizations against around-the-clock positions in the Joint Rescue Coordination Center, the Airlift Control Center (ALCC), and at weather operations within the OSC.

Within the Operations Support Center a savings could be made by putting the search and rescue and the Logistic Readiness Center people on call through the OSC controllers. Where they are colocated, the EDS monitoring during nonduty hours could be handled by the MAC/ALCC. By eliminating one controller position and putting the LRC and the EDS on-call, 20 authorizations could be saved.

The MAC weather watch, which is manned by two people around-the-clock, could be a normal duty operation. There are at least three other 24-hour weather operations within the immediate and adjacent area of Ramstein Air Base.

The MAC Airlift Control Center also appears over staffed. There are at least three weapon systems/aircraft specific officer positions, as well as an enlisted complement of controllers and shift supervisors. The U.S. Transportation Command needs to review its worldwide manning for around-the-clock positions in weather, airlift control and Search and Rescue for absolute essential requirements (See Appendix I-3).

Contracted savings could be achieved by the engineering and services function. The Engineering and Construction Division is supplementing architectural and engineering manpower by contracting for design drawings and facility studies. These task order contracts have progressively increased to over \$300,000 in FY 1987.

The security police contract for alarm testing and evaluation also needs to be eliminated. The requirements should be established through the Headquarters USAFE statement of operational need process for validation and funding under the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation portion of the budget. Savings could approximate \$82 million after FY 1988.

After Phase III (September 1988), the Force Level Automated Planning System (FLAPS) contract can be eliminated. This appears to be the proper stage for complete in-house assumption of software maintenance and system deficiency reporting. The potential FY 1989 savings is \$1.3 million.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and the USAFE/SCI should jointly reevaluate contracts for host and software upgrades in the Combat Operations Intelligence Center and the Tactical Fusion Center to ensure comprehensive and compatible results are achieved against a tactical intelligence architecture.

### Recommendations

D3-1. Eliminate 80 billets in the USAFE Headquarters personnel function and in the European Personnel Center.

D3-2. Eliminate 31 billets in the USAFE Inspection and Safety Center.

D3-3. Disestablish the 7055 Operations Squadron and eliminate 66 billets.

D3-4. Disestablish the 7000 Special Activities Squadron and eliminate 37 billets.

D3-5. Eliminate the 35 USAFE Headquarters billets identified with GLCM draw-down.

D3-6. Eliminate 24 Military Airlift Command billets (3 posts) in the Airlift Control Center.

D3-7. Eliminate 20 billets in the Operations Support Center associated with 24-hour post manning.

D3-8. Eliminate the following USAFE contract support services:

	<u>Millions</u>
-- Civil Engineer Design of Architectural Drawings	\$ .3
-- Security Police Alarm Test and Evaluation	2.1
-- Operations Force Level Automated Planning (FY 1989)	<u>1.3</u>
	<u>\$3.7</u>

## NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

### Stated Mission

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed on April 4, 1949, created an alliance for the collective defense of Europe. The alliance links 14 European countries with the United States and Canada. In addition to providing the framework for a defensive alliance, the treaty provides for continuous cooperation and consultation in political, economic and other non-military fields. The Treaty included provisions for a North Atlantic Council with authority to create such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary to implement the Treaty provisions. This is the basis for the establishment of the present North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

### Organization and Manpower

The North Atlantic Council, the highest authority in the NATO, is geographically located in Brussels, Belgium. The Council provides a forum for wide political consultation and coordination among member nations. The NATO Secretary General is also Chairman of the Council and heads the supporting International Staff. Military policy is discussed in the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), which is composed of representatives of the member countries participating in the NATO integrated military structure.

The U.S. Secretary of State is the senior U.S. member of the North Atlantic Council, but is normally represented by the U.S. Permanent Representative on the Council--the U.S. Ambassador to the NATO. The Ambassador has a supporting staff, known as the U.S. Mission to NATO, which helps formulate, coordinate and present U.S. foreign and defense policies pertaining to NATO. On military matters, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO represents the Secretary of Defense.

- International Staff. In support of their roles, the Council and the DPC have established a number of committees (covering the whole range of NATO activities) that normally meet under the chairmanship of a member of the International Staff. The International Staff is comprised of the Office of the Secretary General and five divisions: (1) Political Affairs, (2) Defense Planning and Policy, (3) Defense Support, (4) Infrastructure, Logistics and Council Operations, and (5) Scientific Affairs, Office of Management, and Office of the



Financial Controller. Each of the divisions is headed by an Assistant Secretary General, who is normally the chairman of a main committee. Through the described structure, the International Staff supports the work of over 300 NATO committees.

- Military Committee. The Military Committee, under the North Atlantic Council, is responsible for the overall conduct of the military affairs of the Alliance. The Military Committee is composed of a chief of staff or other special delegates from each signatory nation contributing forces to the integrated NATO commands. The U.S. representative is the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. In order to enable the Military Committee to function in permanent session with effective powers of decision, each chief of staff appoints a permanent Representative to the Military Committee. The Executive Agent of the Military Committee is the International Military Staff. Its function is to ensure that appropriate steps are taken to implement Military Committee policy and decisions. It is headed by a three star director who has several general officer rank assistants heading up six divisions: (1) Intelligence, (2) Plans and Policy, (3) Operations, (4) Logistics and Resources, (5) Command, Control and Communications, and (6) Armaments, Standardization and Interoperability and a Secretariat.

The U.S. Representative to the Military Committee, currently a four star Admiral, represents and is directly responsible to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. He represents the Chairman in all deliberations and actions of the Military Committee and advises the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NATO matters. The U.S. Representative to the Military Committee also provides military advice to the U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (the U.S. Ambassador to the NATO), the Department of Defense, and as required, the Department of State and other Government agencies.

The U.S. Representative to the Military Committee also has a supporting staff, known as the U.S. Delegation to the NATO Military Committee, to assist him and provide liaison with the International Military Staff. There is also a liaison office within the Pentagon, in the Office of the Joint Staff.

In summary, both the U.S. Permanent Representative on the Council and the U.S. Representative to the Military Committee have supporting staffs to assist them in providing liaison with the International Staff and the International Military Staff. Both staffs are colocated in a facility at Brussels, Belgium.

The following is a breakout by major organizational unit of the offices supporting the International Staff (civil) and the International Military Staff (military).

	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>

NATO--Civil

DoD Manpower Supporting International Staff (Total staff: 309; U.S. is reimbursed by NATO for its civilians.)	0	0	17	17
--	---	---	----	----

U.S. Mission to NATO  
(OSD Staff)

Office of Defense Advisor	2	0	5	7
Office of Administrative Advisor	0	5	4	9
Defense Plans Division	5	0	5	10
Defense Operations Division	3	0	2	5
Communications & Electronics Division	0	0	4	4
Infrastructure, Logistics & Civil Emergency Planning Division	1	0	6	7
Armaments Cooperation Division (In addition to these 49 billets, there are 46 billets from State Department, the U.S. Information Agency and the Federal Emergency Management Agency)	5	0	2	7
	—	—	—	—
Total	<u>16</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>66</u>

<u>NATO--Military</u>	<u>FY 1983 Authorized Manpower</u>			<u>Total</u>
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	
<u>Office of the Deputy Chairman NATO Military Committee</u>	3	2	1	5
<u>DoD Manpower Supporting the International Military Staff (IMS)</u> (The total IMS authori- zation is 189)	34	22	0	56
<u>U.S. Delegation NATO Military Committee</u> (OJCS Staff) (DoD authorization totals 43)				
Office of the U.S. Representative, Military Committee	6	1	2	9
Office of the Deputy U.S. Representative	2	1	1	4
U.S. Representative Liaison Office, Office of the Joint Staff (located in Pentagon)	1	1	1	3
Personnel, Administration and Security	1	3	2	11
Joint Planning Team (includes functional areas of Nuclear, Com- munications-Electronics, Strategic, Force Structure, Logistics, Political/Military, etc.)	11		5	16
Total	<u>58</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>105</u>

In addition to the 43 positions, the U.S. Representative to the Military Committee has 3 enlisted aides assigned to the office. These billets are shown on Service documents. He also has a Special Liaison Detachment (which is not on the Joint Table of Distribution) responsible for intelligence and communications. The units and authorization include:

650th Military Intelligence Battalion	- 2 Officers and 2 Enlisted
128th Signal Battalion	- 10 Enlisted

Service personnel assigned to the International Military Staff (34 officers and 22 enlisted) and the Military Committee (3 officers and 2 enlisted) are provided limited administrative support by the Service Personnel Representatives within the Personnel, Administration and Security Division (personnel assignments).

Other Activities in the  
Brussels Area with DoD  
Authorization Manpower

	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
NATO Integrated Communications Systems Agency (NACISA)	17	5	1	23
Military Agency for Standardization (MAS)	8		3	11
NATO SHAPE Support Group/ NATO Support Activity (provides housekeeping support to Brussels)	3	37	79	119

Observations

Both the U.S. Delegation to the NATO Military Committee and the U.S. Mission to the NATO perform similar duties in serving as advisors to the Ambassador. Consolidation of the U.S. Delegation to the NATO Military Committee within the U.S. Mission to the NATO would eliminate duplicative functions and streamline the activity operations. Currently, within Brussels, there are 210 DoD authorized billets identified in direct support of the NATO

mission, supported by 111 billets in such housekeeping functions as supply and facility maintenance. Consolidation would save an estimated 40 direct support billets.


Consolidation primarily affects the 49 DoD personnel assigned to the U.S. Mission to the NATO and reporting back on military matters to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the 46 DoD personnel assigned to the U.S. Delegation to the NATO Military Committee and reporting back on military matters to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (the U.S. Ambassador to the NATO) is also the senior civilian representative of the Secretary of Defense. In that capacity, the Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the NATO Military Committee and the Defense Advisor, U.S. Mission to the NATO, provide advice and assist the Ambassador in the formulation, coordination, and presentation of DoD policies pertaining to the NATO.

However, the structure of both organizations reflect the separate organizations they primarily support. The U.S. Delegation to the NATO Military Committee is organizationally a reflection of the U.S. "quota" billets within the International Military Staff. For example, the Joint Planning Team on the U.S. Delegation to the NATO Military Committee includes strategic and nuclear planners. Strategic and nuclear planner billets on the International Military Staff are manned by U.S. personnel. The U.S. Mission to the NATO is organizationally a reflection of the International Staff. For example, both organizations have divisions or directorates in the functional areas of defense planning, nuclear planning, civil emergency, armaments, infrastructure and logistics. However, due to the overall NATO mission, there are overlapping functions and staff responsibilities within both organizations. For example, both organizations have staffers responsible for defense planning, communications, armaments and logistics. Per discussion with cognizant personnel, position papers and correspondence relating to defense matters are routinely coordinated among the staff of both organizations.

The Study Team proposed reorganization would place both organizations under the guidance and direction of the U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

Similar functions would be consolidated within one office to streamline operations. (The Study Team was informed that Canada and the United Kingdom have a consolidated organization structure.) The proposed consolidated organizational structure is shown on the following chart (next page).



Recognizing the dual role of the Chief of Mission/Permanent Representative, the Study Team proposes two deputy positions-- i.e., a Deputy for Defense Matters and a Deputy for Political and Economic Matters. A staff position of Legal Advisor and an Office of Administration reporting directly to the Chief of Mission is also proposed. The Office of Administration would include such functions as word processing, mailroom and supply, service personnel representatives, as well as public affairs and security.

The Deputy for Defense Matters will have the following staff activities reporting to him: Plans and Nuclear, Operations, Logistics, Communications and Electronics, and Armaments Cooperation. The civil agency staffs (State Department, U.S. Information Agency, and Federal Emergency Management Agency) will report to the Deputy for Political and Economic Matters through the following staff activities: Political Advisor, Economic Advisor, and Infrastructure and Civil Emergency Planning.

In summary, the proposed consolidation will result in a more efficient operation with a savings of 40 billets through consolidation of similar functions. Consolidation will also help preclude the possibility of U.S. conflicting positions being presented to international committees.

#### Recommendation

D4-1. Consolidate the U.S. Delegation NATO Military Committee and the U.S. Mission to the NATO and eliminate 40 billets.



## U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

### Stated Mission

The U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) is headquartered at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii. The USPACOM mission is to maintain security and defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean; to support and advance national policies and interests of the United States and discharge U.S. military responsibilities in the Pacific, the Far East, the Southeast and South Asia and the Indian Ocean; and to prepare plans, conduct operations and coordinate activities of the USPACOM forces. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCUSPAC) exercises military command over military agencies, offices, and commands that administer security assistance programs within the USPACOM area and coordinates activities through established coordinating authorities who are designated United States Defense Representatives or CINCUSPAC Representatives. In addition, the CINCUSPAC exercises operational command of JCS-assigned or attached forces through the USPACOM Service component commanders, the commanders of subordinate Unified Commands, and the commanders of joint task forces (when established).

This appendix addresses USPACOM headquarters management organizations. It excludes the Service component activities, which are separately addressed (see Appendices E-1 through E-7).

### Organization and Manpower

The USPACOM management headquarters is organized in "J" type directorates, similar to most Unified Commands and the Joint Staff. These directorates are augmented and supported by direct reporting units (via "dotted lines") and by some organizations of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (USPACFLT). Unlike its counterpart, the U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM), there are no significant numbers of "dual-hatted" billets serving both USPACOM and USPACFLT. The following shows the authorized manning by organizational element.

<u>Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command</u>	<u>FY 1888 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Commander and his immediate and special staff	9	18	7	34
Deputy Chief of Staff and his immediate staff	3	2	1	6
Commanders Supportive Staff	16	16	14	46
J-1, Manpower Directorate	14	8	10	32
J-2, Intelligence Directorate	40	71	11	122
J-3, Operations Directorate	102	59	8	169
J-4, Logistics/Security Assistance	53	19	13	85
J-5, Plans and Policy	48	18	23	89
J-6, Command, Control and Communications	40	15	16	71
J-7, Comptroller	3	1	9	13
Other	<u>12</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>22</u>
Subtotal	<u>340</u>	<u>234</u>	<u>115</u>	<u>689</u>

<u>Direct Reporting Units and Other Joint Support</u>	<u>FY 1888 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
(Excluding support from the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Japan, Korea and Security Assistance Offices)				
Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC)	124	197	87	408
Special Operations Command (SOCPAC)	17	5	1	23
Information Systems Support Group (ISSG)	16	49	26	91
Headquarters Support Activity (HSA)	7	44	10	61
Cruise Missile Support Activity (CMSA)	9	17	25	51
U.S. PACOM Special Activities	9	1	7	17
Airborne Command Post (operations crew only)	34	14	1	49
Joint Casualty Resolution Center	<u>6</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>26</u>
Subtotal	<u>222</u>	<u>340</u>	<u>164</u>	<u>726</u>
Total	<u>562</u>	<u>574</u>	<u>279</u>	<u>1,415</u>

## Management Support Contracts

The USPACOM spends about \$3 million annually for its share of services on a contract awarded by the Air Force Electronic Systems Division. The USPACOM receives command, control and communications systems support and intelligence support from the contract. The Study Team does not take exception to its necessity.

## Observations

There are 847 more billets associated with command and fleet management of the Pacific Ocean general area compared to billets associated with the Atlantic Ocean general area--i.e., 4,012 Pacific billets to 3,165 Atlantic billets, or 26.7 percent more. This percentage is disproportionate to the assets managed in the respective ocean areas. The Atlantic area "owns" about 10 percent more ships, about 19 percent more naval aircraft, and over 2 percent more personnel. The general observation is that the Pacific uses more resources to manage fewer assets. The Study Team concluded that this disproportionate posture has evolved over the years due to an absence of "dual-hatted" billets (i.e., a separate Service component commander) and the proliferation of intelligence management and processing billets, duplicative operations, planning and logistics organizations and the existence of some organizations that appear to be totally nonproductive and unnecessary (but not necessarily within the USPACOM Headquarters).

The USLANTCOM and U.S. Atlantic Fleet (USLANTFLT) organizations having significant numbers of "dual-hatted" billets are manpower, intelligence, operations, plans, comptroller, and command, control and communications. The Study Team review of the USPACOM and the USPACFLT organization indicate that these types of functions in the Pacific are separately staffed. Although the USPACOM and the USPACFLT are headquartered at different installations, geographically, they are only a few minutes apart. This relative closeness, the high state of modern telecommunications, the interrelationships and similarity between these two organizations, the similarity of functions, and the fact that "dual-hatting" is working well in the Atlantic area, dictates that the USPACOM and the USPACFLT should share billets. This is particularly so in the area of manpower and personnel, comptroller, command, control and communications, intelligence, operations, and plans.

The Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1) uses 32 billets to perform its management function. If this organization was augmented by "dual-hatted" billets from USPACFLT, using the ratio of "dual-hatted" billets found at the USLANTCOM for this function, 26 USPACOM billets could be eliminated.

The USPACOM Operations Directorate has 169 authorized billets. If this organization was augmented by USPACFLT "dual-hatted" billets, using the same ratios found at the USLANTCOM/USLANTFLT, 39 billets at the USPACOM could be eliminated. Using the same technique, the following additional reductions could be made:

- Plans and Policy Directorate - 12 billets;
- Intelligence Management Directorate - 4 billets;
- Comptroller functions - 5 billets; and
- Command, Control and Communications - 12 billets.

In total, the Study Team concluded that "dual-hatting" similar functions between the USPACOM and the U.S. Pacific Fleet (USPACFLT) would yield a reduction of 98 billets. Furthermore, "dual-hatting" some of the CINCUSPAC immediate staff and his special staff, as well as his close administrative support staff, would increase to 110 billets the reductions available through "dual-hatting."

The Oahu, Hawaii, area is replete with intelligence managing, monitoring, exploiting and reporting activities. These include the various categories of "watch standers" generally found in these types of organizations. Deleting 4 billets from the USPACOM "J-2" Directorate as a result of "dual-hatting" (as discussed above), leaves 118 USPACOM Headquarters intelligence management billets. The Intelligence Center, Pacific (IPAC), is a direct reporting unit supporting the USPACOM. The IPAC has 408 billets authorized for FY 1988. The Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific (FICPAC), is a USPACFLT subordinate organization that also provides intelligence and intelligence management support to the USPACOM and does similar work (including "watch-standers"). This organization has 454 authorized billets. The USPACFLT Headquarters has an additional 98 billets authorized for management of intelligence activities. Adding to the intelligence managing and processing performed by these USPACOM and USPACFLT organizations, the Air Force component command, the Pacific Air Force (USPACAF), has 76 headquarters billets and 310

supporting intelligence billets. The Army component command, the Western Command (WESTCOM), has a total of 65 similar type billets. Therefore, the total intelligence billets for Oahu, Hawaii, is 1,529.

The Study Team acknowledges that the above individual organizations provide essential services, analyses, and products tailored to their respective Service. However, they all support the Unified Commander. They all use similar high technology equipment to accomplish their mission. If all of these organizations were merged into a single organization, working for the Unified Commander, as well as providing services, as needed, to various "Service" customers, the number of analysts, exploiters, communicators, and watch standers could be significantly reduced. Expensive equipment with associated high operation and maintenance costs could also be reduced. For example, each individual organization needs certain similar pieces of equipment to accomplish its function. Each organization may use the equipment only a small percentage of the working time. Therefore, the Department is only realizing benefits from a relatively small portion of the costs associated with this equipment. The Study Team did not match up equipment suites and cannot estimate the magnitude of savings associated with buying, operating and maintaining multiple sets of comparable equipment. It is, however, clearly evident that significant savings would accrue.

The Study Team did consider the individual staffs of these multiple intelligence organizations and concluded that consolidation of all intelligence activities on Oahu, Hawaii, would yield a savings of at least 500 billets in the area of watch standers, equipment operators, communicators, analysts and managers. The Study Team is confident that such a consolidation would not result in a degradation of mission accomplishment. In fact, consolidation may prevent or avoid conflicting interpretation and confused reaction to identical intelligence. Consolidation of these intelligence resources on the Island of Oahu, Hawaii, would align the Pacific structure with the evolving consolidated Joint Intelligence Center in the U.S. European Command.

A similar circumstance, to a lesser degree, exists in the operations planning elements of the USPACOM, the USPACFLT, the USPACAF and the WESTCOM. Using the Study Team definition of headquarters and management organizations (as separately discussed in this report), the Team calculated that there are at least 200 authorized billets involved with management and development of operational plans for various scenarios in identical geographic areas. The Study Team acknowledges that the

Service plans must be tailored to their own mission, be it land, sea or air. However, collectively, all plans must dove-tail into the Unified Command overall plan. Therefore, these activities could be consolidated, hence reducing management and overhead billets, as well as reducing detailed planning billets. The Study Team estimates that at least 70 billets could be reduced by such a consolidation. In addition to saving billets, the resultant plans would be less likely to be conflicting or contradicting.

The manning documents and mission and functions manual for the USPACOM organizations (and their organizational sizes) demand closer scrutiny. Based on the review, the Study Team concluded that the following organizations or positions were unnecessary and/or duplicative of similar organizations. Furthermore, the command could not explain the purpose or demonstrate the products or value added by some organizations.

- Reconnaissance Operations Branch, J-314. This Branch, with 8 officer and 3 enlisted billets authorized, duplicates specialties, equipment and functions performed elsewhere in the USPACOM and the Oahu area.

- Special Operations Division, J-36. This Division has 7 authorized officer billets, 1 authorized enlisted billet and 1 authorized civilian billet. Its function should be accomplished within the existing resources of the USPACOM direct reporting unit, "Special Operations Command, Pacific" (SOCPAC).

- Logistics Directorate, J-4. This Directorate raised the most questions. The Command was unable to explain individual functions and, in particular, could not demonstrate the need for the 3 officer and 2 enlisted authorized billets for Petroleum Management (J-422). Performing this function is redundant since the Defense Logistics Agency manages petroleum products worldwide and has a liaison office colocated with the USPACOM. The Study Team also rejects the need for the Mobility Operations Branch, J-431, which has 5 officer and 1 enlisted billets authorized. The narrative description provided for this organization appears to fall under the responsibility, individually and collectively, of the Military Traffic Management Command, the Military Sealift Command, the Military Airlift Command, and the Unified U.S. Transportation Command. The Facilities Engineering Division, J-44, is comprised of 5 officer, 1 enlisted and 2 civilian authorized billets. This organization was described as managing integrated military construction planning throughout the Pacific. Each Service currently has large organizations in-place that can thoroughly and effectively accomplish this function. The

Security Assistance Resource Management and Evaluation Division, J-470, has 3 officer, 1 enlisted and 1 civilian authorized billets. In light of the almost 300 independently operating security assistance office billets located throughout the Pacific, and in light of the oversight provided by the Defense Security Assistance Agency and the security assistance organizations of the Services and the State Department, the J-470 organization is redundant. Collectively, of the J-4 directorate 85 authorized billets, 24 could be eliminated without degradation of the USPACOM mission.

### Recommendations

E-1. Create a series of "dual-hatted" positions between the U.S. Pacific Command and the U.S. Pacific Fleet (in the areas of manpower, personnel, operations, plans, intelligence, comptroller, command, control and communication, and command supporting staff) and eliminate 110 billets.

E-2. Merge the intelligence management organizations on Oahu, Hawaii by establishing a combined or joint intelligence organization, similar to the consolidated Joint Intelligence Center being formed in the European Command and eliminate 500 billets. The consolidated organization should (1) report to and serve the Unified Command, (2) be formed from members of all Services in a ratio approximating the current ratio for the total Oahu population of intelligence managers, and provide services to all the military organizations on Oahu.

E-3. Consolidate the operational planning functions of the USPACFLT, the USPACAF, and the WESTCOM into a single organization, reporting to and serving the Unified Commander, and eliminate 70 billets. The new organization should be staffed by all Services, with none having more than 50 percent of authorized billets nor less than 25 percent.

E-4. Eliminate the 31 unexplained and unnecessary J-3 and J-4 organization billets.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**



## U.S. ARMY WESTERN COMMAND

### Stated Mission

The U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM) Headquarters is located at Fort Shafter (Honolulu), Hawaii. On March 23, 1979, the WESTCOM was activated as a major command and evolved from the old deactivated U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), which was initially formed in November 1947. The WESTCOM is the Army component to the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). The WESTCOM area of operation includes (U.S. Army interests) the Pacific Ocean, minus the Republic of Korea and the peninsula of Japan.

In addition, by agreement, the WESTCOM serves as the Forces Command representative to the Army Reserve and National Guard units assigned to the Pacific basin.

### Organization and Manpower

The WESTCOM Headquarters utilizes a traditional Army staff organizational structure with a few modifications. The WESTCOM Inspector General, Provost Marshal, and Deputy Chief of Staff Reserve Affairs (DCSRA) serve in "dual-hat" positions for the U.S. Army Support Command Hawaii (USASCH). The WESTCOM organizational structure and manning is as follows:

<u>Headquarters WESTCOM</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Command Group	8	14	4	26
Special Staff	19	15	32	66
Personnel	12	17	33	62
Intelligence	9	6	23	38
Operations and Plans	59	30	60	149
Logistics	14	6	45	65
Deputy Chief of Staff Resource Management	3	-	78	81
Information Management	4	1	4	9
Engineer	4	1	19	24
Acquisition Management	-	-	7	7
Total	<u>132</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>305</u>	<u>527</u>

- United States Army Support Command, Hawaii (USASCH).

This support command is the installation support element of the WESTCOM, providing installation, administrative, and logistical support to 84 tenant activities on 29 separate installations throughout the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, American Samoa and Johnston Island. The largest subinstallation supported by the USASCH is the Pohakula training area on the Island of Hawaii.

<u>Headquarters, U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Command Group	1	5	8	14
Special Staff	7	41	56	104
Deputy Installation Commander, Schofield Barracks	3	7	7	17
Deputy Installation Commander, Pohakula Training Area	4	22	11	37
Deputy Installation Commander, Fort Shafter	4	16	8	28
Personnel and Community Activities	10	73	313	396
Plans, Training and Mobilization	18	60	116	194
Logistics	5	30	632	667
Facility Engineer	2	15	679	696
Family Housing	1	3	247	251
Contracts	2	-	66	68
Resource Management	2	23	179	204
Provost Marshal	<u>14</u>	<u>297</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>375</u>
Total	<u>73</u>	<u>592</u>	<u>2,381</u>	<u>3,064</u>

The following elements are under the command of the WESTCOM:

- INSCOM Theater Intelligence Center Pacific (ITICPAC).

This intelligence center is a subordinate element of the 500th MI Brigade, provides multidisciplined intelligence and security support to Headquarters WESTCOM and Army forces in the Pacific. The Center's support to Korea is limited to security testing of facilities. Echelon above Corps Intelligence Center personnel from the ITICPAC directly support the intelligence staffs of Headquarters WESTCOM and Headquarters U.S. Army Japan.

<u>Headquarters, Intelligence Center Pacific</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Total Headquarters Staff	7	16	26	49

- U.S. Army Information Systems Command-WESTCOM (ISC). This subcommand provides telecommunications, automation, visual information management, records management, and printing and publications support. Together with the 261st Signal Command (Delaware Army National Guard), the ISC-WESTCOM is responsible for planning post-mobilization communications throughout the Pacific and Asia. The ISC manning is not charged against the WESTCOM account.

- U.S. Army Readiness Group-WESTCOM. This Readiness Group is the active Army organization responsible for the support of Army Reserve components in the Pacific. The U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard in Hawaii, Guam, Saipan, and American Samoa have an authorized active duty strength of approximately 3,600 (575 of this number are full-time employees). The Hawaii Army National Guard has an authorized strength of 4,237. The Guam Army National Guard has an authorized strength of 604.

<u>Headquarters, U.S. Army Reserve and Guard, Pacific</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Total Headquarters Staff	20	28	5	53

- Army IX Corps (Reinforcement). The IX Corps is a dual mission troop program unit, whose primary mobilization mission is to augment the Army IX Corps in Japan. Its peacetime mission is to command Army Reserve units in the Pacific.

<u>Headquarters IX Corps (Reinforcement)</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Total Headquarters Staff	6	6	93	105

#### Management Support Contracts

Nothing of significance was noted by the Study Team.

## Observations

The U.S. Army Western Command serves as a major Army component command and as the Army component to the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACAF). The only combat forces within the WESTCOM area of operation is the 25th Infantry Division and Reserve units belonging to the Hawaii and Guam National Guard and the Army Reserve. In essence, the WESTCOM is performing for the Army in Hawaii the function that the U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) performs within the continental United States. The WESTCOM lists the following as primary component command responsibilities:

- Provide Army combat-ready forces to the USPACOM. As indicated, the only combat forces within the WESTCOM area of responsibility belong to the 25th Infantry Division (Light), which operates as an independent entity. The overall Army responsibility for providing such forces is already charged to the U.S. Forces Command.

- Command and support of the U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard forces on Hawaii, Guam and other U.S.-administered territories. Once again, however, this charter falls to the U.S. Forces Command or the State of Hawaii (in the case of National Guard personnel).

- Interface and coordinate with such Army elements as the U.S. Army Japan, the Department of the Army Headquarters, the Eighth U.S. Army, the Army Forces Command, the Army Material Command and the Army Training and Doctrine Command. While the Study Team recognizes the need for coordination, it is not a command-unique function and could be accomplished with a very small cell (five persons), especially since all the activities mentioned are in two separate time zones.

The USASCH accomplishes all the housekeeping and day-to-day operational functions for the WESTCOM throughout the vast span of 29 installations and the Army Pacific geographic area. The USASCH has its own management (including small cells of managers "on-the-ground") and is not dependent on WESTCOM Headquarters for its management. In fact, any excessive higher level management might be counterproductive.

The Department cannot afford the luxury of maintaining 527 command personnel essentially to serve as the Army trainer for Hawaii and Guam and the "advisor" in Army-unique matters to the U.S. Pacific Command. The Study Team concluded, therefore, that the USWESTERN Command should be disestablished.

The USPACOM already has direct communications with the multi-hatted U.S. Army four star commander in Korea, as well as the commanding general of Army elements in Japan. A small cell from the FORSCOM could be attached to the USPACOM headquarters to serve as the Army component for planning purposes. The 25th Division and Reserve elements in Hawaii would then be managed by the Forces Command, in the same manner that units stationed in the continental United States are managed. An alternative to the FORSCOM approach would be transfer the active duty portion of the IX Corps from Japan to Hawaii, to serve as the USPACOM Army component.

### Recommendations

E1-1. Disestablish the U.S. Army Western Command, replace it with a small cell (five billets), whose primary duties would be as advisors to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, on Army-specific issues; transfer 25 billets to the USASCH or Forces Command to handle any additional oversight responsibility that may accrue as a result of the disestablishment of the WESTCOM; and eliminate 467 billets. (The USASCH should continue to provide the landlord type services it now provides.)

E1-2. Place a U.S. Forces Command Pacific cell in Hawaii to carry out the assigned mission of that command within the Pacific basin (approximately 20 billets). Because the infrastructure already exists, a duplication of all staffs would not be necessary, nor should it be allowed.

E1-3. Place all responsibility for the Reserve forces with the new U.S. Forces Command Pacific cell, in keeping with the FORSCOM charter.

E1-4. Designate the U.S. Forces Command as the Army component to the U.S. Pacific Command.

E1-5. Alternatively, assign the Army IX Corps (currently in Japan) the mission of the Army Service component command for USPACOM.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

### Stated Mission

The U.S. Pacific Fleet (USPACFLT) is the Navy component command to the U.S. Pacific Command and is headquartered in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The overall USPACFLT mission is to support national objectives of deterrence, maintain a maritime security, and prepare U.S. naval forces for sustained combat operations. In wartime, the USPACFLT is responsible for defending the United States interests against attacks throughout the Pacific, provide combat-ready U.S. naval forces to the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), take the war to the enemy as far forward as possible, deny the enemy the ability to project maritime power into the Pacific, ensure control of the sea and air in the Pacific area of responsibility (AOR) and support the operations of allied commanders, as required.

### Organization and Manpower

The USPACFLT accomplishes its mission with the following management organizations:

<u>Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Fleet</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Commander, Deputy, and their immediate and special staff	17	58	12	87
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans	5	3	3	11
Intelligence	2	35	4	41
Deputy Chief of Staff for Management and staff	55	20	45	120
Operations	47	102	1	150
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and staff	4	3	9	16
Communications	9	8	3	20
Plans and Policy	22	14	5	41
Manpower and Personnel	16	22	18	56
Cryptology	<u>13</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>27</u>
Total	<u>190</u>	<u>279</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>569</u>

The USPACFLT Headquarters is further supported by the following direct reporting commands/activities:

Headquarters, USPACFLT Direct Reporting Command/ Activities	FY 1988 Authorized Manpower			
	Officer	Enlisted	Civilian	Total
Naval Air Pacific	114	113	167	394
Naval Logistics Pacific	46	43	25	116
Naval Submarine Pacific	98	147	53	298
Naval Surface Pacific	101	160	103	364
Naval Training Pacific	25	32	11	68
Data Processing Service Center Pacific	19	95	28	142
Fleet Marine Force Pacific	Breakdown not available			285
Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific	"	"	"	454
Total				2,121

Separate appendices have been prepared on the Data Processing Service Center Pacific (DPSCPAC), the Fleet Intelligence Center (FICPAC), the Naval Logistic Center (LOGPAC), and the Naval Training Pacific (TRAPAC) (see Appendices E3 through E6). The following observations and recommendations cover only USPACFLT Headquarters.

### Observations

Study Team briefings received from the command and management personnel at USPACFLT were among the least detailed and least informative. Discussions regarding individual missions and functions of the various directorates and related authorized and assigned staff indicated that management could not explain some positions and could not reconcile manpower to manning documents. For example, the logistics function could not clearly distinguish between the USPACFLT Headquarters mission, its associated responsibilities and manpower, and the additional duty organization, the LOGPAC and its mission, responsibilities and manpower. Consequently, these organizations were revisited by a Study Team member and are discussed in a separate appendix E5. The separate narrative recommends the disestablishment of the LOGPAC and transfer of 50 billets to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, USPACFLT. These billets are intended to fulfill the transferred LOGPAC functions.



Overall, the USPACFLT appeared to be excessively manned, particularly in the areas of operations, plans, intelligence and logistics. Recommendations made in other narratives (see Appendices E, E3, E4, E5, and E6), including disestablishment of organizations, mergers and consolidations, as well as "dual-hatting," will tend to increase the workload requirements of the USPACFLT. The authorized billets remaining, after other recommendations are acted on, will achieve better utilization of the USPACFLT remaining billets. Peak workload periods can be accomplished by augmentees, additional duty from the USPACFLT reporting supportive organizations, and from reservists.

### Recommendations

E2-1. Rewrite the missions and functions statements for all USPACFLT organizations to describe clearly the purpose for the existence of those organizations.

E2-2. Reconcile the USPACFLT manning documents to USPACFLT personnel authorizations and actual strength by directorate, division, branch and lower echelons.

E2-3. Absorb into USPACFLT the LOGPAC functions and the transfer of 50 LOGPAC billets (see Appendix E5). (If 50 billets proves to be insufficient to handle the additional logistics workload, augment with "dual-hatted," additional duty billets from USPACFLT supportive organizations.)

E2-4. If the consolidations recommended in the U.S. Pacific Command narrative are not implemented (see Appendix E), reduce 130 USPACFLT billets in the area of intelligence, planning, operations, command and special staff areas. Any manpower voids created by these reductions should be accomplished by "dual-hatted" billets from the USPACOM and the USPACFLT supportive organizations.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## DATA PROCESSING SERVICE CENTER, PACIFIC

### Stated Mission

The Data Processing Service Center, Pacific (DPSCPAC) is located in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The assigned mission is to provide the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), the U.S. Pacific Fleet (USPACFLT), the U.S. Western Command (USWESTCOM), the U.S. Naval Central Command (USNAVCENT), the Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific (FMFPAC), and other Pacific area commands with command and control ADP services through the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) and the WWMCCS Information System (WIS).

As a U.S. Pacific Fleet (USPACFLT) subordinate command, the DPSCPAC operates computer systems for the Fleet Command Center, including the Navy WWMCCS Software Standardization System, the Operations Support Group, the Fleet High Level Terminal, the JINTACCS Translation Unit, and the Fleet Command Center Battle Management Program.

### Organization and Manpower

The DPSCPAC is a direct reporting unit to the USPACFLT and classified as a management headquarters support activity by DoD Directive 5100.73. The headquarters consists of a commanding officer, and executive officer, a technical director, staff offices, and five line directorates. Authorized manpower is, as follows:

<u>Headquarters Staff Element</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			<u>Total</u>
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	
Commander and Staff				
Officers	4	18	10	32
Plans and Project				
Management	6	4	0	10
System Software	0	1	8	9
Computer				
Operations	4	59	2	65
Date Management				
and Programming	1	4	10	15
WWMCCS Information				
System	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>13</u>
Total	<u>19</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>142</u>

## Management Support Contracts

The DPSCPAC has no management support contracts.

## Observations

The DoD Reorganization Act requires that all management headquarters and management headquarters support activities identified in the President's Budget Exhibit (PB-22) must reduce to 90 percent of authorized end strength. The baseline for this reduction was the FY 1986 column of the FY 1987 President's Budget submission to Congress.

The Study Team found that the Navy was only reporting the civilian end strength assigned to the DPSCPAC as management headquarters. The 114 DPSCPAC military end strength was being misreported within nonmanagement headquarter accounting lines. Consequently, the Navy understated its aggregate PB-22 end strength by 114. A study member followed on this issue with the Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMP). The NAVCOMP staff indicated that the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel and Training) (OP-01) was responsible for military manpower and provided the numbers for display in the PB-22 exhibit. In a subsequent meeting with an OP-01 staff member, no satisfactory rationale was provided for reporting the DPSCPAC military end strength as nonmanagement headquarters.

Consequently, in order for the DPSCPAC military authorization to comply with the congressional direction, it should be reduced by 10 percent. The Navy should also be required to treat the 114 military authorizations as growth to the reduction baseline. If the Navy deliberately shielded these military authorizations, a further reduction of 103 authorizations should be directed across all Navy management headquarters activities. If, on the other hand, the accounting of these military billets was an unintentional oversight, then Congress should be advised accordingly, and no further penalty assessed to the Navy aside from the 10 percent reduction to DPSCPAC military authorizations.

In FY 1976, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCUSPAC) directed a feasibility study of the consolidation of all WWMCCS sites on the Island of OAHU. In FY 1980, all WWMCCS sites were consolidated under the DPSCPAC, in one facility, with the exception of the U.S. Pacific Air Force (USPACAF). A senior officer interviewed indicated that such a further consolidation was feasible, but was not aware of the initial rationale for

excluding the USPACAF or whether that rationale was still valid. This area should be studied for further consolidation and possible manpower savings.

### Recommendations

E3-1. Reduce DPSCPAC military authorizations by 10 percent (11 billets) as a result of noncompliance with the provisions of DoD Directive 5100.73 and the DoD Reorganization Act.

E3-2. Review of the circumstances leading to the classification of DPSCPAC military manpower as nonmanagement headquarters. If the finding reflects a deliberate effort to circumvent the 10 percent reduction, direct the Navy to reduce Navy management headquarters activities by an additional 103 military authorizations.

E3-3. Assess the feasibility of consolidating the PACAF WWMCCS operation into the DPSCPAC.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## FLEET INTELLIGENCE CENTER, PACIFIC

### Stated Mission

The Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific (FICPAC) is located in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. As a direct reporting unit to the U.S. Pacific Fleet (USPACFLT), the FICPAC has an assigned mission to develop and maintain an intelligence exploitation, processing, and production capability that is immediately available to support U.S. Navy Forces in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas assigned to the U.S. Pacific Command for defense responsibility. The FICPAC provides those forces with intelligence material necessary to accomplish their respective missions efficiently. Also, the FICPAC provides direct support and assistance to the USPACFLT for special weapons employment and planning.

The FICPAC Headquarters consists of a commanding officer, executive officer, staff offices and five line departments. Authorized manpower is allocated, as follows:

<u>Headquarters, Fleet Intelligence Center</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Commanding Officer and Staff	4	5	6	15
Intelligence Support Department	4	92	5	91
Intelligence Produc- tion Department	19	62	18	99
Intelligence Data System Department	10	67	18	95
Strike Amphibious Department	19	68	0	87
FOSIC, Pacific Department	<u>30</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>67</u>
Total	<u>86</u>	<u>321</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>454</u>

### Management Support Contracts

The FICPAC has no management support contracts.

## Observations

There is a proliferation of intelligence assets in Hawaii (1,500 billets). The U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), the USPACFLT, the U.S. Air Forces Pacific (USPACAF), and the U.S. Western Command (USWESTCOM) all maintain separate intelligence operations. The Study Team found a great deal of overlap in intelligence management, operations and equipment. The principle behind a unified command structure is to ensure coordinated and integrated forces and systems in time of war or conflict. For precisely this reason, the intelligence function lends itself to consolidation and centralization within the USPACOM organization. A detailed discussion of this consolidation concept can be found in the U.S. Pacific Command narrative (Appendix E).

There are also certain other interim efficiencies within the FICPAC structure that can be pursued independently (or in the event a centralization of intelligence assets does not transpire).

Specifically, within the Intelligence Production Department there are eight subordinate divisions and a total of 14 branches. The current department structure has broken the Pacific area of responsibility (AOR) down into an excessive number of subregions. Each of these subregions has a corresponding division within the FICPAC, and each of the divisions has its own Processing and Interpretation Center (PIC) branch. The PIC function can be centralized within the department. The Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf branches can be consolidated, as can the Southeast Asia, the Korea, and the Pacific Ocean Basin branches. The two branches involved in data base management are performing functions that can readily be assumed by the Intelligence Data Systems Department within existing resources.

The result of these consolidations and interdepartmental transfer of functions will be a net manpower savings of 34 billets (6 officers, 22 enlisted and 6 civilians).

## Recommendations

E4-1. Consolidate all intelligence assets in Hawaii under the U.S. Pacific Command (see Appendix E).

E4-2. In the interim, consolidate the functions within the FICPAC Intelligence Production Department, reduce the number of branches from 14 to 7 and eliminate 34 billets.



## LOGISTICS COMMAND, PACIFIC

### Stated Mission

The Naval Logistics Command, Pacific (LOGPAC) is located at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The LOGPAC mission is to exercise primary cognizance over all matters pertaining to ship and shore-based logistics in the Pacific Fleet. The Commander, Naval Logistics Command (COMNAVLOGPAC) commands a variety of naval shore activities including (1) Ship Repair Facilities (SRF); Mobile Technical Units (MOTU); (2) Naval Electronics Engineering Activities (NEEACT); (3) Pacific Personnel Support Activities (PSA); (4) Naval Supply Depots (NSD); and (5) Naval Magazines. Also, the COMNAVLOGPAC has additional duty responsibilities to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCUSPACFLT) staff as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.

### Organization and Manpower

Each of these subordinate command roles are delineated as follows:

- Ship Repair Facility. There are three SRFs in the Pacific--Guam, Subic Bay and Yokosuka, Japan. Each employs between 1,000 and 4,500 personnel in the performance of depot level maintenance for deployed ships and submarines.

- Mobile Technical Units. The LOGPAC employs seven MOTUs, each consisting of 25 to 80 personnel and located on the West Coast, Subic Bay, and Yokosuka, Japan. The MOTUs perform afloat training and provide emergent equipment repair assistance to underway units.

- Naval Electronic Engineering Activities. There are four geographically located NEEACTs in Hawaii, Guam, Subic Bay and Yokosuka. The Hawaii NEEACT employs 125 personnel, while the remaining three NEEACTs employ between 25 to 100 personnel. The principal mission of these activities is to design and install ship and shore-based electronic systems.

- Personnel Support Activities. There are eight PSAs within the Pacific and under the command of the COMNAVLOGPAC. The eight PSAs are located in San Diego, San Francisco, Puget Sound, Hawaii, Long Beach, Yokosuka, Subic Bay and Guam, and have a total aggregate of 49 detachments. The PSAs and their detachments are providing pay and personnel support to 124,905

U.S. Navy and U.S. Navy Reserve personnel. Total manpower associated with the delivery of these services is 2,790 billets (91 officers, 1,927 enlisted and 772 civilians). The ratio of personnel served to support staff is 45 to 1 and excludes the number of dependents receiving PSA services.

- Naval Supply Depot. The three NSDs are located in Guam, Yokosuka, and Subic Bay and provide supply support, including receipt, storage, issuance of repair parts, consumables, subsistence, ship stores, fuel, and contracting for nonstandard requirements.

- Naval Magazines. The three magazines (ammunition storage facilities) are located in Hawaii, Subic Bay and Guam. They function to receive, renovate, maintain, demilitarize, store and issue ammunition, explosives, expendable ordnance items and weapons. Also, they maintain and operate a complete ordnance and weapon systems outloading and transshipment facility.

The LOGPAC Headquarters consists of a Commander, a Chief of Staff, staff offices and "N" designated directorates. Authorized manpower for each element is, as follows:

<u>Headquarters, Logistics Com- mand Pacific</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Commander/Chief of Staff/Staff Offices	5	15	4	24
N-40, Logistics Plans	2	1	0	3
N-41, Supply	16	10	7	33
N-43, Maintenance	14	6	3	23
N-44, Facilities	4	2	4	10
N-45, Medical	1	1	0	2
B-48, Comptroller	2	3	6	11
N-49, Manpower/ Personnel	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>10</u>
Total	<u>46</u>	<u>43</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>116</u>

#### Management Support Contracts

The LOGPAC has no management support contracts.

## Observations

As noted previously, the U.S. Pacific Fleet has no staff billet authorizations to perform required staff logistics functions. Instead, the USPACFLT relies on additional duty manpower from the LOGPAC to perform the logistics mission. Resident within this mission are planning, supply, maintenance and facilities functions. The Study Team estimated that about 50 LOGPAC billets are dedicated to accomplishing these USPACFLT functions.

The LOGPAC is a unique element within the Fleet type command structure. It has no counterpart in the Atlantic Fleet and appears to expend more than 50 percent of its authorized manpower performing functions that legitimately belong to the Navy Systems Commands (Naval Sea Systems Command, Naval Supply Systems Command, Naval Space and Warfare System Command) and other shore establishment activities. There is no apparent value added in having the LOGPAC direct the SRFs, the NEEACTs, the PSAs, the Naval Magazine, and the supply depots, when the expertise in these areas clearly resides beyond the LOGPAC. Certainly, there is a control factor that permits the USPACFLT to dictate immediate requirements and priorities, but this convenience does not justify the current expenditure of manpower. In many respects, this command exhibits the classic type of layering/coordination functions that the Study Team was chartered to identify. Under the circumstances, there is no reason why a much smaller element on the USPACFLT staff cannot accomplish this coordination function.

The Personnel Support Activities should be decentralized to appropriate USPACFLT naval bases, naval stations and naval air stations. The Study Team does not support the notion that these activities need central coordination; however, appropriate oversight can be accomplished by the USPACFLT Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Personnel, within existing manpower resources.

All Mobile Technical Units should be placed under the supervision and direction of Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Pacific (COMSURFPAC). The Study Team review of the SURFPAC indicates that MOTU management can be accomplished within assigned SURFPAC manpower authorizations.

The USPACFLT has a war fighting mission and must be responsive to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCUSPAC) by providing operational forces that are in an optimum state of readiness. In the course of preparing combat-ready forces, the USPACFLT must ensure that the type commands are focused on Fleet related functions. The shore establishment has the vital role of ensuring Fleet logistical support. If that support is inefficient or ineffective, then the Fleet Commander must petition the Secretary of the Navy or the Chief of Naval Operations to resolve the problem. For the Fleet to duplicate or assume shore establishment functions, for any reason, results in inefficient use of manpower and possibly jeopardizes Fleet readiness.

#### Recommendations

E5-1. Disestablish the Logistics Command, Pacific, and eliminate 66 billets.

E5-2. Transfer the Ship Repair Facilities and Naval Magazines to the Naval Sea Systems Command.

E5-3. Transfer the Naval Electronics Engineering Activities to the Naval Space and Warfare Systems Command.

E5-4. Transfer the Supply Depots to the Naval Supply Systems Command.

E5-5. Transfer the Personnel Support Activities and Detachments to appropriate USPACFLT subordinate Naval Bases, Naval Stations or Naval Air Stations.

E5-6. Transfer 50 LOGPAC billets to the U.S. Pacific Fleet staff to perform the USPACFLT staff logistics function.

## TRAINING COMMAND, PACIFIC

### Stated Mission

The Training Command, TRAPAC is under the command of a Navy flag officer and located in San Diego, CA. The Commander, Training Command (COMTRAPAC) has a primary reporting chain to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCUSPACFLT) and a significant additional duty responsibility to the Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET).

In support of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (USPACFLT), the TRAPAC has an assigned mission to conduct precommissioning shakedown, refresher and operational training to personnel of the operating forces in the Pacific. The TRAPAC also develops training doctrines, policies and exercises and conducts inspections to assist type and functional commanders in maintaining an optimum state of training readiness.

Under the CNET, the TRAPAC exercises command of CNET shore training activities that are of primary interest to the CINCPACFLT. These include Fleet Combat Training Center, Pacific; Fleet ASW Training Center, Pacific; Fleet Training Center, San Diego; Fleet Intelligence Training Center, Pacific; and the Naval Educational and Training Support Center, Pacific.

The TRAPAC Headquarters consists of a Commander, Chief of Staff, staff offices, and "N" designated directories. Authorized billets are, as follows:

<u>Headquarters, Training Command, Pacific</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Commander/Chief of				
Staff/Staff Offices	3	3	1	7
N-1, Administration	2	11	2	15
N-2, Training Operations	10	7	1	18
N-3, Training Manage- ment/Plans	3	3	1	7
N-4, Resource Management/Comptroller	3	3	4	10
N-5, Training Assess- ment/Automated Data Processing/Management Information Systems	3	4	1	3

<u>(Continued)</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
N-6, Total Force Training	1	1	0	2
N-7, Physical Security Training	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	<u>25</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>68</u>

#### Management Support Contracts

The TRAPAC does not have any management support contracts.

#### Observations

There are basically two broad categories of training. The first type can be characterized as "organization" or "unit" level training. This may take the form of team training designed to increase afloat unit proficiency and often involves exercise training. The second type of training--"schoolhouse" training--is dedicated to developing or improving an individual's proficiency in a given general or technical area.

While both categories are of interest and importance to a Fleet Commander, clearly "organization" level training is a Fleet responsibility and must command the focus of Fleet training resources. There is a direct correlation between effective "organization" training and the operational readiness of sea-going forces. On the other hand, "schoolhouse" training is a definite responsibility of the Military Department--in this case executed by the CNET. The principal focus of the CNET mission is to train naval personnel in the basic and advanced skills necessary to perform required functions both afloat and ashore.

Any analysis of the TRAPAC structure and its contribution to the USPACFLT organization must be preceded by an understanding of the Navy training structure and associated problems. There is no central focus for training within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV). No less than four separate offices are developing training policy and providing direction and funding to the CNET. This fragmentation was the source of intense congressional criticism during the 1970s. In 1978, the Navy reorganized the training function and established the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel and Training) (OP-01). The intent behind the OP-01 organization was to

centralize the training function and integrate the manpower, personnel and training policy apparatus within one organization. However, OP-01, for a variety of reasons, was never able to provide central control over the training establishment and its role eroded to oversight of general training.

The CNET must, therefore, attempt to serve four competing interests, establish training priorities, integrate training policies on a defacto basis, and continue to manage a poorly structured "schoolhouse" operation. Within the management structure, the CNET has two principal subordinates, the Naval Air Training (NATRA) and the Naval Technical Training (NATECHTRA). The latter's span of control is unreasonable at best. The TECHTRA is located in Millington, Tennessee, and manages well over 60 "schoolhouses" that are geographically dispersed throughout the continental U.S. The current structure attempts to alleviate the control problem through two intermediate layers between the NATECHTRA and the individual schoolhouses. These layers are the (1) three Naval Training Centers (NTC) and (2) the three Service School Commands that report to the Naval Training Centers.

The CNET proposed a reorganized structure that would have established nine regional commands. These regional commands would be responsible for the training establishment on a geographical basis and report directly to the CNET. Under the proposal, the NATECHTRA would become one of the regional commands, with a significantly reduced role within the overall training scheme.

The proposal was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, but was never implemented because several Members of Congress objected to a reduced naval personnel presence in the Millington/Memphis area. To prevent implementation, the following provision was inserted into the FY 1988 Defense Appropriation Act: "... Provided further, that funds appropriated or made available in this ACT shall be obligated and expended to restore the facilities, activities, and personnel levels, including specifically the medical facilities, activities, and personnel levels, at the Memphis Naval Complex, Millington, Tennessee, to the fiscal year 1984 levels...."

The CNET proposal was sound, but did not go far enough. Consideration should have been given to eliminating the redundant Service School Command layer. Also, under the CNET proposal the Fleet Commanders would have continued to play a major role in "schoolhouse" training inasmuch as both the Training Command

Pacific (TRAPAC) and the Training Command Atlantic (TRALANT) were to be designated as regional commanders within the revised CNET structure.

The Fleet Commanders have a war fighting and readiness mission that requires limiting their training involvement to the "organization" level. The Fleet Commanders must rely on the CNET to provide the "schoolhouse" training. Continued management of CNET subordinate activities by the TRAPAC and the TRALANT only serves to divert Fleet attention from its primary mission and to require excessive Fleet involvement in what should be a Navy Department responsibility.

The Study Team recognizes that removal of the Fleet training commands from the CNET structure will aggravate management of "schoolhouse" training within the Navy. Fleet readiness, however, cannot be subordinated to a Military Department training function simply because the Navy has been unable or unwilling to resolve its training structural problems for the past 16 years.

Assuming the Fleet should concern itself only with "organization" level training, the Study Team found that the TRAPAC is providing 90 percent of this level of training to the surface community. The remaining 10 percent of training was generic in nature and was applicable to all three warfare specialties. There was no unique training or training support being provided to the air or submarine communities.

Since the principal focus is on surface training, there is little justification for maintaining distinct training commands within the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. The Study Team review of Naval Surface Forces Command, Pacific (SURFPAC) and the Naval Surface Forces Command, Atlantic (SURFLANT) clearly indicated that both the SURFPAC and the SURFLANT can assume management of the "organization" level training activities currently being performed by the TRAPAC and the TRALANT, without additional resources.

Such a transfer of responsibility will categorially ensure that surface training requirements are being reflected in the training curricula. The Study Team also anticipates that such a change with result enhancement in surface forces operational readiness.



## Recommendations

E6-1. Disestablish the Pacific Training Command and eliminate 68 billets.

E6-2. Transfer management responsibility for the Nuclear Weapons Training Group, Fleet Combat Systems Training Unit, Tactical Training Group, Navy Petroleum Training Unit, and the Personnel and Administration Assistance Team to the Naval Surface Forces Command, Pacific.

E6-3. Transfer "school house" training courses to the Chief of Naval Education and Training for management and administration.

E6-4. Convey to Congress the importance of allowing the CNET to restructure and request the elimination of the Appropriation Act provision that is having an adverse effect on the delivery of quality training.

E6-5. Centralize the Department of the Navy training establishment with a view toward a more effective and efficient organizational structure. Centralization of training policy and funding within The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations should produce additional overhead manpower savings as would the elimination of excessive layering under the CNET.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## U.S. PACIFIC AIR FORCES

### Stated Mission

The U.S. Pacific Air Forces (USPACAF) is the Air Force component command to the U.S. Pacific Command and is headquartered at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. The USPACAF mission is to plan, conduct, control, and coordinate offensive and defensive operations according to tasks assigned by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCUSPAC). The USPACAF functions both as a component commander and as a commander of an Air Force major command. In both of these capacities, the USPACAF has similar interrelationships with other commands and agencies of the United States and allied nations. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Air Forces (CINCUSPACAF) has command over all Air Force operational and support units and property and equipment. The CINCUSPACAF responsibilities include:

- Organizing, equipping, training, and ensuring the readiness of those units and their equipment.
- Planning and implementing Air Force administrative and logistic support.
- Executing assigned Air Force responsibilities in connection with overseas operations, logistics and training support of countries in the USPACOM area of responsibility (AOR).
- Developing and exploiting all possible sources of aerospace intelligence information and manages intelligence resources.
- Managing and staffing indications and warnings and other watch positions.
- Managing and executing a broad list of other support, international relations, and civic action missions, as necessary and appropriate.

## Organization and Manpower

The Pacific Air Force and its supporting elements are organized and manned as follows:

<u>Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Pacific</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			<u>Total</u>
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	
Commander, Immediate Staff and Special Staff	10	18	3	31
Historian	0	0	6	6
Intelligence	42	25	9	76
Operations	120	69	28	217
Plans	61	35	26	122
Personnel	28	50	37	115
Logistics	61	96	45	202
Engineering and Services	27	37	66	130
Security Police	8	13	5	26
Medical/Surgeon	14	4	6	24
Administration	3	11	5	19
Other Command Special Assistant	14	12	5	31
Inspector General	37	20	4	61
Safety	7	8	3	18
Comptroller	<u>19</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>50</u>
Total	<u>451</u>	<u>414</u>	<u>263</u>	<u>1,128</u>

The Study Team considered the PACAF Combat Operation Staffs (PACOPS) as headquarters and/or headquarters management organizations since they, in fact, are managers not "fighters." The Study Team found that the Air Force typically separates its management into headquarters and combat operations staffs in order to avoid the frequent across-the-board congressionally-mandated headquarters cuts. The combat operations staff are included in the above 1,128 authorized billets.

In addition to USPACAF Headquarters and its related Pacific Combat Operations Staff (PACOPS), USPACAF headquarters is supported by the following numbered headquarters management staffs, direct reporting management staffs, units, and their management-type combat operation staffs.

Headquarters, U.S. PACAF Support Elements	FY 1988 Authorized Manpower			Total
	Officers	Enlisted	Civilian	
5th Air Force, Japan (discussed in Appendix E-8)	101	100	34	235
313th Air Division, Okinawa (not visited by the Study Team)	25	84	59	168
7th Air Force, Korea (discussed in Appendix E-10)	88	79	18	185
13th Air Force, Philippines (not visited by the Study Team)	56	52	17	125
326th Air Division, Pacific Islands Defense Region (not visited by the Study Team)	21	30	4	55
548th Reconnaissance Technical Group (discussed in USPACOM Narrative - Appendix E)	40	264	6	310
6004th Management Engineering Squadron	10	53	25	88
6007th School Squadron	1	19	1	21
6008th Tactical Air Control Flight	<u>28</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>54</u>
Total	<u>370</u>	<u>695</u>	<u>176</u>	<u>1,241</u>

The Study Team calculated that the USPACAF and USPACAF supporting units have 2,369 management-type authorized billets. The 5th and 7th Air Forces are discussed in the narratives covering the U.S. Forces Japan (Appendix E8) and the U.S. Forces Korea (Appendix E9). Supporting organizations for which the Study Team has no recommendations are omitted from this narrative.

### Management Support Contracts

The USPACAF management support contracts totalled about \$1.3 million annually. This continuing contract effort supported the 6008th Tactical Air Control Flight. The Study Team did not observe any questionable areas.

### Observations

The intelligence management aspects of the U.S. Pacific Air Force, including headquarters, the combat operations staffs and the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Group, totaling 386 billets, are reflected in the U.S. Pacific Command narrative (Appendix E) and recommend consolidation on the Island of Oahu, Hawaii. (Those organizations, therefore, are not discussed here. In addition, the recommended billet reductions have been factored into the USPACOM narrative (Appendix E) and are not identified in this narrative.)

The USPACAF Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations has 217 authorized billets. The Study Team concluded that the USPACAF management staff for functions such as meteorology, operational plans, operations analysis, support operations, and command and control are either performed effectively elsewhere within the Air Force on the Island of Oahu, Hawaii, or should be accomplished in a consolidated mode or as additional duties. The Study Team recognizes, however, the need to maintain a small staff in each of these organizations to advise and inform the CINCUSPACAF.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans has 122 authorized billets. The Study Team concluded that a significant number of billets could be eliminated by keeping planning management activities to an essential only level and by relying on support of "war fighting" Air Force activities to augment this headquarters function.

Discussions between USPACAF staff and the Study Team raised doubts regarding the mission and functions of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. In an attempt to reassure the Study Team, the command stated that although it could not explain what the personnel in most of the 115 authorized billets were doing, or what products they were producing, "they were all working hard." Similar statements were made at many of the activities visited by the Study Team. Personnel management policies and procedures are well established by the DoD and the Air Force. The 115 billets were not manning "personnel offices." Furthermore, they were not writing personnel policies or procedures. The Study Team recognizes that the CINCUSPACAF needs a staff to keep him informed on personnel-related matters, and to perform limited oversight of the managers of personnel offices. This organization should, therefore, be reduced to the minimal staff necessary to accomplish these essential functions.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics has 202 authorized management billets. The functional responsibilities of this office, to a large extent, duplicate functions performed by other Air Force or DoD activities. For example, there were 33 billets in the area of logistics planning management. Many of these personnel were working in the security assistance arena. The Study Team concluded that the security assistance functions were, to a large extent, duplicating activities of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, the responsible Military Service staff organizations and the State Department. Furthermore, a significant amount of logistics planning is being done, or can be accomplished by the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), the other Services and by the "war fighting" Air Force units under the USPACAF. The Study Team, therefore, concluded that a staff of not more than 15 billets would be adequate to advise the commander and protect USPACAF interests in the logistics planning management functions.

Transportation management is another "logistics" functional area with 27 authorized billets. The Military Traffic Management Command, the Military Sealift Command, the Military Airlift Command, and the newly evolving Unified U.S. Transportation Command are heavily involved in transportation management and planning, as is the U.S. Pacific Command. In fact, the Military Airlift Command has a large staff of logistics transportation planners at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii (i.e., at the same installation where the USPACAF is located). The Study Team concluded that a staff of no more than 7 billets is necessary to coordinate and monitor these activities and to keep the CINCUSPACAF advised and informed on logistical issues.

The logistics staff could not explain or justify, to the satisfaction of the Study Team, the need for 12 billets to oversee the managers at air base levels who are managing and administering contracts. Laws, and the Federal Acquisition Regulation, as supplemented by the DoD and the Services, and Service contracting manuals and policies, dictate how contracting will be performed. The Commander, U.S. Pacific Air Force should only be minimally involved in this area and should not be writing, formulating or expousing his own policy. A small staff of not more than 5 people should be retained to keep the CINCUSPACAF informed and "out of trouble" in this area.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics has, among others, an immediate staff of 8, a maintenance management staff of 50, a supply management staff of 46, and a munitions management staff of 31 billets. Since most of these functions are accomplished elsewhere, or in conjunction with other organizations, the Study Team concluded that 135 billets is excessive in comparison to other organizations visited. The Study Team also concluded that an aggregate staff of 120 billets for these functions would be adequate.

The engineering and services management organization has 130 authorized billets. These people manage well-established policies and perform oversight of programs having additional large management staffs at the numbered Air Forces and Air Division level. The numbered Air Forces and Air Divisions, in turn, manage services actually provided at the wing or squadron level. Being conservative, the Study Team concluded that the PACAF Commander may need a staff of not more than 30 people to keep him informed and advised, to make installation staff assistance visits and to accomplish trouble-shooting for the Commander.

Organizations such as management of security police (26 billets), management of medical policies and programs (24 billets), and management of safety programs (18 billets), also appeared excessive; however, the Study Team did not have sufficient time to review these areas further.

In addition to USPACAF Headquarters and combat operations staff organizations, the 6004th Management Engineering Squadron, considered by the Study Team as a supporting management function, and the Pacific Logistics Support Center, an operating level intermediate maintenance activity, require scrutiny. The Study Team simply did not have the time to make the detailed review that should be undertaken but feel secure in making limited recommendations to reduce staffing.



The 6004th Management Engineering Squadron has 88 authorized billets. The Study Team was able to determine that most of the 88 are active management engineering detachments located at various installations. While there was not time to prove the necessity for the numbers of billets assigned to the detachments, the Study Team did conclude that this number seemed excessive. Breaking the billets into detachments, as is common within the Air Force, provides the appearance of smaller management organizations when this is not actually the case.

The Pacific Logistics Support Center (PLSC), reporting directly to the USPACAF, has 456 authorized billets and is located at Kadena Air Force Base, Okinawa. This "wrench-turning" organization evolved several years ago and is comprised of elements that transferred from various air component wings. The PLSC was significantly larger and is currently in the process of being split up and returned to the various wings. The Study Team fully endorses this divestiture since the functions accomplished are truly "wing" related. Since the potential recipient "wings" are already doing similar type work, they should be able to absorb the workload with less than the full compliment of PLSC billets. The Study Team concluded, however, that only 342 billets should be returned to the wings. Since the PLSC is not a headquarters or management support activity (as defined by the Study Team), the recommendation section of this narrative, and the Study Team's overall recommended billet reductions, do not include the PLSC.

### Recommendations

E7-1. Eliminate 50 billets from the USPACAF Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. Rely on other Air Force activities, potential Oahu area consolidations, and additional duty billets to accomplish the meteorology, operations planning, operations analysis, support operations and command and control operations functions.

E7-2. Eliminate 40 billets from the USPACAF Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans. Use other Air Force assets available in the geographic area, as well as input from the USPACOM-related organizations to accomplish the mission. Limit planning to essential issues, and, after plans are formulated, alter as infrequently as possible.

E7-3. Eliminate 44 billets from the USPACAF Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. Since personnel policies within the DoD and the Air Force are formulated, directed and implemented at levels well above the U.S. Pacific Air Force, and even the U.S. Pacific Command, all that should remain in this office is a small group to keep the USPACAF Commander advised and informed.

E7-4. Eliminate 60 billets from the USPACAF Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. Eliminate those functions that are, or could be, provided by existing organizations, with particular attention to reductions in the areas of administration, logistics planning, logistics transportation planning and management, contracting management, and the directors' immediate staffs.

E7-5. Eliminate 100 billets from the Engineering and Services Group. Cease micro-managing activities for which various wings, squadrons and Air Base groups are responsible and are apparently accomplishing. If these activities are not being readily accomplished elsewhere, a small group should be retained at PACAF Headquarters (no more than 10 billets) to keep the USPACAF Commander informed and advised and to enforce the obligations of the organizations failing to accomplish their designated responsibilities.

E7-6. Reorganize the 6004th Management Engineering Squadron into either a single location squadron, or a squadron with no more than 3 detachments. Evaluate the services required by the activities currently supported by the 6004th detachments for essentiality and, when approved, accomplish them on a temporary duty basis. Determine the number of billets required to staff the 6004th Management Engineering Squadron as a part of the reorganization.

## U.S. FORCES JAPAN

### Stated Mission

The U.S. Forces, Japan (USFJ) is a subordinate Unified Command under the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). As the USPACOM defense representative in Japan, the Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan, supports the Security Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement and coordinates various matters of interest with the Service commanders. Included in the USFJ Commander's responsibilities are matters affecting U.S.-Japan relationships among and between Department of Defense (DoD) agencies and the Government of Japan.

### Organization and Manpower

The U.S. Forces, Japan, is organized and manned as follows:

<u>Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan</u>	<u>FY 1987 Authorized Manpower</u>			<u>Total</u>
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	
Headquarters Staff				
Command Staff	5	3	6	14
J-1, Personnel and Administration	4	3	7	14
J-2, Intelligence	6	5	5	16
J-3, Operations	15	14	2	31
J-4, Logistics	18	3	14	35
Plans & Policy	6	2	7	15
Command and Communications	12	14	5	31
Public Affairs	3	1	6	10
Protocol	2	1	0	3
Liaison	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>
Total	<u>75</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>176</u>

To accomplish the planning and war fighting missions, the USFJ is supported by Air Force, Army, and Navy components. The Commander also serves as U.S. Air Force Commander, Japan, and Commander 5th Air Force.

- Army. The U.S. Army Japan/IX Corps is the Army component command to the USFJ. The U.S. Army Japan/IX Corps commands all U.S. Army units assigned to the USFJ area of responsibility. There are no combat or combat support Army units in the USFJ area. There is, however, a large Army planning organization and two large Area Support Groups (ASG). Among other functions, the ASGs perform "hands-on" functions--they are the managers, the operators and the workers for handling fuel and munitions storage and movement facilities. Under mobilization, the ASGs will expand to provide support services for Army units passing through Japan.

The U.S. Army Japan headquarters staff, including its headquarters support activity, have 332 authorized billets, of which 92 are dual-hatted as a part of the IX Corps.

<u>Headquarters Army Sub Component</u>	<u>FY 1987 Authorized Manpower</u>				<u>Dual- Hatted to IX Corps</u>
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>	
Staff Secretariat					
Command Group	7	9	7	23	(14)
Equal Employment					
Opportunity	-	1	2	3	( 3)
Inspector General	2	2	2	6	( 4)
Public Affairs	2	3	8	13	( 5)
Staff Judge					
Advocate	4	2	5	11	(10)
G-1, Personnel	10	12	32	54	-
G-2, Intelligence	5	8	8	21	(10)
G-3, Operations	19	18	23	60	(24)
G-4, Logistics	9	6	35	50	(15)
G-5, Host Nation	8	1	8	17	( 3)
Resource Management	1	1	44	46	-
Engineering	2	-	17	19	-
Other	—	—	1	1	—
 Total	 69	 67	 196	 332	 (92)

- Navy. There are two permanent U.S. Naval activities in Japan. The U.S. Naval Forces, Japan (NAVFORJAPAN) is designated as the Naval component commander to the USFJ. The primary NAVFORJAPAN mission is to act as the U.S. naval representative for the U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) in Japan. The Commander, U.S. Naval Activities in Japan has the additional

responsibilities of coordinating naval shore activities and naval personnel located in Japan.

The NAVFORJAPAN has a headquarters staff of 93 billets, as shown on the next page:

<u>Headquarters U.S. Naval Forces Japan</u>	<u>FY 1987 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Commander	9	14	10	33
Operations, Plans and Communications	8	19	0	27
Intelligence	8	11	2	21
Logistics	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>12</u>
Total	<u>29</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>93</u>

The other permanent naval activity headquartered in Japan is the Fleet Air Western Pacific (FAIRWESTPAC). The primary FAIRWESTPAC mission is to provide operational command, control, and coordination of assigned naval aircraft and related shore facilities. This naval activity also provides logistical support for naval and marine aircraft afloat and ashore.

The FAIRWESTPAC has a headquarters staff of 88 authorized billets; 27 officers, 51 enlisted, and 10 civilians.

Also located at Yokosuka Navy Station, when not afloat, is the Commander, 7th Fleet. His mission is to exercise operational control of assigned ships and landing forces within the western pacific area of responsibility. The Commander, 7th Fleet is supported by a shore establishment located at the Navy Station.

- Air Force. The Commander, USFJ, is "dual-hatted" as the Commander, 5th Air Force, the Air Force subcomponent command of the USFJ. The 5th Air Force mission is to conduct, control, and coordinate offensive and defensive air operations planning and, when necessary, execution. Also, the Commander, USFJ, represents the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces, in the interdepartmental, interservice, and host country relationships in the USFJ area of responsibility.

The 5th Air Force management structure is comprised of 235 authorized billets, as shown below:

<u>Headquarters, Air Force Sub-Component</u>	<u>FY 1987 Authorized Manpower</u>			<u>Total</u>
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	
Commander	8	7	5	20
Historian	-	1	2	3
Engineering and Services	4	2	4	10
Operations	48	52	7	107
Personnel	2	4	1	7
Intelligence	8	7	3	18
Judge Advocate	1	1	3	5
Logistics	13	19	4	36
Public Affairs	3	1	1	5
Safety	2	1	-	3
Security Police	2	3	2	7
Plans	<u>6</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>14</u>
Total	<u>101</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>235</u>

This 235 total includes the designated 5th Air Force combat operations staff (COS). Based on the Study Team definition of headquarters and headquarters management organizations, and to be consistent with other Air Force activities visited, the COS authorized manpower is included in the 5th Air Force headquarters manpower shown above.

### Observations

The need for a combined subunified command for Japan and Korea is separately described earlier in this report. The Study Team observations in this narrative focuses on the Service activities.

- Army. The Study Team recognizes the political and military significance of the Japanese government as an Ally. Of no less importance is the need to "show the flags" of all military services in this region and to work closely with the Japanese Self Defense Force. There is, however, a significant price to be paid in terms of U.S. force structure to have a subunified command with a full complement of military service component commands, especially where these component commanders do not command forces and are not ever likely to do so. The question of "how much is enough" cannot be overlooked when

examining this Flag presence. The Study Team anguished over the size of the Army activities in Japan since there appears to be a "presence" need but not a command need. The Study Team was not convinced that the Army has a legitimate need to maintain a IX Corps. This Corps appears to be the "odd man out" in all the various operational plans save one. The Study Team concluded, therefore, that IX Corps should either be used as the Army planning element for the U.S. Pacific Command (see Appendix E1) or be disestablished, if a decision is made to use Forces Command for this function.

The Study Team could not reach a conclusion regarding the U.S. Army, Japan. It is suspected that by assigning an Army general officer to the USFJ, with not more than a typical general officer support staff, the U.S. could accomplish both the military and political missions of the U.S. Army Japan. Furthermore, the management of the two large ASGs could be left largely to themselves, since together they have more than 100 billets dedicated to their own management. The Army general officers assigned to the USFJ could provide "Army" unique liaison and assistance to the ASG, may be as minimally necessary. The Study Team did not have sufficient time to develop this matter and, therefore, is not offering a specific recommendation. It should be reviewed.

- Navy. There are three admirals stationed in Japan. As tradition would have it, each Admiral has his immediate staff of flag writers, public affairs officers, race relations officers, etc. Even if all three naval organizations in Japan had essential and unique missions, it would be obvious that the flag support staffs would be duplicative.

An analysis of the three naval activities in Japan yields the conclusion that the Naval Forces Japan is the least essential of the three. All of his duties are to provide coordination, liaison and assistance--there are no command or control missions. Quite frankly, the NAVFORJAPAN is there to support the notion that subunified commands also need designated Service component commands. The Study Team disagrees with that premise. It is clear that the Navy will never "chop" forces to the naval component commander. A review of the functional responsibilities emphasizes this point. The U.S. Naval Forces, Japan:

- Coordinates as the representative of the USPACFLT, with U.S. Forces, Japan, in providing for the conduct of combined planning with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense (JMSDF); effects liaison between the JMSDF and the 7th Fleet in the planning and conduct of combined exercises.

- Is responsive to the requirements of the 7th Fleet in the coordination of support facilities ashore and in liaison with foreign governments and military forces.

- Maintains liaison with appropriate Army, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Japanese commands.

- Coordinates and represents (1) all U.S. naval commands and agencies in Japan, (2) all other agencies associated principally with U.S. naval functions in Japan, and (3) the U.S. Coast Guard, Far East Section.

- Assists type commanders in solving problems involving support or services provided by or to one of their subordinate shore activities to or from another activity, especially if the latter is outside the PACFLT chain of command.

- Exercises regional coordination for ashore naval personnel and all shore activities in Japan (and Okinawa).

The Study Team concluded that the U.S. Naval Forces organization should be disestablished. The Commander, Fleet Air Western Pacific, and the Commander 7th Fleet should be assigned the coordination, liaison, and representations duties within Japan.

In addition to the authorized administration staff of the commander, eight other officers, 14 enlisted, and 10 civilians, U.S. Naval Forces Japan has these functional staff organizations--N-2, Intelligence; N-3, Operations, Plans, and Communication, and N-4, Logistics.

Intelligence (N-2), has eight officers, 11 enlisted, and 2 civilian authorized billets. The basic function of this division is to advise the Commander, Naval Forces Japan on intelligence matters, to operate a Special Intelligence Communication Facility (SPINTCOM), to perform intelligence liaison as the U.S. Pacific Fleet executive agent for in-country intelligence coordination with the Japanese, and to provide intelligence support, as directed, to units of the 7th Fleet.

The Study Team concluded that the intelligence management and gathering staff of U.S. Forces, Japan (to be augmented by not more than 10 billets from U.S. Naval Forces Japan) and the intelligence resources of the 7th Fleet can provide all of the intelligence services currently provided by NAVFORJAPAN.



The NAVFORJAPAN Operations, Plans, and Communications Division (N-3) basic function is to advise and assist in the coordination of operations, communications, and training between U.S. Forces afloat and the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force. In addition, the NAVFORJAPAN conducts liaison with Japan Air Self Defense Forces (JASDF) and Japan Ground Self Defense Force, develops plans to ensure the accomplishment of assigned missions, maintains close liaison with the JMSDF to conduct mutually supporting operations and prevent mutual interference, maintains and operates an Operational Control Center on a 24-hour a day basis. The NAVFORJAPAN also supports the U.S. Seventh Fleet operations, as directed. The N-3 division is comprised of eight officers and nine enlisted authorized billets. The briefings presented to the Study Team did not answer the question as to what value these functions add to the plans, operations, and communications organizations of the USFJ, the FAIRWESTPAC, and the 7th Fleet. The Study Team, therefore, concluded that these functions are already accomplished as primary responsibilities or could easily be accomplished by the other naval activities in Japan, augmented by not more than five billets from NAVFORJAPAN.

The Logistics Division (N-4), is responsible for advising and assisting the NAVFORJAPAN in executing logistic support responsibilities for forces afloat and shore-based facilities, environmental protection, and administration of real estate matters. The Logistics Division also has responsibility for the acquisition, consolidation, and disposition of U.S. facilities and areas, staff supply, and fiscal matters, and customs. The N-4 Division is comprised of four officers, two enlisted, and six civilian billets. As with the N-3 Division, the Study Team could not determine the value-added by this division to the overall DoD logistical support efforts in Japan. The Study Team concluded that the U.S. Forces, Japan, and the 7th Fleet, augmented by five billets transferred from the NAVFORJAPAN to a shore-based component of the 7th Fleet, could effectively accomplish the logistics functions currently accomplished by U.S. Naval Forces Japan.

- Air Force. The Air Force is the only Service component command in Japan to have combat and combat support units assigned. The Study Team developed no constructive comments pertaining to the 5th Air Force, its size, its structure, or its mission.

## Recommendations

E8-1. Disestablish the IX Corps as an organization and eliminate 25 U.S. Army Japan billets. (Since IX Corps responsibilities of the 92 dual-hatted billets will then disappear, the Study Team concluded that the "dual-hatted" billets will have more available time to devote to U.S. Army, Japan activities.)

E8-2. Add the combat operations staff of the 5th Air Force to the 5th Air Force manning documents to realistically report the size of the management structure. (There are no billet eliminations associated with this recommendation.)

E8-3. Disestablish USNAVFORJAPAN as the naval component commander to U.S. Forces, Japan and eliminate 73 of the 93 authorized billets.

E8-4. Assign the "showing the flag" naval presence/naval liaison responsibilities in Japan to the Command Fleet Air Western Pacific and the Commander, 7th Fleet.

E8-5. Transfer five of the remaining 20 NAVFORJAPAN billets to FAIRWESTPAC to accomplish the additional responsibilities.

E8-6. Transfer five of the remaining 15 NAVFORJAPAN billets to a shore-based activity of the 7th Fleet to accomplish additional planning and logistical support that may be required due to the disestablishment of U.S. Naval Forces Japan.

E8-7. Transfer the remaining 10 NAVFORJAPAN billets to U.S. Forces, Japan, to accomplish any additional intelligence management and gathering missions, as well as any additional planning and logistics missions and responsibilities created by the disestablishment of U.S. Naval Forces Japan.

E8-8. Review the Army structure in Japan with respect to the suggestions made in the observations section of this appendix.

## UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

### Stated Mission

The U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) is headquartered at Seoul, Korea. The USFK mission is to:

- support the United Nations Command (UNC) and Republic of Korea/U.S. Combined Forces Command (ROK/US CFC);
- coordinate planning among U.S. component commands in Korea and exercise operational control of U.S. forces assigned, as directed by United States Commander in Chief, Pacific (USCINCPAC);
- coordinate U.S. military assistance to the Republic of Korea; and
- function as the United States Defense Representative (USDR) in Korea, with responsibility for U.S. Government administrative coordination.

### Organization and Manpower

The USFK has a "J" staff organization. As is the case of the United Nations Command and Combined Forces Commands (UNC and CFC), there are personnel assigned to the USFK manning document who fill USFK organizational billets on a multi-hat basis, but are actually assigned to other organizations in Korea. Listed below is a distribution of the positions assigned to the USFK:

<u>Headquarters,</u> <u>U.S. Forces Korea</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Command Group	4	5	6	15
Secretary Joint Staff	6	6	5	17
J-1, Personnel	6	6	3	15
J-2, Intelligence	29	40	13	82
J-3, Operations	16	13	1	30
J-4, Logistics	10	8	4	22
J-5, Plans	7	0	3	10
J-6, Information Management	8	13	9	30

<u>(Continued)</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Resource Management	4	2	1	7
Public Affairs	4	2	0	6
Judge Advocate	5	2	9	16
Engineer	5	0	9	14
Provost Marshal	6	4	0	10
Other	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>11</u>
Total	<u>112</u>	<u>109</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>285</u>

The Service distribution of the military positions is as follows: Army 73; Navy 37; Air Force 102; Marine Corps 8. All civilians are Army employees.

In addition to the individuals displayed above, an additional 679 individuals are assigned to the USFK organization while multi-hatted from other organizations. The distribution of these individuals is as follows: Army CFC positions, 57; Navy CFC positions, 13; Air Force CFC positions, 23; Marine Corps CFC positions, 8; Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA), 578. A discrepancy in the manpower documents, similar to that described in the UNC/CFC description (Appendix E13), was noted. For example, 101 positions are shown on the USFK/EUSA documents as being multi-hatted from the UNC/CFC, which the UNC/CFC documents show only 76 positions as multi-hatted to the USFK/EUSA.

### Observations

The USFK carries an organizational structure of almost 1,100 positions, most of which are multi-hatted from other organizations. Virtually the entire headquarters structure of the Eighth U.S. Army is also assigned to the USFK. As noted above, 101 USFK positions are on the books of and double-hatted from the UNC/CFC. In essence, the USFK has only 285 positions allocated to it out of the of almost 1,100 it carries on its authorization. Of these 285, 75 are shown on the CFC manning document as double-hatted to the UNC/CFC (at variance with the 101 shown on the UNC/CFC documents).

The complexity of the command relationships, both among the U.S. components and with the various elements of the Republic of Korea forces, combined with the multiple manpower allocations and multiple roles performed by individuals, makes the USFK a most difficult organization to evaluate. It can, however, be

determined that, at the most, there are about 200 U.S. personnel, including U.S. paid civilians, who have no duties other than those associated with the USFK. It is a leap of faith, given the state of the manpower documentation and confusion among USFK staff members concerning the numbers of people and manpower accountability, to even assume that these 200 are actually dedicated to the USFK, but that is what analysis of the manpower documents suggests. At any rate, the USFK is not the warfighting structure in Korea, the Combined Forces Command is the warfighting structure. Recognizing that there may be some U.S.-unique functions that cannot be done either by the U.S. components or by the CFC, the size and mission of the USFK should be reduced significantly. The model used should be that of U.S. Air Forces Korea, which does not have a single billet assigned to it, but which continues to function with the Commander, 7th Air Force, and his staff functioning as the U.S. Air Forces Korea as an additional duty. In view of the numerous other important headquarters in Korea--i.e., the Combined Forces Command, United Nations Command, the Eighth U.S. Army, etc.--, there is no need to have large numbers of personnel assigned to the USFK.

### Recommendations

E9-1. Reduce the U.S. Forces Korea to a minimally-sized shell organization to perform U.S. unique functions that cannot be done by UNC/CFC or the U.S. components and eliminate 168 USFK billets. The billets currently assigned to the U.S. Forces Korea (285) should be reallocated as follows:

- those dual-hatted to UNC/CFC should be assigned there (75);
- the additional 26 positions shown on the UNC/CFC documents as USFK/EUSA billets should be held until each position can be identified and justified and an explanation provided as to why the manning documents are not in agreement;
- eliminate the residual of the 26 positions discrepancy which cannot be defended;
- 10 positions are allocated to remain as USFK/EUSA dedicated positions to perform those administrative functions necessary to maintain the shell organization (the six positions associated with status of forces agreements should be part of the 10 positions remaining at the USFK/EUSA); and

- senior U.S. military personnel can, as is the case now, be assigned to the USFK shell organization from the UNC/CFC or the U.S. components on an additional duty basis, as required.

## EIGHTH U.S. ARMY

### Stated Mission

The Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) is headquartered at Seoul, Korea. The EUSA mission is to attain and maintain a combat readiness posture and to conduct sustained Army, joint, and combined military operations. The EUSA also organizes, equips, trains, and employs forces assigned to ensure optimum readiness for combat operations. It provides logistic and administrative support to the Headquarters, United Nations Command (UNC), in order to fulfill the operational requirements of the Republic of Korea (ROK)/US Combined Forces Command (CFC) and the United States Forces, Korea (USFK). In addition, the Eighth U.S. Army provides support to other commands, agencies, services, non-assigned U.S. Army forces and Republic of Korea Armed Forces.

### Organization and Manpower

Virtually all the EUSA Headquarters personnel also hold U.S. Forces Korea positions. The manpower distribution shown below reflects those actually carried on the manpower books for the EUSA:

<u>Headquarters, U.S. Eighth Army</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Command Group	4	5	2	11
G-1, Personnel	4	22	26	52
G-2, Intelligence	5	3	3	11
G-3, Operations	27	24	16	67
G-4, Logistics	41	32	72	145
G-5, Plans	9	2	3	14
Special Staffs	10	17	22	49
Information Management	11	9	21	41
Inspector General and Internal Review	10	21	17	48

<u>(Continued)</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Engineer	3	4	8	15
Resource				
Management	2	9	72	83
Civilian Personnel	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>23</u>
Total	<u>127</u>	<u>156</u>	<u>294</u>	<u>577</u>

As noted in the narrative on the U.S. Forces Korea (Appendix E9), virtually all of these people can be traced into the USFK structure and some can also be traced into the CFC and/or the UNC structure. It is important to remember that the stated mission of the EUSA is administration and support, rather than warfighting.

Under the EUSA control are a number of administrative support units. These include the 19th Support Command, the Facilities Engineering Activity, Korea, the Community, Family and Soldier Support Command, Korea, the 8th Personnel Command, and others.

### Observations

In reviewing the EUSA structure and staffing, the Study Team was struck by the difficulties experienced in determining how many people were assigned to and working in various organizational elements of the headquarters. The Study Team also received some information that there were additional people performing headquarters functions who were not carried on the books of the Headquarters. Short tour lengths and poor documentation no doubt contribute to the problems in tracking manpower.

The U.S. Army does not have a large number of combat forces assigned to Korea--there is one infantry division plus a few additional "war fighting" organizations. An assumption could be made that 20,000 of the 31,000 U.S. Army military personnel are combat forces. There remains 11,000, plus the 13,500 Army portion of the civilian employees in Korea. (The total civilian employees for all Services is 2,487 direct hire U.S. citizens, 13,045 direct hire foreign nationals.) There are also about 7,400 Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) personnel providing support (79 at Headquarters, EUSA). In summary, there are more Army administrative headquarters support and administrative personnel in Korea than there are war fighting personnel--in a country where the number of dependents is relatively low because of the preponderance of unaccompanied tours.



While there is no intent to reduce the numbers of people who are necessary to deliver support and services, the numbers appear excessive. This probably reflects the abundant supply of low cost foreign national labor. Also excessive are the number of different organizations delivering support--each of which tends to have a headquarters, as well as geographically organized subunits with headquarters elements. The proliferation of organizations and headquarters staffs is not necessary for the efficient delivery of services. The headquarters component of the 19th Support Command alone is 478 (out of about 8,282), not counting those assigned to the regional headquarters. The Facilities Engineering Activity Korea (FEAK) has a headquarters element of 225 (out of about 3,500). The 8th Personnel Command headquarters staff is 189 (out of 524). The Community, Family, and Soldier Support Command has a headquarters of 184 (out of 3,139). The 18th Medical Command has a headquarters staff of 133 (out of 1,909). The Headquarters staffs, 8th Army Special Troops Command has 663 personnel assigned. For just these support units alone, headquarters staffs total 1,877. In fact, the layering is so prevalent in Korea support headquarters staffs, it has the appearance of being created to justify the field command structure. The Study Team concluded that consolidation of the support elements is needed, along with the elimination of 500 support element billets. (This should include the elimination of a significant portion of senior officers (O5-O6) and civilians (GS/GM 11-14).)

### Recommendations

E10-1. Assign to the Eighth U.S. Army Headquarters staff all necessary policy making and interpretation functions for subordinate support activities. Combine the various subordinate support activities into a single organization, with minimum headquarters level positions. Use as an organizational model the U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii (USASCH) (see Appendix E1).

E10-2. Assign to the Combined Forces Command all Eighth U.S. Army Headquarters personnel having war fighting (management) responsibilities within the CFC structure and transfer the related billets to the CFC (some 21 positions).

E10-3. Audit the Eighth U.S. Army administrative headquarters manning documents (1) to determine who and how many personnel are assigned to and working in the various organizational elements and (2) to identify those personnel who do not appear on the manpower authorizations. (Note: The Study Team is not recommending a specific reduction to the Eighth U.S. Army Headquarters because of the expectation it will perform a

broader policy and oversight function due to elimination of the layered headquarters personnel in subordinate organizations. After reducing the staff by the 21 positions to be assigned to the UNC/CFC, 546 positions remain. Any positions the audit identifies as working in the Headquarters but not being a Headquarters EUSA authorization should, however, be eliminated.

## UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES, KOREA

### Stated Mission

The United States Naval Forces Korea (USNAVFORKOREA) is headquartered at Seoul, Korea. The mission is to provide administrative and intelligence liaison, and operational, planning, logistical, and communications support to the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea:

- Acts as the primary point of contact for U.S. Navy administrative matters.

- Coordinates with the Commander, USFK, in implementing the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with respect to U.S. Navy personnel in the Republic of Korea.

- Participates in joint and combined operational, intelligence, logistical, and communications planning activities in defense of the Republic of Korea.

- Advises the Commander, USFK, on naval matters involving discussions and coordination with ROK agencies and military commands.

- Acts as liaison for U.S. Navy intelligence organizations outside the Republic of Korea.

- Acts as liaison for the U.S. Seventh Fleet and Fleet Marine Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet to obtain approval for unilateral exercises and to provide information on fleet movements in the ROK area of operations.

- Coordinates area naval administrative functions such as security, intelligence, logistics, discipline of naval personnel, publicity, communications, community service events, and matters related to the customs and traditions of the Navy, and issues necessary directives on an area-wide basis.

The U.S. Naval Forces Korea is designated as the Naval Component, USFK, and as such, is directly responsible to the Commander, USFK, in U.S. naval component-related matters.

## Organization and Manpower

The USNAVFORKOREA organization is authorized 32 positions, almost all of which are also assigned to headquarters positions in the United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command (UNC/CFC) structure. Also assigned are 12 Republic of Korea (ROK) civilians, bringing assigned total to 94. The distribution of U.S. personnel is, as follows:

<u>Headquarters,</u> <u>U.S. Naval</u> <u>Forces Korea</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			<u>Total</u>
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	
Command Group	6	8	0	14
N-2 Intelligence	4	13	0	17
N-3 Operations	7	4	0	11
N-4 Logistics and Supply	3	9	0	12
N-5 Communications	1	16	0	17
Marine Corps	1	1	0	2
Pohang Detachment	<u>1</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>9</u>
Total	<u>23</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>82</u>

## Management Support Contracts

No significant management support contracts were noted.

## Observations

The USNAVFORKOREA is not a war fighting headquarters. There are clearly reasons for a Navy flag presence in Korea, but these are more related to duties within the UNC/CFC and to continuous armistice negotiations with the North Koreans and Chinese, than with commanding U.S. naval forces. If U.S. naval forces are to be employed in Korea, operational control will certainly remain with the Commander, Seventh Fleet, and with the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet. It would, therefore, seem logical to do away with the fiction that there is a U.S. naval "command" and reallocate those individuals having CFC responsibilities to the CFC manpower allocation. They can exercise their responsibilities for logistics support, exercise coordination and deployment, and ammunition site maintenance from the Combined Forces Command.

## Recommendations

Ell-1. Disestablish the U.S. Naval Forces Korea, and transfer the bulk, if not all, of the authorized billets to the United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command with additional duties or a few residual positions assigned to the U.S. Forces Korea organization, if required (see Appendix E9).

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## UNITED STATES AIR FORCE KOREA

### Stated Mission

The United States Air Force Korea (USAFK) is headquartered at Osan, Korea. The USAFK mission is to be responsive to, coordinate with, and support the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), in areas of mutual operational interests. These include the time-phased deployment list development process, augmentation force reception, staging, deployment, support, and operational planning, interface of transportation, logistics, and communications systems, the peacetime aerial reconnaissance program, search and rescue, and airlift.

The U.S. Air Forces Korea responsibilities are to:

- Discharge responsibilities as the U.S. Forces Korea air component.
- Communicate directly with the commanders of the Service components of U.S. Pacific Command.
- Provide U.S. Air Force (USAF) support and coordination to Combined Forces Command air component commander.
- Coordinate the reception and preparation for deployment of USAF augmentation forces.
- Coordinate logistic and administrative support for USAF forces operating in Korea.
- Coordinate U.S. logistics and service support and conduct bilateral planning with the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF).
- Assist in the evacuation of U.S. noncombatants and designated aliens to safe havens in accordance with evacuation plans.
- Provide guidance and recommendations on U.S. air matters to Commander, U.S. Forces Korea.
- Prepare to exercise operational control of USAF forces and augmentation forces on their arrival in the USFK area of operations.

The Commander, 7th Air Force is designated Commander, U.S. Air Force Korea (COMUSAFK) and, as such, is directly responsible to the Commander, USFK, in U.S. air component-related matters. The 7th Air Force staff also serves as the COMUSAFK staff.

### Organization and Manpower

Air Force personnel in Korea are carried on the books of the United Nations Command (UNC)/Combined Forces Command (CFC) (172) and the USFK (102), as well as on the books of the 7th Air Force. No positions are carried on the books of the USAFK. Some Air Force personnel have duties in both the UNC/CFC and the USFK, while some do not have multiple responsibilities. A total of 55 additional UNC/CFC Air Force positions are carried on the 7th Air Force books. (See U.S. Forces Korea narrative - Appendix E9.)

Within the 7th Air Force, the usual arrangement of having both a headquarters staff and a Numbered Air Force Combat Operations Support (NAFCOS) staff is present. The combined 7th Air Force/NAFCOS manning levels are, as follows:

<u>Headquarters, 7th</u> <u>Air Force/NAFCOS</u>	<u>FY1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Command	5	5	5	15
Engineering Services	7	3	3	13
Operations	34	25	2	61
Personnel	1	4	1	6
History	0	1	1	2
Intelligence	11	6	1	18
Staff JAG	3	3	0	6
Safety	2	2	0	4
Logistics	15	21	2	38
Security Police	2	5	1	8
Plans	<u>8</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>14</u>
Total	<u>88</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>185</u>

(Positions also assigned  
to the UNC/CFC)

- Breakdown not available - (55)

There are a total of 13,100 Air Force personnel assigned to Korea.

### Management Support Contracts

No management support contracts of significance were noted.



## Observations

The USAFK headquarters structure that is easily visible is not large. Unlike the Army, which creates separate organizations to provide support and services, the Air Force base support functions are integral to the wings and do not appear to be overly large or excessively layered.

## Recommendation

E12-1. Eliminate the 77 Air Force positions assigned exclusively to the USFK. (These are included in the 168 reductions under U.S. Forces Korea--see Appendix E9, recommendation E9-1.)

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

UNITED NATIONS COMMAND AND  
REPUBLIC OF KOREA/UNITED STATES COMBINED FORCES COMMAND

Stated Mission

The United Nations Command (UNC) is headquartered at Seoul, Korea. The UNC mission is to carry out the conditions and terms of the Armistice Agreement (and subsequent Agreements thereto) of July 27, 1953, entered into by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command with Supreme Commander, Korea Peoples Army, and the Commander, Chinese Peoples Volunteers. The UNC exercises operational control of United Nations Command Forces in Korea.

The Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces (CFC) is also headquartered at Seoul, Korea. The CFC mission is to deter hostile acts of external aggression against the Republic of Korea (ROK) by a combined military effort of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea; and, in the event deterrence fails, to defeat an external armed attack against the Republic.

Organization and Manpower

The headquarters organization of these two commands are so interwoven as to be inseparable from a manpower accounting perspective. The numbers below deal with U.S. personnel only (including local nationals) who are assigned to these commands. Numbers for ROK personnel, which are comparable with the number of U.S. personnel (371), are not presented. The FY 1988 Joint Table of Distribution reflects a total requirement of 275 U.S. personnel (including local nationals).

U.S. Personnel only UNC/CFC	FY 1988 Authorized Manpower			
	Officer	Enlisted	Civilian	Total
Command Group	8	3	8	24
Secretary Combined Staff	4	3	1	8
UNC Military Airlift				
Command Secretariat	8	9	12	29
C-1, Administration	4	8	2	14
C-2, Intelligence	25	17	3	45
C-3, Operations	43	26	4	73
C-4, Logistics	12	2	1	15
C-5, Plans and Policy	13	6	2	21
C-6, Information and				
Management	9	4	1	14
Engineer	6	2	0	8
Adjutant General	5	1	4	10
Public Affairs	1	0	0	1
Naval Component				
Command Headquarters	2	0	0	2
Air Component				
Command Headquarters	<u>6</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>11</u>
Totals	<u>146</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>275</u>

The distribution by Service of these 275 positions is: Army 151, Navy 38, Air Force 71, Marine Corps 12. In addition to ROK personnel, the manpower documents show 260 additional U.S. personnel dual-hatted to these commands. These individuals are accounted for on the manning document on which they are actually carried. One-hundred and fifteen are carried on the U.S. Forces Korea/Eight U.S. Army (USFK/EUSA) authorization, 91 on the U.S. Naval Forces Korea manning, and 54 on the 7th Air Force rolls. In addition, 76 of the individuals on the CFC rolls are also dual-hatted to the USFK.

#### Management Support Contracts

Nothing significance was observed.

#### Observations

The United Nations organization is largely a paper one, which has predominantly diplomatic and representational functions. The ROK/US Combined Forces Command is viewed as the

war fighting structure for Korea. As stated above, carried in the structure of these two command are another 260 U.S. personnel, including virtually the entire staff of the U.S. Naval Forces Korea.

The manning documents for the UNC/CFC, the USFK, and the Eighth U.S. Army Headquarters cannot be made to balance. For example, 115 UNC/CFC positions are shown as carried on the USFK/EUSA authorization. The USFK/EUSA authorization, however, shows only 75 positions as dual-hatted to the UNC/CFC and identified an additional 21 positions as Eighth Army Headquarters positions, triple-hatted to both the UNC/CFC and the USFK/EUSA.

### Recommendation

E13-1. Transfer to the Combined Forces Command those individuals assigned elsewhere who have key positions in CFC. The CFC is the primary war fighting headquarters in Korea and as such should be strengthened.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

### Stated Mission

The United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) is headquartered in Quarry Heights, Panama. It is a geographic (theater) Unified Command, responsible for all U.S. military activities on the land mass of Latin America, south of Mexico. Its mission is to secure the southern flank of the United States and be prepared to fulfill obligations to our allies to meet U.S. military objectives in the region.

The component commands are the U.S. Army South, the U.S. Naval Forces, South, both located in Panama, and the U.S. Southern Air Force (the 12th Air Force), located at Bergstrom Air Force Base, Austin, Texas.

The Joint Task Force Bravo is responsible for command and control of U.S. forces in Honduras.

The Special Operations Command, South, is a subordinate unified command, responsible for planning and conducting special operations and providing the nucleus of a deployable headquarters for control of theater special operations forces.

### Organization and Manpower

The USSOUTHCOM organization and manpower structure is shown on the table below:

<u>Headquarters,</u> <u>U.S. Southern Command</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Commander and Other Staff	--Breakdown Not Available--			100
J-1, Manpower	7	9	1	17
J-2, Intelligence	20	14	7	41
J-3, Operations and Plans	60	22	7	89
J-5, Strategy, Programs and Policy	12	3	4	19
Communications	27	6	4	37

(Continued)	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
J-6, Electronics and ADP	20	54	5	79
	—	—	—	—
Subtotal	--Breakdown not available--			<u>382</u>
<u>Subordinate Activities</u>				
Joint Task Force Bravo	6	-	-	6
Special Operations				
Command	6	6	0	12
Indications and	26	17	4	47
Analysis Center				
Special Activities	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>
Subtotal	<u>41</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>70</u>
<u>Component Commands</u>				
U.S. Army, South	88	70	56	214
U.S. Navy, South	42	27	0	69
U.S. Southern	<u>147</u>	<u>104</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>279</u>
Air Force (12th Air Force)				
Subtotal	<u>277</u>	<u>201</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>562</u>
Total	--Breakdown not available--			<u>1,014</u>

#### Observations

The Study Team did not visit the U.S. Southern Command, nor was it briefed. Therefore, there are no special comments concerning this command.

#### Recommendations

None.



## UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND

### Stated Mission

The United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) is a Unified Command activated to consolidate assets affecting U.S. activities in space. The headquarters is at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado. The component commands are the Air Force Space Command (AFSPACECOM), also at Peterson Air Force Base, the Naval Space Command (NAVSPACE) in Dahlgren, VA, and the U.S. Army Space Agency (USASA) at Peterson Air Force Base. The Army Space Agency is reorganizing to become Army Space Command by mid-CY 1988 and is scheduled to move, probably this year. The USSPACECOM has no geographical area of responsibility but is responsible for all of space. As such, it supports all other Unified and Specified Commands. The Commander, U.S. Space Command (CINCSPACECOM) is dual-hatted as the Commander, North American Air Defense Command (NORAD).

The USSPACECOM is responsible for providing integrated warning and assessment of attacks on the continental United States mounted by ballistic missiles, bombers and cruise missiles and space related threats. It has responsibilities in both space operations and aerospace defense. The space operations mission includes space control (access to space for our forces and denying access to potential adversaries) and space support (operating satellites). The aerospace defense mission includes warning of aerospace attack, plus planning and developing requirements for ballistic missile defense.

### Organization and Manpower

Current manning at the USSPACECOM includes 291 personnel on the headquarters staff and 342 in the combat operations staff, totalling 633 as shown on the following table:

Headquarters, U.S. Space  
Command (including Combat  
Operations Staff)

FY 1988 Authorized Manpower  
Officer    Enlisted    Civilian    Total

Commander/Personal Support Staff	3	2	3	8
Commander Group	4	0	1	5
Political Advisor	1	0	1	2
Inspector General	2	0	2	4
Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff	4	1	1	6
Special Staff	11	12	7	30
J-1, Manpower and Personnel	8	15	5	28
J-2, Intelligence	9	2	2	13
Combat Operations Staff	51	34	11	96
J-3, Operations	65	21	16	102
Combat Operations Staff	143	98	5	246
J-4/5, Systems Integration, Logistics and Support	31	1	5	37
J-5, Plans	<u>45</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>56</u>
Total	<u>377</u>	<u>189</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>633</u>
(Combat Operations Staff included in this figure)	(194)	(132)	(16)	(342)

Management Contract Support

Management contract support totalled \$3.626 million for FY 1987 and \$3.350 million for FY 1988. These expenditures appear to be appropriate.

Observations

It is clear that all the Services should have an active role in the development and execution of USSPACECOM policies and operations. The current approach is to continue the development of three major component commands (one for each Service) and apportion the USSPACECOM mission areas to each Service component. In effect, this organizational structure will perpetuate duplicate Service "unique" headquarters, each developing policy and plans, operating and managing portions of the USSPACECOM systems (satellites, ground facilities and other space related equipment).

The U.S. Space Command and its Service components can operate more effectively and efficiently if consolidated into a single, truly Unified Command, with representation from all the

Services. The Army Space Agency and the Navy Space Command personnel should be transferred to the U.S. Space Command. The Air Force Space Command should also be merged, with all of its assets, into the U.S. Space Command and be placed under USSPACECOM operational control. Within two years of this consolidation, the Unified Command should be composed of approximately 50 percent Air Force, 25 percent Army, and 25 percent Navy/Marine Corps personnel.

Operating three separate component commands prevents the CINCUSSPACECOM from maximizing the effectiveness and efficiency of the entire space mission. Service requirements and expertise may be narrowly focused on their individual command responsibilities. Every Service has a bona fide need to use existing national assets and should jointly participate in developing coordinated requirements, and coordinating management and operation of these assets. Integration of requests for space system resources under one Unified Commander would help ensure a coordinated national program to satisfy national requirements for space assets.

The review of the U.S. Space Command and Air Force Space Command Headquarters, plus their combat operations staffs, was conducted with the objective of assessing major functions and their personnel authorizations in order to determine an approximate size for a larger, reorganized, truly unified U.S. Space Command. The Study Team concluded that the restructured U.S. Space Command can function effectively and efficiently with approximately 2,050 personnel, obtained from the following sources:

Headquarters, U.S. Space Command	291
- Combat Operations Staff	314
Army Space Agency	42
Naval Space Command	103
Headquarters Air Force Space Command	500
- Combat Operations Staff	<u>800</u>
Total	<u>2,050</u>

This aggregate reduced strength can be achieved by consolidating those portions of the staffs at both the Air Force Space Command and the U.S. Space Command that now perform the same functions. As a result of the consolidation, approximately 300 spaces at Air Force Space Command would be deleted. In addition, it is the Study Team's view that Air Force personnel should only represent approximately 50 percent of the restructured U.S. Space Command total manpower, with the Army and Navy/Marine Corps personnel each representing at least 25

percent. Over a period of two years, the Army and Navy/Marine Corps should program their authorizations and manning to achieve the above percentage minimum in the headquarters, as well as the combat operations staff.

- Watch Standing Functions. The USSPACECOM Missile Warning Center, like the other watch standing functions, has utilized the DoD manpower manning standard of five authorizations per position manned. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) uses the same standard. This requires five separate crews or teams to carry out that operation around-the-clock.

As an example, in a 30 day period, the Missile Warning Center crews work five day shifts in a row (0630-1430) and then they are off for three 24 hour periods. They return to work for five swing shifts in a row (1430-2230) and again are off for three 24 hour periods, returning to work for five mid-shifts in a row (2230-0630) and then are finally off for four 24 hour periods before beginning the cycle of shifts again.

The Study Team noted that in any given 30 day period, a specific team or crew would work ten 8-hour day shifts (80 hours), five 9-hour swing shifts (45 hours) and five 8-hour mid-shifts (40 hours). This totals 20 shifts and 165 hours of work in a 30 day period, or 1,980 hours of work per year. That yearly figure is 100 hours less per year than a typical Federal work year based on a 40-hour work week (2,080 total hours per year).

The Study Team further noted that an Air Force Radar Approach Control (RAPCON) operator (watch standing function) might work the eight hour shifts in the sequence of one swing shift then a break, one day shift and a break, then one mid-shift followed by one and one-third days off, before returning to the next swing shift to begin a new round of shifts. These personnel, in effect, work 30 shifts per 30-day period, which equates to 240 hours per month. Therefore, in a 12 month period they work 2,880 hours--900 hours more than the USSPACECOM watch standers, as follows:

USSPACECOM watch standers	1,980 hours per year
Typical Federal work week (40 hour week)	2,080 hours per year
Air Force RAPCON watch standers	2,880 hours per year

In view of the fact that the USSPACECOM watch standing personnel only work 1,980 hours per year, the Study Team concluded that a manning standard of four authorizations per position manned would be appropriate. This would result in a four team approach, with all shifts being eight hours, and would reduce watch standers by an average of 20 percent--i.e., 28 positions in the USSPACECOM combat operations staff. The four team approach would work two evening shifts, two day shifts, and two mid-shifts, followed by three complete days off. The four team approach would require each watch stander to work 192 hours per month, which is considerably below other Air Force watch standers, and would equate to 2,304 hours per year. Using this approach would eliminate a total of 28 USSPACECOM watch standing positions.

- Technical Training. The U.S. Space Command was formed to place the combined space resources of the Services under one manager to more effectively utilize those valuable resources and to better achieve national priorities. The U.S. Space Command and its Service components have a number of similar skills. A comprehensive, joint study/analysis should be conducted to determine if technical training can be consolidated for all Services for a basic core curriculum for each specialty, officer and enlisted, with additional Service, equipment, site-unique follow-on training provided by each Service.

For example, both the Air Force and the Navy utilize personnel whose job is to locate, identify, track and catalog space items. These and many more specialties are very similar, therefore, consolidating Service training could be beneficial and cost-effective. It would also create the flexibility to permit the rotation of various Service members into the NORAD/USSPACECOM, and would reduce some associated training costs.

## Recommendations

G-1. Organize U.S. Space Command as a truly Unified Command, with a joint headquarters and operational staff totaling approximately 2,050. Disestablish the current Army, Navy and Air Force component commands (see Appendices G1, G2, and G3).

G-2. Transfer all existing Army Space Agency and Navy Space Command headquarters billets and approximately 1,300 Air Force Space Command headquarters and combat operations staff personnel to U.S. Space Command to become the USSPACECOM consolidated functional staffs and combat operations staff. The command should be manned by all the Services, with Air Force representation being no more than 50 percent, and at least 25 percent each for the Army and Navy/Marine Corps.

G-3. Continue the dual-hatted position between the CINCUSSPACECOM and the CINCNORAD.

G-4. Exercise budgeting/programming responsibilities under one of the alternatives separately discussed earlier in this report.

G-5. Reduce watch stander manning standards from five to four per billet and eliminate 28 USSPACECOM positions.

G-6. Reevaluate the current manpower manning standards for watch standers throughout the Services and Defense Agencies and consider utilizing the figure of four versus five as the recommended watch standing manning standard.

G-7. Identify all related space specialties across the Services, both officer and enlisted, and determine which specialties could be trained using a consolidated joint Service training curriculum. Identify the number of students to attend the joint training courses and develop a schedule for establishing consolidated training to satisfy space training requirements. (The Joint Staff analysis should be completed by the end of FY 1988.)

G-8. Designate the U.S. Space Command as the executive agent for the Department of Defense (DoD) manned space flight, to act as the DoD point of contact with the National Aeronautical and Space Administration for all commitments affecting the Space Transportation System and its use, in matters regarding national security space operations. Also designate the U.S. SPACECOM as the DoD manager for the Military Men in Space Program.

## U.S. ARMY SPACE AGENCY

### Stated Mission

The U.S. Army Space Agency (USASA) is located at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado and is the U.S. Army component of U.S. Space Command. The USASA provides a perspective on strategic defense planning and enhanced space support for land forces, develops space plans and operates assigned space systems in support of national/Department of Defense space programs. The Army is planning to convert this organization to the U.S. Army Space Command in mid-CY 1988.

### Organization and Manpower

The Army Space Agency headquarters staff functions and authorizations are, as follow:

<u>Army Space Agency</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Strength</u>			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Command Group	2	0	1	3
Scientific Advisor	0	0	1	1
Administrations				
Management Division	3	3	0	6
Space Operations				
Division	5	0	1	6
Space Plans/Policy				
Division	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>7</u>
Total	<u>16</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>23</u>

### Management Support Contracts

The Army Space Agency has no management support contracts.

### Observations

The Army is planning to build a space-educated and experienced corps of personnel. Currently, the Army has eight officers undergoing undergraduate space training for four months at Lowry AFB, Colorado. Following graduation, they will receive combat crew training and then will be assigned to teams working in the Air Force Consolidated Space Operations Center at Falcon Air

Force Station. They will receive training and experience in the actual control of satellites beginning in mid-1988. (Satellite systems include the Global Positioning System, the NAVSTAR, the Defense Satellite Communication System, the MILSTAR and the Weather Satellite.) As they gain experience, this group of eight officers will also learn what the Army field forces actually require for space support. After a maximum of three years, current plans project that they will be assigned throughout the Army and, after some field experience, they will return to the Consolidated Space Operations Center or to other Army Space Command positions.

In addition, there is an effort under way to transfer a military satellite communications system--the Defense Satellite Communications System II/III--to the Army Space Agency in 1988. This would consist of two sites to be transferred--one Navy and one Air Force--in addition to the five sites the Army is already operating. The Army Defense Satellite Communications System Operations Centers would be responsible for exercising network control and managing terminal access, as well as managing and operating payload control (i.e., reconfiguring satellite antennas and transponders).

The Army Space Agency is also currently involved in building a data base on theater requirements for space support for exercises and actual operations. Procedures are being developed to assist Army field units in obtaining support from space systems. Another effort is directed toward ongoing strategic defense planning efforts, such as the Strategic Defense Architecture-2000, the Air Defense Initiative, the Strategic Defense Initiative and the development of ballistic missile defense planning and operational requirements.

Consolidation of Service personnel into a single, larger, truly unified U.S. Space Command should result in more efficient operations (see Appendix G). In view of this, the Army Space Agency should be disestablished and its 42 authorizations immediately transferred to the U.S. Space Command. The Army should manage a programmed growth to attain full authorized strength within the U.S. Space Command of approximately 425 personnel within the next two years, which represents about 25 percent of the USSPACECOM manning.

The assignment of Army authorizations and manning to the consolidated U.S. Space Command will prepare for and better complement the future Army role in support of the Strategic Defense Initiative.



## Recommendations

G1-1. Disestablish the Army Space Agency and immediately transfer its 42 authorizations and associated manning to the U.S. Space Command.

G1-2. Program a growth in Army strength at the U.S. Space Command over the next two years, increasing the Army contingent to approximately 425 personnel.

G1-3. Assign all Army space assets, including the Military Satellite Communications System II/III to the U.S. Space Command for operation (i.e., five sites currently operated by the Army).

G1-4. Assign development of the Army theater requirements to the U.S. Space Command Headquarters staff.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## NAVAL SPACE COMMAND

### Stated Mission

The Naval Space Command is located at Dahlgren, Virginia, and is the Navy component of U.S. Space Command. Its mission is to provide fleet unit direct support worldwide, to provide, operate and maintain adequate naval space resources and personnel, to coordinate naval requirements for the use of existing space capabilities and resources, to support mission development for current and future space activities, to develop budget requirements, and to exercise command support authority over naval space systems.

The Naval Space Command consists of three operating organizations: the Navy Astronautic Group, the Naval Space Surveillance System and the Fleet Surveillance Support Command. The Navy Astronautic Group maintains and operates astronautics systems including spacecraft, ground-based components and subsystems. The Naval Space Surveillance System maintains a constant surveillance of space and provide satellite data. It also operates the Alternate Space Defense Operations Center (ASPADOC) and the Alternate Space Surveillance Center. (These last two facilities are the designated backups for U.S. Space Command.)

The Fleet Surveillance Support Command operates and maintains Navy Relocatable-Over-the-Horizon Radar (ROTHR) systems necessary to provide wide-area oceanic surface and air surveillance data to support Fleet commanders. It provides no space support.

### Organization and Manpower

Headquarters, Naval Space Command support activities consist of intelligence, logistics, information systems plus space planning (operational plans/future plans), as shown on the following chart:

<u>Headquarters, Naval Space Command</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Commander/Staff	3	1	5	9
N-1, Management Support Division	4	2	15	21
N-2, Intelligence Division	6	2	3	11
N-3, Operations Division	17	5	6	28
N-4/6, Logistics and Information Systems Division	7	3	10	20
N-5, Space Plans Division	<u>7</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>14</u>
Total	<u>44</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>103</u>

### Management Support Contracts

Current Navy management contracts total \$3.4 million. Portions of some of the contracts appear to duplicate functions more appropriately done by the command itself, as follows:

- ST Systems Corporation. This \$450,000 contract consists of two tasks--(1) investigate the feasibility of exploiting naval platforms, including surface/subsurface systems and associated types of rockets and missiles as a survivable supplement to the existing national launch capability and (2) develop a comprehensive requirements capabilities architecture for the integration of survivable secondary space systems into naval warfare.

- John Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory. This \$175,000 contract has one task--i.e., consolidate and analyze potential enemies (space-based, terrestrial and/or ocean based).

- Mitre Corporation. This \$682,000 contract includes three tasks--(1) to develop Naval Space Operations Center technical definition and supporting documentation, (2) define common elements and approaches for developing the Naval Space Operations Center, Alternate Space Defense Operations Center and Space Surveillance Operations Center upgrade and associated systems, and (3) develop a Naval Space Command program plan for future naval space support activities.

### Observations and Conclusions

The Fleet Surveillance Support Command operationally reports to the U.S. Atlantic Fleet (USLANTFLT) and administratively reports through the Commander, Naval Space Command, to the Chief

of Naval Operations. The Fleet Surveillance Support Command provides no mission support to the Naval Space Command nor to its component support of U.S. Space Command. It appears that this group is inappropriately assigned to the Naval Space Command.

Consolidation of Service personnel into a single, larger, truly unified U.S. Space Command should result in more efficient operations (see Appendix G). Therefore, the Navy Space Command should be disestablished and its 103 authorizations should be immediately transferred to the U.S. Space Command. The Navy should manage a programmed growth to attain full authorized strength within U.S. Space Command of approximately 425 personnel within the next two years.

The Naval Astronautic Group and the Naval Space Surveillance System be transferred to the consolidated U.S. Space Command and retained at their present locations.

#### Recommendations

G2-1. Disestablish the Naval Space Command and transfer its 103 authorizations and associated manning to the U.S. Space Command.

G2-2. Program a growth in Navy strength at the U.S. Space Command over the next two years, increasing the Navy USSPACECOM contingent to approximately 425 personnel.

G2-3. Transfer the Naval Astronautics Group and the Naval Space Surveillance System to the consolidated U.S. Space Command. They should remain in their current location, however.

G2-4. Reassign the Fleet Surveillance Support Command from the Naval Space Command to an appropriate organization within the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

G2-5. Cancel \$1.3 million in support contracts.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND

### Stated Mission

The Air Force Space Command (AFSPACECOM) is located at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado, and is the Air Force component of the U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM), as well as a separate Air Force Major Air Command. Its mission is to organize, train, equip and administer missile warning and space operations resources provided to the USSPACECOM for employment. The AFSPACECOM plans and operate USSPACECOM facilities, defines operational concepts and develops contingency and wartime plans.

In addition, as the Air Force component to both North American Aerospace Air Defense Command (NORAD) and the USSPACECOM, the Air Force Space Command is responsible to certain support functions, including protocol, public affairs and audiovisual. (The AFSPACECOM support to NORAD/USSPACECOM, if withdrawn, would require 71 additional personnel to backfill those responsibilities.)

### Organization and Manpower

The AFSPACECOM is organized and manned, as follows:

<u>Headquarters, Air Force Space Command</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			<u>Total</u>
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	
Command	6	9	7	22
Engineering and Service	12	6	40	58
Operations	92	35	20	147
Combat Operations Staff	36	23	27	86
Intelligence	12	6	7	25
Combat Operations Staff	34	65	23	122
Systems Integration				
Logistics Support	38	28	38	104
Combat Operations Staff	188	241	182	611
Manpower and Personnel	18	26	25	69
Security Police	3	7	2	12
Combat Operations Staff	3	5	1	9
Plans	102	12	24	138
Combat Operations Staff	40	14	22	76

<u>Continued</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Miscellaneous Staff	<u>40</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>134</u>
Total	<u>624</u>	<u>506</u>	<u>483</u>	<u>1,613</u>
(Combat Operations Staff included)	(301)	(348)	(255)	(904)

The AFSPACECOM consists of over 13,000 personnel in locations around the world. There are over 6,000 military, nearly 2,000 civilian and nearly 5,500 contractor personnel. The contractors support the command's three space wings, four bases, three stations, and 35 sites that control 61 satellites and warning and surveillance functions. The AFSPACECOM current operating budget is \$537 million, with \$34 million in technical service contracts.

The AFSPACECOM also operates and manages the Consolidated Space Operations Center, satellite systems and the DoD flight control portion of the Space Transportation System. Further, it is responsible for the Global Positioning System, seven remote tracking stations and the Colorado Tracking Station at Falcon Air Force Station. Recently, the AFSPACECOM was designated the lead agency for development of the Air Force Space Plan. The DoD also designated the AFSPACECOM as the DoD manager for unscheduled landing support of the space shuttle.

#### Management Support Contracts

The Study Team indentified no management support contracts that appeared to be questionable.

#### Observations

This new, large, technically complex, worldwide organization is in the process of restructuring to sort out its mission, responsibilities, functions, tasks and manning. The USAFSPACECOM has never had a comprehensive manpower survey or analysis.

It is clearly in the national interest to consolidate into a truly unified command all space assets, including facilities and personnel authorizations and manning, under a single Unified Command, the U.S. Space Command. This decision will provide centralized command, operational control and senior leadership and management of the U.S. space effort and space assets.



Currently, each Service pursues its own "unique" requirements, plans and programs. These tend to result in a costly proliferation and generally uncoordinated effort. As explained earlier (see Appendices B, B1, and B2), the Study Team concluded that Army Space Agency, Naval Space Command and Air Force Space Command should be consolidated into a single unified U.S. Space Command of approximately 2,050 personnel. The Air Force should comprise about 50 percent of this command, or about 1,025 personnel, and the Army and Navy/Marines about 25 percent each, or about 425 per Service. This should be achieved by transferring approximately 1,300 Air Force Space Command personnel to the reorganized U.S. Space Command. As a result of such a consolidation and the elimination of functional overlaps, 341 Air Force Space Command positions could be deleted.

- Combat Crew Training. Generally, personnel serving on combat crews in the Cheyenne Mountain Complex and other NORAD/USSPACECOM/AFSPACECOM locations undergo four phases of training. The first is basic technical training, such as the seven and one-half week course at Lowry Air Force Base where enlisted technicians are taught theory and basic fundamentals and introduced to the variety of jobs included in a particular specialty. Prior to assignment to an operational crew, for several weeks personnel undergo qualification training on-the-job or at the 1013th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS). On completion of qualification training, the mission qualified technicians are assigned to a combat crew where they receive operational training to orient them to their crew assignment and responsibilities, and to become mission ready. The fourth training phase, recurring training, is provided to operational crews on a continual basis to maintain proficiency. Officers go through similar training phases.

Personnel assigned to crews do not go through the CCTS but, instead, receive qualification, as well as operational training. To a large extent, their training is decentralized. Crew personnel at the USSPACECOM receive classroom qualification training at the CCTS, but do not receive console positional qualification training until they join an operational crew. Qualification training for AFSPACECOM is conducted centrally at the CCTS for some crew assignments and on-the-job for other assignments. The different training regimens are dictated by the lack of training simulators at the CCTS, a problem that also forces USSPACECOM crew personnel to split their qualification training between the CCTS and on-the-job.

Decentralized qualification training impacts manpower, training time and readiness. The ability to conduct training exercises in the classroom is significantly higher than on an operational crew. Two exercises run in a day at CCTS might take a week to run in an operational crew environment.

Centralized training on simulators can significantly decrease the time required to qualify crew personnel. This would be particularly significant at remote surveillance sites, where personnel are assigned for 12 month tours, but spend as much as 3 months of that time receiving on-the-job qualification training. Decreased on-the-job training time would also reduce the size of the student pipeline required to support operational requirements. Decentralized training reduces standardization and can impact on training quality. It is also less efficient in terms of manpower, requiring more training personnel to administer and is probably reflected in the number of training authorizations at the NORAD, and the First and Second Space Wings of the AFSPACECOM.

There are a number of initiatives under way that will improve the efficiency and quality of qualification training. A memorandum of agreement between NORAD and the AFSPACECOM is being staffed that will transfer five training authorizations from the NORAD to the CCTS, along with the responsibility for providing qualification training for NORAD combat crews. The CCTS, which has been operational for only two years, is expanding its training capabilities and acquiring new simulators. Since many surveillance/sensor sites have unique, one of a kind equipment, the acquisition of simulators is cost-prohibitive. To provide simulator-type training for technicians assigned to those sites, the CCTS has a computer graphics simulator, which can provide simulation training for a variety of equipment systems once the software is developed. The CCTS can presently train ballistic missile early warning technicians and is developing the capability to provide simulator training for a second sensor system.

- Manned Space Flight. The 1st Manned Spaceflight Control Squadron (1MSCS) located at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, has been a major focal point for DoD participation in manned space flight operations.

The basis for the relationship between the DoD and National Aeronautical Space Administration (NASA) at the Johnson Space Center is a memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed March 27, 1980, prior to the establishment of the USSPACECOM. The MOU designates the Air Force as the sole DoD point of contact with the NASA for all commitments affecting the Space Transportation System and its use in matters regarding national security (classified) space operations. The MOU stipulates that Designated National Security Missions (i.e., DoD missions) will be controlled by DoD mission directors and flight directors and anticipates the DoD development of that capability, along with a separate facility from which to operate. To assist the DoD transition to the separate facility, the NASA agreed to integrate

DoD personnel into NASA line functions at the Johnson Space Center for training and operational experience. The separate DoD facility, the Shuttle Operations and Planning Complex (SOPC), was to have been located in Colorado Springs, Colorado. However, budgetary constraints forced cancellation of the SOPC from the U.S. Air Force FY 1987 POM (program objectives memorandum). Although future DoD missions are programmed, they will be planned and controlled at the Johnson Space Center.

The 1st Manned Spaceflight Control Squadron was initially authorized and assigned 104 of some of the brightest young Air Force officers. That number was subsequently reduced to 83, following cancellation of the SOPC. As of December 28, 1987, the Johnson Space Center had 112 Air Force officers assigned, although efforts were under way to reassign the overages. A July 1987 AFSPACECOM staff study recommended further reducing squadron authorizations to 55. Final approval of that reduction is expected in January 1988. In addition to the 55 Johnson Space Center authorizations, the Air Force study also recommended increasing the size of the AFSPACECOM operating location at the Johnson Space Center to 10 personnel. The operating location staff is essentially a program office to represent DoD interests in and coordinate actions on the space station, the Military-Man-In-Space, the Space Transportation System and the Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle/Orbital Transfer Vehicle Programs.

The necessity for continued participation in spaceflight control is not clear in light of the SOPC cancellation and the very limited planned DoD use of the space shuttle in the future. The Johnson Space Center program has graduated over 200 qualified Air Force manned spaceflight operations personnel. In addition, manned spaceflight experience (other than flight control operations) is obtainable through other assignments, including the Air Force Systems Command Space Division in Los Angeles, and at the Onizuka Air Force Station, California. Without a clearly defined need for spaceflight control expertise, the Johnson Space Center operation is not required by the DoD.

### Recommendations

G3-1. Disestablish the Air Force Space Command, transfer 1,025 of its authorized billets and associated manning to the U.S. Space Command (as explained in the narrative on U.S. Space Command--(see Appendix G), and eliminate 341 Air Force Space Command positions as a result of this consolidation.

G3-2. Continue efforts to centralize qualification training at the CCTS through the acquisition of additional simulator capability.

G3-3. Eliminate 11 billets as additional crew training for organizations of the First and Second Space Wings is shifted to the Combat Crew Training Squadron.

G3-4. Phase out the Air Force space flight control contingent at the Johnson Space Flight Center, and eliminate 83 billets.

G3-5. Transfer functions now performed by the AFSPACECOM operating location at Johnson Space Center to the USSPACECOM in Colorado Springs.

## NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

### Stated Mission

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is located at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado. The NORAD is a bi-national command (United States-Canada). The NORAD mission is to provide surveillance and control of the airspace of Canada and the United States; warning and assessment of aerospace attack; and appropriate response against air attack. This warning and assessment mission includes air, missile and space.

The NORAD forces are supplied primarily by the U.S. Air Force commands, as well as Guard, Reserve and Canadian Forces Air Command. Although no Army or Navy components are dedicated, they would augment the NORAD during air defense contingencies.

The Canadian Forces Air Command provides fighter interceptors, radar stations and control centers for the air defense of Canada. The U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command 1st Air Force is responsible for the management of air defense of the continental United States, utilizing fighter interceptors, radar sites and control centers. The Alaskan Air Command operates the air defense units in Alaska.

### Organization and Manpower

The majority of the NORAD personnel are located in the combat operations staff, which is primarily responsible for operations at the Cheyenne Mountain Complex, intelligence, exercises and training. The combat operations staff has a heavy mix of senior supervisory positions. The NORAD headquarters staff is relatively small. Headquarters support activities (administration, protocol, audiovisual services, public affairs, comptroller, manpower and personnel, history office, legal advisor and security police) are provided by the Air Force Space Command.

Current organization and manning of both the NORAD headquarters and combat support staff is shown below:

NORAD Headquarters	Officer	FY 1988 Authorized Manpower		Total
		Enlisted	Civilian	
Command and associated general staff	15	9	2	26
Planning Staff	38	4	14	56
Combat Operations Staff	<u>32</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>154</u>
Subtotal	<u>85</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>136</u>
<u>NORAD Combat Operations Staff</u>				
Director and Associated	5	0	0	5
Deputy Director for Air Defense	8	18	0	26
Deputy Director for Cheyenne Mountain Operations	37	32	4	73
Deputy Director for NORAD Combat Intelligence	31	14	2	47
Deputy Director for Standardization/ Evaluation	<u>22</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>41</u>
Subtotal	<u>105</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>200</u>
Total	<u>190</u>	<u>111</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>336</u>

#### Management Support Contracts

The only significant management support contract is for analysis and evaluation in the amount of \$486,000. It appeared appropriate.

#### Observations

The current DoD manning standard utilized by the NORAD permits five personnel to be authorized against each watch standing position. As explained in the discussion under U.S. Space Command (see Appendix G), the Study Team concluded that these missions can be successfully performed using a 4-person per position manning standard.

There is a significant number of NORAD, USSPACECOM, AFSPACECOM command and control facilities, command posts and different types of watch standing centers, all located in the Cheyenne Mountain complex or at nearby Peterson Air Force Base. Different missions are acknowledged--i.e., air, missile and space--and it is recognized that one facility may not be able to perform another facility's function.

The different operations centers and the types of facilities manned 24 hours a day are shown on the next charts.

Facilities Manned 24 hours a Day In or Near  
Cheyenne Mountain Complex

<u>NORAD</u>	<u>Total Manning</u>
Air Defense Operations Center	25
NORAD Command Post	25
Aerospace Defense Intelligence Center	<u>6</u>
Subtotal	56

U.S. Space Command

Space Defense Operations Center	35
Space Surveillance Center	35
Missile Warning Center	30
Joint Space Intelligence Center	5
Space Command Center	35
Indications and Warning Center	<u>5</u>
Subtotal	145

U.S. Air Force Space Command

Consolidated Space Operations Center	420
Space Operations Support Center	21
Systems Center	<u>24</u>
Subtotal	465
Total	<u>666</u>

TYPES OF FACILITIES MANNED  
24 HOURS A DAY  
(Number of Personnel in Parenthesis)

<u>Command</u>	<u>Air Defense</u>	<u>Missile Defense</u>	<u>Space Defense</u>	<u>General Command Center</u>
<u>NORAD</u>	Air Defense Operations Center (25)		Aerospace Defense Intelligence Center (6)	Command Post (25)
<u>USSPACECOM</u>		Missile Warning Center (30)	Space Defense Operations Center (35)	Indications and Warning Center (5)
			Joint Space Intelligence Center (5)	Space Command Center (35)
			Space Surveillance Center (35)	
<u>AFSPACECOM</u>				Consolidated Space Operations Center (420)
				Space Operations Support Center (21)
				Systems Center (24)
Subtotal	<u>1 (25)</u>	<u>1 (30)</u>	<u>4 (81)</u>	<u>6 (530)</u>
			Total	<u>12 (666)</u>



This proliferation of command and control centers is not justifiable. It appears that the NORAD Command Post and U.S. Space Command Center can be merged. A comprehensive evaluation of all of these facilities would result in the elimination of redundant functions and associated manpower and equipment.

### Recommendations

G4-1. Eliminate 11 NORAD watch standing billets based on a manning standard of 4 versus 5 personnel per each watch standing position.

G4-2. Review all of the NORAD command and control facilities (i.e., control centers, command posts, intelligence centers, etc.), plus those for the U.S. Space Command and the Air Force Space Command to determine the economies in personnel, equipment or facilities that can be achieved through merger.

G4-3. If the NORAD is unsuccessful in consolidating its command and control facilities, conduct a comprehensive assessment of all of the facilities in the Cheyenne Mountain Complex, at Peterson Air Force Base and at Falcon Air Force Station, to determine which specific facilities could be reduced, merged or eliminated in order to produce more cost effectively staffing, operation and maintenance.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

### Stated Mission

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is located at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. This new Unified Command was established on April 16, 1987, through an Act of Congress. The USSOCOM unifies all continental United States (CONUS) based Special Operations Forces under one commander responsible for preparing special operations forces to carry out assigned missions.

The primary command mission is to be a supporting commander to the theater Unified Commands by providing combat-ready special operations forces for rapid reinforcement. An additional mission is to be a supported commander by being prepared to plan and conduct selected special operations when specifically directed by the National Command Authority.

The Commander-in-Chief, USSOCOM (CINCUSOCCOM), performs the following functions:

- develops joint doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures for special operations forces;
- conducts specialized courses of instruction, training assigned forces and ensures interoperability of equipment and forces;
- monitors the preparedness of special operations forces assigned to the other Unified Commands;
- develops and acquires unique special operations forces equipment, material, supplies and services;
- consolidates and submits Special Operations Forces program and budget proposals; and
- monitors the promotions, assignments, retention, training and professional development of all Special Operations Forces.

## Organization and Manpower

To accomplish these missions, the USSOCOM has, as component commands, all active and Reserve component Special Operations Forces based in the continental United States.

Those components are the Army 1st Special Operations Command (ARSOC), Fort Bragg, NC; the Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSOC); and the 23rd Air Force (AFSOC), Hurlburt Field, FL. The Special Operations Command area component headquarters manning is, as follows:

<u>Special Operations Command</u>	<u>FY 1987 Authorized Manpower<sup>1/</sup></u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Command Headquarters	118	47	76	241
Command Support Element	<u>6</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>101</u>
Subtotal	<u>124</u>	<u>112</u>	<u>106</u>	<u>342</u>
Headquarters, Army Special Operations Command	129	192	150	471
Headquarters, Navy Special Operations Command	13	12	2	27
Headquarters, Air Force Special Operations Command (including Combat Operations Staff)	<u>142</u>	<u>142</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>315</u>
Subtotal	<u>284</u>	<u>346</u>	<u>183</u>	<u>813</u>
Total	<u>408</u>	<u>458</u>	<u>289</u>	<u>1,155</u>

<sup>1/</sup> FY 1988 authorized manpower not approved at the time the report was prepared.

In addition, the Service components have the following special operations schools and centers:

- John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.  
This center/school has the two-fold mission of developing doctrine and providing training. Based at Fort Bragg since 1952, this organization conducts training courses for Army special

forces, civil affairs, psychological operations, foreign area officers, and survival, evasion, resistance and escape. It is also responsible for developing doctrine and new equipment for Army Special Operations Forces.

- Naval Special Warfare Center. In November 1985, the Naval Special Warfare Center was established at the Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, California. Its mission is to provide instruction and training in naval special warfare operations and to be the principal authority for naval special warfare doctrine.

- Air Force Special Operations School. This facility is located at Hurlburt Field, FL, and has the mission of educating selected U.S. and allied personnel in the geopolitical, psychological, sociological, and military factors in Air Force special operations; educating selected U.S. personnel for security assistance assignments to technical assistance field teams, mobile training teams and other specified overseas activities; and assisting in preparing selected individuals for unconventional warfare and special operations missions.

#### Management Contract Support

The USSOCOM currently has a six-month, \$500,000 contract with Los Alamos National Laboratories to develop a USSOCOM Joint Special Operations Force (SOF) baseline master plan. It was contracted out because in-house resources are not available to perform the function. No headquarters functional missions were observed being accomplished by contractor personnel in lieu of assigned personnel.

#### Observations

The USSOCOM is a unique, new Unified Command, mandated by the Congress. By statute, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command (CINCUSOC) was given research and development and acquisition authority. In addition, a specific Assistant Secretary of Defense (Low Intensity Conflicts and Special Operations) was established to support the special operations mission area.

The CINCUSOCOM has approached the establishment of his command in a prudent manner, sharing facilities wherever possible. For example, the USSOCOM Headquarters shares the communications center, the Worldwide Military Command and Control System terminals, and the data processing facilities with other

DoD entities, resulting in substantial manpower savings (as compared to setting up separate USSOCOM-unique capabilities). This sharing of resources exists within the staff elements as well and appears to have minimized inter-Service rivalry. The Study Team fully supports the "low overhead" attitude and result at the USSOCOM.

The USSOCOM is charged with providing combat-ready Special Operations Forces for rapid reinforcement of the theater Unified Commands. Unless otherwise specifically directed by the National Command Authority, the CINCSOCOM will not command the special forces during any hostile engagement. Instead, the required special forces will be "chopped" (transferred) to the operational control of the appropriate theater Unified Commander-in-Chief. The theater unified commanders need to maintain small special operations planning groups on their staffs. The CINCSOCOM needs to maintain ongoing liaison with these theater special operations planning groups. To make sure this occurs, each theater special operations group should place a small liaison staff with the USSOCOM staff. Conversely, the CINCSOC should place a small liaison staff with each theater special operations planning group. The current theater Unified Commander planning groups are, as follows:

<u>Theater Unified Commands</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
U.S. Atlantic Command Special Operations	8	6	1	15
U.S. European Command Special Operations	17	10	2	29
U.S. Pacific Command Special Operations	17	5	1	23
U.S. Central Command Special Operations	19	10	0	29
U.S. Southern Command Special Operations	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>12</u>
Total	<u>67</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>108</u>

In order to have the special forces combat-ready and jointly trained, CINCUSSOCOM should have operational control of the component special forces in the continental United States during peacetime. This is exactly the opposite of what occurs with the theater Unified Commanders.

In order to accomplish this in the required joint environment, the best and most direct approach would be to incorporate elements of the Service component commands and transfer the Service special operations functions and related assets, including operational control of the forces in CONUS, to the USSOCCOM.

Also, if the CINCUSSOCOM is going to be able to control special forces-related research and development, acquisition and joint training, he also must control his budget--i.e., be able to determine what funds should be used for what purpose in the special forces arena. It is the Study Team view that without some type of budget control, the USSOCOM effectiveness will be significantly diminished. This subject is separately addressed earlier in the report.

### Recommendations

H-1. Establish a truly unified U.S. Special Operations Command headquarters, incorporating the Navy and Air Force Special Operations Commands (NAVSOC and AFSOC), and appropriate elements of the Army Special Operations Command (ARSOC).

H-2. Give the Commander-in-Chief, USSOCOM, operational control of the Service Special Operations Forces--i.e., the Army contingent at Fort Bragg, NC; the Navy Seals at Coronado, CA; and the 23rd Air Force at Hurlburt Field, FL.

H-3. Give the Commander-in-Chief, USSOCOM, operational control of the Service Special Operations Schools--i.e., the Army John F. Kennedy Warforce Center and School, the Naval Special Warfare Center, and the Air Force Special Operations School.

H-4. Transfer a total of 231 billets to the U.S. Special Operations Command, as follows:

37 billets from the Army Special Operations Command

27 billets from the Navy Special Operations Command

167 billets from the Air Force Special Operations Command (23rd Air Force--also see Appendix I)

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**



## UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

### Stated Mission

The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is headquartered at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. Its mission is to provide global air, land and sea transportation to meet national security needs. The USTRANSCOM is responsible for the transportation aspects of worldwide mobility planning, operation of the Joint Deployment System (JDS), development of procedures for transition to war, and centralized wartime traffic management to include interface of strategic and theater transportation systems. The command will also integrate transportation mobility and deployment automated data processing (ADP) systems into a single deployment system and will coordinate acquisition of transportation-related ADP for DoD commands and operating agencies to ensure overall system compatibility. In peacetime, the USTRANSCOM will collect and analyze unit movement requirements, task component commands and optimize transportation modes.

### Organization and Manpower

The USTRANSCOM has three components: the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), the Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Military Airlift Command (MAC). The Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) will be disestablished and its assets and functions integrated into the USTRANSCOM Headquarters. The manning for the USTRANSCOM and its Service component commands is, as follows:

#### Headquarters, U.S. Transportation Command

	<u>FY 1989 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY 1987 <sup>1/</sup>	113	46	33	192
FY 1988	+45	+28	+37	+110
FY 1989 <sup>2/</sup>	+17	+47	+22	+86
Total	175	121	92	388
MAC (dual-hat)	69	83	7	159
Total	244	204	99	547

1/ Includes 142 JDA authorizations transferred to the USTRANSCOM.

2/ FY 1989 increase of 86 authorizations under review (pending approval).

Headquarters, U.S.  
Transportation  
Command

FY 1988 Authorized Manpower<sup>3/</sup>  
Officer   Enlisted   Civilian   Total

U.S. TRANSCOM HQ:

Commander and Support Staff	33	21	29	83
J-1, Manpower and Personnel	9	13	9	31
J-2, Intelligence	24	14	7	45
J-3/4, Operational Logistics	91	64	15	170
J-5, Plans	38	15	9	62
J-6, Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems <sup>4/</sup>	<u>48</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>156</u>

HQ Total (FY 1989)	244	204	99	547
--------------------	-----	-----	----	-----

USTRANSCOM Auth	(175)	(121)	(92)	(388)
MAC Dual-Hat	(69)	(83)	(7)	(159)

3/ The USTRANSCOM data reflect planned headquarters organization, with growth of +86 authorizations for FY 1989.

4/ The J-6 Directorate should continue to receive support from the Air Force.

Observations

A Unified Transportation Command was created in April 1986, to provide an integrated military transportation system under one Unified Command, to be operated in peacetime with the capability to transition smoothly to a wartime activity. As the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Transportation Command (CINCUSTRANSCOM) stated, this Unified Command is intended to provide a unified response to combatant commanders and to solve the historical problem of not having the command structure to provide the most efficient use of power-projection forces during war.

The current Unified Command Plan transfers to the Unified Command (1) a few of the functions (primarily strategic planning) now performed by the Service component headquarters and (2) the authorizations and functions of the Joint Deployment Agency, including development and implementation of a master plan for Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems. It also assigns to the Unified Command a small part of the forces now controlled by the three component commands. Component forces not being assigned to the USTRANSCOM are discussed in the appendices pertaining to those commands (see Appendices I1, I2, and I3).

The Joint Staff four-phased implementation plan to bring the USTRANSCOM to full operational status retains the existing headquarters and command structure for the three Service components with very minor changes (if any). This plan leaves a layer of subordinate headquarters between the CINCUSTRANSCOM and his transportation forces and systems. The justification for the retention of the existing component headquarters management structure is claimed to be the requirement to perform "Service-unique" missions and functions assigned to the Service headquarters. The Study Team review of these headquarters functions shows, however, that they are predominately USTRANSCOM-related, not Service-unique.

For example, the MTMC does manage the DoD personal property movement and storage program worldwide and does some transportation engineering for Army systems. These functions are minor considering the total MTMC mission, and could be easily absorbed in the USTRANSCOM mission or, if appropriate, transferred to another Army activity (see Appendix I1). A similar situation is discussed in the MAC and the MSC sections of the report (see Appendices I2 and I3).

Under the existing USTRANSCOM implementation plan, much of the essential headquarters functions associated with transportation management and control of transportation forces remains with the component headquarters. This has created problems in the past, some of which were demonstrated in major exercises like NIFTY NUGGET. Information provided to the Study Team shows clear evidence that duplication and incompatible systems will continue to exist if the three components continue to manage their parts of the transportation system separately through Service component headquarters.

For example, each Service component has its own information systems offices, contracting officers, plans, operations and logistics offices. Separate management of these functions by Service component headquarters is inefficient and will significantly reduce the effectiveness of the USTRANSCOM. A review of one of these functional areas illustrates the potential risk. Clearly, separate information systems offices at each of the components will continue to preserve the need to have Service-unique information systems, which interfere with the USTRANSCOM thrust to develop an integrated system. Each of the components is continuing its own system development plans, as demonstrated by component contract plans for future automated data (ADP) support.

Improvements in effectiveness and efficiency can be realized by combining and managing the essential staff functions directly under a Unified Commander. Many other staff functions associated with administration of a headquarters can be reduced when consolidated into a single headquarters. This consolidation would require a separation of the J-3 and J-4 Directorates because of the increased operational mission.

Central oversight of comptroller functions, to include programming and budgeting, would provide the CINCUSTRANSCOM the resource information needed to provide the Unified Commanders with a direct role in the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. The Unified Commanders direct involvement in the resource allocation process was a major function stressed in the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, as necessary to ensure that a Commander-in-Chief really has the authority and ability to manage his command. It warrants the creation of a separate staff function.

Other benefits would also accrue from the elimination of Service component headquarters. With consolidation, the USTRANSCOM would improve the management of personnel, contract services, ADP support, logistics and supply, management and visibility of goods in transit, etc., as well as functions associated with the joint deployment of units. Central management with direct command and control of all of the military transportation assets would provide the war fighting commanders with more effective transportation services and movement of unit personnel, supplies, and equipment. In addition, the peacetime transportation system would be organized to operate as it would fight in wartime. The chart on the next page summarizes the authorizations associated with USTRANSCOM headquarters and its component command headquarters.

Summary-U.S.  
Transportation  
Command and  
Component  
Headquarters

FY 1988 Authorized Manpower  
Officer   Enlisted   Civilian   Total

(not including  
subordinate  
commands)

Headquarters, U.S.  
Transportation  
Command<sup>5/</sup>

175                  121                  92                  388

Headquarters,  
Military Traffic  
Management  
Command

86                    15                    503                  604

Headquarters,  
Military Sealift  
Command

42                    39                    427                  508

Headquarters,  
Military Airlift  
Command<sup>6/</sup>

388                  859                  765                  2,512

Total

1,191              1,034              1,787              4,012

<sup>5/</sup> Does not indicate MAC dual-hat.

<sup>6/</sup> Includes combat operations staff.

Recommendations

I-1. Authorize a total of 2,856 personnel for the USTRANSCOM, to be composed of a truly joint staff consisting of no less than 25 percent of the military staff from a single Military Department. Organize the headquarters staff with the functions of operations, logistics, plans and command, control, communications and computer systems, plus austere manned smaller functions of manpower and personnel, resource management, intelligence and administration.

I-2. Disestablish the component command headquarters (i.e., Military Traffic Management Command, Military Sealift Command and the Military Airlift Command) and transfer 2,468 of the present aggregate 3,624 authorizations to Headquarters, U.S. Transportation Command (as discussed in Appendices A1, A2, and

A3). Eliminate 1,015 of the remaining Service component authorizations; transfer 167 to Headquarters U.S. Special Operations Command; and transfer 154 to naval activities to the extent that Service-unique items require (such as the MSC Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force and special mission support), in accordance with the specific recommendations contained in the identified component command appendices and summarized in the following chart:

<u>Transfers and Deletions</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Previous Total, All Component Command Elements	<u>1,191</u>	<u>1,034</u>	<u>1,787</u>	<u>4,012</u>
Transfer to U.S. Transportation Command Head- quarters <sup>7/</sup>	357	694	1,305	2,856
Transfer to U.S. Special Opera- tion Head- quarters	55	74	38	167
Transfer to Navy Activities	-	-	154	154
Eliminate Billets	<u>293</u>	<u>267</u>	<u>455</u>	<u>1,015</u>

<sup>7/</sup> Includes 388 authorizations planned for FY 1989.

I-3. Direct the CINCUSTRANSCOM to exercise program and budget responsibilities, as separately discussed earlier in the report.

I-4. Organize the USTRANSCOM staff with a separate J-3 Directorate for Operations, a J-4 Directorate for Logistics and add a J-8 Directorate for Resource Management.

## MILITARY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND

### Stated Mission

The Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) is headquartered in Falls Church, Virginia. The MTMC mission is to serve as the single manager for military traffic, land transportation, sealift cargo offering and booking, transportation engineering, operation of common-user ocean terminals, operational management of Defense intermodel containers and specified worldwide traffic management responsibilities for the movement and storage of personal property. The MTMC controls procurement of commercial transportation for movement of cargo and passenger traffic. The MTMC also reviews contingency and mobilization plans for transportation feasibility and prepares unit movement tables to airports and seaports in Continental United States (CONUS). In addition, the MTMC coordinates the transportation support for people, equipment and supplies for exercises and provides centralized operations center support during emergency operations.

### Organization and Manpower

The MTMC has a headquarters staff of 604, organized and staffed, as follows:

<u>Headquarters, Military Traffic Management Command</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Command Group	9	2	6	17
Senior Trans Advisor	8	-	25	33
Spec Asst Trans Eng	-	-	15	15
Judge Advocate	2	-	8	10
IG	3	1	6	10
Internal Review	-	-	5	5
EEO	-	-	4	4
Personnel	3	4	36	43
Logistics	3	-	31	34
Public Affairs	-	-	7	7
Resource Mgt	8	-	80	88
Safety, Security and Intelligence	3	-	8	11

(Continued)	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
International Traffic	7	-	38	45
Personal Property	7	2	48	57
Plans	18	3	35	56
Inland Traffic	3	-	88	91
Passenger Traffic	5	1	50	56
Field Office				
Europe	4	2	6	12
Pacific	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>18</u>
Total	<u>86</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>503</u>	<u>604</u>

The MTMC has four subordinate commands. Three of the commands are MTMC Eastern Area, MTMC Western Area, and MTMC Transportation Terminal Command, Europe. These commands manage and operate military ocean terminals and outports in the U.S. Northern Europe, the Far East, the Mediterranean, and in Panama. The subordinate commanders function as the Military Sealift Command representative in those ports, as assigned, and operate the MTMC Military Air Traffic Coordinating Units, which are responsible for the flow of military cargo and passengers within the airlift system. The Eastern Area also manages the Defense Freight Railway Interchange Fleet (DFRIF), which includes over 2,700 rail cars.

The fourth subordinate command is the MTMC Transportation Engineering Agency. It provides scientific, engineering, and transportation management knowledge to analyze and improve transportability of equipment and deployability of Army units within the worldwide Defense transportation system.

The following chart summarizes MTMC headquarters and subordinate headquarters staffing:

<u>MTMC and Subordinate Command Headquarters</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Headquarters, Military Traffic Management Command	86	15	503	604
Eastern Area	45	18	545	608
Western Area	29	55	410	494



<u>(Continued)</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Transportation Terminal Command, Europe	17	25	83 <u>1</u> /	125 <u>1</u> /
Transportation Engineering Agency	<u>8</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>105</u>
Total	<u>185</u>	<u>113</u>	<u>1,638</u> <u>1</u> /	<u>1,936</u> <u>1</u> /

1/ Includes 61 local nationals.

### Observations

The three major MTMC subordinate commands (Eastern Area, Western Area, and Europe) and their respective offices at various locations around the world execute the traffic management function in support of the Nation's military forces. The current Joint Staff implementation plan for the USTRANSCOM retains the existing Army headquarters to manage and direct this key USTRANSCOM mission. The approach taken is to maintain the status quo of operational management at the MTMC headquarters level and to focus the USTRANSCOM involvement primarily in very specific areas, such as planning and strategic mobility.

Without consolidation of the key transportation functions and traffic management with the other USTRANSCOM functions, there would not be a unified execution of the military transportation mission at the USTRANSCOM headquarters level, in support of the war fighting commanders. It is one thing to coordinate and consolidate the planning functions associated with strategic mobility; however, is just as important to consolidate the execution of this mission under the direct operational control of the USTRANSCOM.

There are improvements in effectiveness and efficiency associated with consolidating the subordinate headquarters and field operators of both the MTMC and the MSC within the same organization. Under the current USTRANSCOM implementing plan, existing MTMC and MSC offices would continue to operate separately and report through separate headquarters located at the same location. For example, the MTMC has a staff of 144 at the terminal in Yokohama, while the MSC has a separate staff of 121 at the same location. Likewise, the subordinate commands of MTMC Eastern Area and MSC Atlantic are both located in Bayonne, New Jersey. There are numerous examples of colocation of operational activities, as well as separate MTMC and MSC liaison offices colocated with other commands.

Although the MTMC does manage the DoD personal property movement and storage program worldwide and does some transportation engineering for Army systems, these functions are minor considering its total mission. These personal property programs are well established and could continue to be managed under the USTRANSCOM with no adverse impact. The transportation engineering function should be comprehensive and include review of all Department of Defense systems to ensure they can be transported effectively and efficiently throughout the world. The Transportation Engineering Agency (TEA), with its 105 authorizations, should complement the USTRANSCOM ability to impact the future transportation system.

### Recommendations

11-1. Disestablish the Military Traffic Management Command and assign its mission to the U.S. Transportation Command at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. Eliminate a total of 193 billets (39 officers, 9 enlisted, and 145 civilian) and transfer the remaining authorizations to the USTRANSCOM for headquarters management of this mission.

11-2. Consolidate and merge the MTMC subordinate commands (Eastern Area in Bayonne, Western Area in Oakland, and Europe in Rotterdam) and offices with MSC subordinate commands and offices. Review and survey consolidated commands and offices to identify manpower reductions and efficiencies resulting from consolidation.

11-3. Transfer the Transportation Engineering Agency to the U.S. Transportation Command and designate it as a direct reporting activity.

## MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND

### Stated Mission

The Military Sealift Command (MSC) is headquartered in Washington, D.C. The MSC mission is to provide strategic sealift in support of the deployment and sustainment of U.S. military forces worldwide, direct fleet support for U.S. Navy operational forces, worldwide with Naval Fleet Auxiliary Forces and to perform special missions in response to specific taskings from designated U.S. agencies and sponsors worldwide.

### Organization and Manpower

The MSC has a headquarters staff of 506, organized and staffed as shown in the chart below. At the time of the Study Team's review, a headquarters reduction of 52 civilians has not yet been allocated by office; however, the total reflects the reduction.

<u>Headquarters, Military Sealift Command</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Command Group	4	3	6	13
Public Affairs	-	-	15	15
Secretariat	-	1	21	22
Inspector General, Internal Review, and Equal Employment Opportunity	1	-	7	8
Readiness and Sealift	10	14	26	50
Engineering	1	-	75	76
Supply	2	2	12	16
Strategic Mobility	2	-	75	76
Information Systems	-	5	51	56
Personnel and Manpower	2	8	31	41
Operations	7	1	53	63
Medical	1	1	4	6
Comptroller	-	-	66	66
Counsel	-	-	15	15
Contracts and Business Management	5	3	71	79
Liaison Offices	4	1	2	7
Unallocated	2	-	-	2
Headquarters reduction (unallocated)	-	-	(-52)	(-52)
Total	<u>41</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>428</u>	<u>508</u>

The MSC has four subordinate commands to carry out the command mission in their geographic areas of responsibility. Two of the commands, Sealift Command Europe, located in London, and Sealift Command Far East, located in Yokohama, do not have any ships assigned to them. The MSC fleet ships are assigned to Sealift Command Atlantic, located in Bayonne, New Jersey, or Sealift Command Pacific, located in Oakland, California. These latter two commands are responsible for the control, operation and administration of Government-owned ships assigned. These ships are run by contractor/civilian personnel and are generally former active Navy ships or special mission ships. The balance of MSC ship assets are procured by bareboat, time, voyage charter or by allocation from other Government agencies.

A summary of the manpower authorizations for the MSC and its subordinate commands headquarters is shown below:

<u>Headquarters, Military Sealift Command and Subordinate Commands</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Headquarters, Military Sealift Command	41	39	428	508
Headquarters, MSC Europe	7	13	37	57
Headquarters, MSC Atlantic	17	29	458	504
Headquarters, MSC Pacific	16	23	404	443
Headquarters, MSC Far East	<u>11</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>121</u>
Total	<u>92</u>	<u>121</u>	<u>1,420</u>	<u>1,633</u>

#### Observations

The MSC manages key ships assets that will provide strategic sealift capability to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Transportation Command (CINCUSTRANSCOM), in support of the war fighting Unified Commanders. The MSC has subordinate commands and offices throughout the world to execute this mission. The current Joint Staff implementation plan for the USTRANSCOM keeps the existing MSC Headquarters to manage and direct this transportation function. Prepositional ships, dry cargo ships, tankers, and other supporting ships will be critical to the forward deployed fighting units. The implementation plan expects to achieve a unified and integrated transportation system, while leaving the

existing Navy MSC Headquarters between the USTRANSCOM and the subordinate activities that execute this function and control these critical ship assets.

In order to achieve unified execution of this military sealift mission and coordinate and integrate the people and assets of the entire USTRANSCOM military transportation mission, consolidation and unified operation and management are needed. It is not necessary to retain a Service-unique component headquarters layered between the USTRANSCOM and the operations in the field. The relationship between the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) and MSC functions should be strengthened at all levels, as well as within the USTRANSCOM Headquarters. Almost every subordinate command headquarters, operational office and liaison office is colocated or is in close proximity to a MTMC office. Consolidation will not only improve communications and management within the USTRANSCOM, it will also establish a more effective and efficient organization that would operate in peacetime as it should operate in wartime.

The MSC does have some Service and sponsor-unique missions and the 61 ships dedicated to those functions should be transferred to the appropriate Navy activity--i.e., one of the fleet, supply or materiel commands. Many of the ships were former Navy ships manned by military and were run directly by Navy commands. The functions of supply, contracting, engineering, personnel, and comptroller already exist in those Navy activities. A small augmentation to the existing staffs would be sufficient to support the transfer of the ships and to manage the contractors/civilians that operate them. Resources for the ships already exist in the Navy budget, except in special cases of supporting a non-Navy sponsor. Those special mission ships could be directly funded with a transfer of resources to the Navy budget from the sponsor budget.

### Recommendations

I2-1. Disestablish the Military Sealift Command and assign its mission to the U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, and to Navy operational forces and activities in the Atlantic and Pacific (see Appendix I1). Distribute the mission, functions, and resources in accordance with the recommendations and table shown on next page:

Military Sealift Command Transfers	Authorized Manpower Changes			
	Officers	Enlisted	Civilian	Total
Headquarters Military Sealift Command	-41	-39	-428	-508
MSC Europe	-1	-	-3	-5
MSC Atlantic	-6	-	-87	-93
MSC Pacific	-5	-	-71	-76
MSC Far East	-2	-1	-3	-6
Headquarters USTRANSCOM	+23	+27	+282	+332
Other Navy Activities (Special Mission Support and Naval Fleet Auxiliary Forces)	-	-	+154 <sup>1</sup> /	+154 <sup>1</sup> /
Eliminate Billets	-33	-13	-156	-202

<sup>1</sup>/ The increase in "other Navy Activities" is to be accomplished from the reductions in MSC Atlantic, Europe, Pacific and Far East.

I2-2. Transfer Strategic Sealift (11 ships) and Ready Reserve (92 ships) assets to the U.S. Transportation Command.

I2-3. Transfer Special Mission Support (22 ships) and Naval Fleet Auxiliary Forces (39 ships) to the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and the U.S. Pacific Fleet, as appropriate. Resources for these ships should be budgeted by the Navy, thus eliminating the need for an industrial fund for these ships.

I2-4. Consolidate the Military Sealift Command subordinate commands (London, Bayonne, Oakland, and Yokohama) with the Military Traffic Management Command subordinate commands and terminal offices (see Appendix I1).

I2-5. Transfer the Support Unit Atlantic and Support Unit Pacific to the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and the U.S. Pacific Fleet (total of 2 officers and 21 civilians).

I2-6. Consolidate the remaining Military Sealift Command offices and activities with the appropriate Military Traffic Management Command field offices. Review and survey all consolidated offices to identify manpower reductions and efficiencies resulting from consolidation (see Appendix I1).

12-7. Transfer part of the functions of engineering, supply, operations, personnel, and contracting to the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and the U.S. Pacific Fleet Navy sea systems and Navy supply commands to augment their existing staffs in these areas. Transfer a total of 154 civilian authorizations to those activities.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**



## MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND

### Stated Mission

The mission of the Military Airlift Command (MAC) is headquartered at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. The MAC mission is to provide a global military airlift system in peacetime during periods of crisis and in wartime. The command is responsible for aerial deployment, employment and redeployment of combat and support forces, logistical resupply of these forces, aeromedical evacuation, presidential airlift, aerial search, rescue and recovery, special operations, weather reconnaissance and atmospheric sampling, aerospace audiovisual service, operational support airlift to all DoD Agencies and special aircrew training. In addition, the command contracts for long-term commercial airlift for the DoD and is responsible for planning, coordinating and managing the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Program.

### Organization and Manpower

The Military Airlift Command has a headquarters staff of 1,687 and a military airlift combat operations staff (MACOS) of 825 that report directly to the commander and associated deputy directors, for a total staff of 2,512. Dual-hatted positions (159) from these two staffs have been designated to support the Headquarters, U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). These staffs are organized, as follows:

<u>Military Airlift Command</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>		
	<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Headquarters MACOS</u>	<u>Total</u>
Headquarters Section	73	-	73
Operations/Plans	20	51	71
Surgeon	41	17	58
Inspector General	177	-	-177
Security Police	20	16	36
Administration	21	-	21
Transportation	73	199	272
Chaplain	11	-	11

(Continued)	Headquarters	Headquarters MACOS	Total
Public Affairs	29	-	29
Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems <sup>1/</sup>	6	-	6
Judge Advocate	14	-	14
Analysis Group	30	-	30
Intelligence	15	84	99
Engineering and Services	96	27	123
Personnel	227	18	245
Plans	207	16	223
Comptroller	126	-	126
Operations	174	50	224
Logistics	296	116	412
Command and Control Integration	13	-	13
Liaison Offices and Detachments	87	86	104
Total	1,687	825	2,512
Officer	612	276	888
Enlisted	505	354	859
Civilian	570	195	765

<sup>1/</sup> Support provided by Air Force external agency.

The major MAC components are the 21st and 22nd Air Forces, which operate the Airlift System (aircraft), the 23rd Air Force, which contains Special Operations units, the Air Weather Service, the Audiovisual Service, and 11 direct reporting units. Each numbered Air Force also has a combat operations staff (NAFCOS). The following chart is a summary of MAC Headquarters, subordinate headquarters and direct reporting units.

Headquarters Staffs	FY 1988 Authorized Manpower			
	Officers	Enlisted	Civilian	Total
Military Airlift Command				
Headquarters	612	505	570	1,687
MAC Combat Operations Staff	276	354	195	825
Subtotal	888	859	765	2,512

Major Subordinate Headquarters	FY 1988 Authorized Manpower			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Headquarters 21st Air Force	70	56	36	162
21st Air Force Combat Operations Staff	41	78	5	124
Headquarters 22nd Air Force	62	62	50	174
22nd Air Force Combat Operations Staff	36	71	4	111
Headquarters 23rd Air Force	101	108	20	229
23rd Air Force Combat Operations Staff	41	34	11	86
Headquarters Air Weather Service	153	63	42	258
Headquarters Aerospace Audiovisual Service	<u>15</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>80</u>
Subtotal	<u>519</u>	<u>490</u>	<u>215</u>	<u>1,224</u>
Direct Reporting Units (not including combat operations staff)	FY 1988 Authorized Manpower			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
528 Air Force Band	2	43	-	45
1275 Test & Evaluation Flight	14	43	-	57
1380 School Squad	-	22	4	26
1381 School Squad	-	17	2	19
1501 Airlift Industrial Service	1	-	36	37
1600 Management Engineering Squad	34	86	93	213
Airlift Operations School	9	2	3	14
1212 Special Security Squad	-	40	-	40
Special Missions Operational Test and Evaluation	13	10	3	26
Air Force Airlift Center	34	29	7	70
1201 Printing Squad	<u>-</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>93</u>
Subtotal	<u>107</u>	<u>340</u>	<u>193</u>	<u>640</u>
Total	<u>626</u>	<u>830</u>	<u>408</u>	<u>1,864</u>

## Observations

The military airlift and air weather assets of the MAC would be called on first during a joint deployment of forces in support of the other war fighting commanders. The USTRANSCOM would have to provide effective airlift operations, reallocate assets in accordance with priorities, coordinate other elements of the transportation system, and deliver maximum responsiveness in a highly time-sensitive environment.

Operations in the peacetime environment should be executed just as they would be in wartime or other national emergencies. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Transportation Command (CINCUSTRANSCOM) would require operational command and control of transportation-related forces. Duplication of functions or the layering of headquarters between the CINCUSTRANSCOM and airlift transportation forces and assets would significantly risk the effective and timely support to other Commanders-in-Chief.

The current Joint Staff four-phased implementation plan to bring the USTRANSCOM to operational status calls for two separate staffs. One at the USTRANSCOM and one at Headquarters, MAC. There is no demonstrated benefit to having two staffs coordinating functions for deployment plans, operations, logistics, intelligence, and others related to delivering unified airlift support. The fact that the current plan considers sharing the benefits of the existing MAC global communications network and using 159 dual-hat MAC authorizations to support the USTRANSCOM demonstrates the need to utilize fully existing capabilities and expertise through direct support to the USTRANSCOM. There is no merit in duplicating command and control centers, headquarters, overhead functions, and other essential functions for two separate headquarters located at the same Air Force Base. Coordination and implementation emphasis should be focused on coordination between staff functions without the additional burden of coordination between two separate headquarters. One joint staff, unified under one commander, would be more effective and more efficient and would improve the ability of the CINCUSTRANSCOM to respond quickly to the changing needs of the theater Unified Commanders during mobilization and deployment of forces.

The existing MAC functions of the 23rd Air Force (Special Operations) and the audiovisual service are not essential to the transportation mission. These functions do not require the oversight of the USTRANSCOM and should be separated from the existing MAC headquarters management. The Special Operations (23rd Air Force) assets are directly related to the U.S. Special

Operations Command (USSOCOM) mission. The Audiovisual Service is a stand-alone function and Service-unique item that could be managed as a separate support activity of the Air Force or could be associated with another Air Force activity, such as the Air Training Command.

### Recommendations

I3-1. Disestablish the Military Airlift Command and assign its airlift mission assets and resources to the U.S. Transportation Command (see Appendix I). Assign other unique missions and resources to the USSOCOM and other Air Force activities, in accordance with the further recommendations and table below:

<u>Action Command</u>	FY 1988 Headquarters <u>Authorization Transfers/Reductions</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Transfer to the U.S. Transportation Command (+)	612	540	573	1,725
Transfer to the U.S. Special Operations Command (+)	55	74	38	167
Eliminate (-)	<u>221</u>	<u>245</u>	<u>154</u>	<u>620</u>
Total	<u>888</u>	<u>859</u>	<u>765</u>	<u>2,512</u>

I3-2. Transfer the military airlift assets and resources, including the 21st and 22nd Air Forces, the Air Weather Service, and the Direct Reporting Units listed in the Organization and Manpower section, to the U.S. Transportation Command including 1,725 billets (612 officers, 540 enlisted, and 573 civilians).

I3-3. Transfer the MAC Special Operations functions and the 23rd Air Force to the U.S. Special Operations Command, including 167 billets from Headquarters, MAC and MACOS (55 officer, 74 enlisted, 38 civilian).

I4-4. Transfer the Aerospace Audiovisual Service to another Air Force activity or have it stand alone as an Air Force support activity.

I3-5. Merge the MAC Headquarters staff and the MAC combat operations Headquarters staff with the U.S. Transportation Command staff.

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

## UNITED STATES FORCES COMMAND

### Stated Mission

The U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) is located at Fort McPherson, Atlanta, Georgia. The FORSCOM became a Specified Command when it assumed responsibility for the following missions upon the deactivation of U.S. Readiness Command (REDCOM):

- planning for and conducting of land defense of the continental United States (CONUS) (hostile acts against selected key assets only);
- combined Canadian - U.S. defense of North America;
- defense of Alaska (less aerospace and the Aleutians);
- military support to civil defense (MSCD);
- joint exercise support; and
- joint training.

In addition to being a Specified Command, the FORSCOM retained its current major Army command role as the U.S. Army Forces Command, responsible for:

- providing Army forces to augment the Unified Commanders and a contingency battalion for rapid deployment worldwide;
- preparing Army forces capable of mobilizing, deploying, fighting, and winning on any battlefield.
- preparing and, if necessary, executing plans for assigned domestic emergency missions.
- functioning, for planning purposes, as the U.S. Army component of U.S. Atlantic Command.

The FORSCOM sets, as its first and second priority (1) the augmenting of other Commanders-in-Chief deployment planning, performing joint functions inherent to a specified command, and training and equipping a contingency battalion, and (2) preparing for and conducting the land defense of the continental United States.

The other missions in descending order of priority are the defense of Alaska, the Canada-United States defense, provide military support to civil defense, joint exercises, and joint training.

### Organization and Manpower

The FORSCOM is supported by six subordinate commands. The 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th Continental U.S. Armies (CONUSAs) are responsible for specific regions (several states) of the continental United States. The 3rd Army is the Army component of U.S. Central Command, and is discussed under Appendix C.

<u>Headquarters Forces Command</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			<u>Total</u>
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	
Commanders Group	17	10	29	56
J-1, Personnel	37	10	117	164
J-2, Intelligence	25	10	52	87
J-3, Operations	107	51	213	371
J-4, Logistics	35	15	165	215
J-5, Plans, Policy and Programming	28	3	60	91
J-6, Command, Control, Communications and Computers	13	11	112	136
J-8, Resource Management Operating Agency	17	4	134	155
Other Staff	<u>85</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>196</u>	<u>303</u>
Army	364	136	1,078	1,578 <sup>1/</sup>
Non-Army	<u>31</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>31</u>
Subtotal	<u>395</u>	<u>136</u>	<u>1,078</u>	<u>1,609</u>

<sup>1/</sup>The precise distribution among the functional areas, as well as the civilian/military mix, is still being decided; however, the total authorized Army manning level remains at 1,578.



<u>Headquarters Forces Command</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Field Operating Agencies</u>				
Resource Management				
Operating Agency	-	1	204	205
Worldwide Military				
Command and Control				
System	<u>8</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>118</u>
Subtotal	<u>403</u>	<u>207</u>	<u>1,322</u>	<u>1,932</u>
Headquarters, First Army	101	55	261	417
Headquarters, Second Army	98	57	217	372
Headquarters, Third Army	(See U.S. Army Central under Central Command)			
Headquarters, Fourth Army	106	42	232	380
Headquarters, Fifth Army	99	41	216	356
Headquarters, Sixth Army	<u>106</u>	<u>54</u>	<u>212</u>	<u>372</u>
Subtotal	<u>510</u>	<u>249</u>	<u>1,138</u>	<u>1,897</u>
Total	<u>1,308</u>	<u>592</u>	<u>3,538</u>	<u>5,438</u>

The FORSCOM initially reported that it needed 2,084 headquarters positions (183 positions above its existing manpower authorizations). That figure is now hovering in the vicinity of 1,990. In addition, the Joint Staff approved the transfer of 55 of the prior Readiness Command (REDCOM) positions to the FORSCOM, subject to Services approval. Of the 21 Army positions in the REDCOM package, the Army approved the transfer of only 18. The Army recently directed the FORSCOM to delete an additional 17 officer positions, but allowed the positions to be back-filled with (converted to) civilians. In effect, the Army simply authorized 17 of the previously approved positions to be civilian rather than officer.

There are 1,897 manpower authorizations distributed among five Continental U.S. Armies (CONUSAs). There are also likely to be additional field operating agencies operating under the CONUSAs, performing FORSCOM - CONUSA Headquarters functions, but the Study Team did not obtain this information.

#### Management Support Contracts

The FORSCOM identified three current support contracts totalling under \$1 million. The contracts are not relevant to the headquarters management issues pursued in this study.

#### Observations

The transferred REDCOM missions are not of sufficient criticality to warrant the additional manpower and materiel resources that are needed to establish a specified command. The FORSCOM should be returned to its status as a U.S. Army supporting command. Further, the CONUS and Alaska missions assigned to the FORSCOM are ill-defined, and should not have Army resources dedicated to them until the National Command Authority clarifies the Department of Defense role. (The Alaska mission is separately addressed earlier in this report.)

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (hereafter referred to as the Act) directed the Secretary of Defense to consider revising the missions and responsibilities of the REDCOM, to include an enhanced role in securing the borders of the United States, and the assignment of responsibility for regions of the world not assigned as part of the geographic area of responsibility of any other Unified Command.

The Act did not direct that the REDCOM be disestablished or that the FORSCOM be elevated to Specified Command status. In fact, a key author of the Act indicated that the missions transferred to the FORSCOM did not merit Unified or Specified Command status, and that Section 162 of Title 10, United States Code, which requires that all forces be assigned to a Unified or Specified Command, was actually inserted into the Act to strengthen the REDCOM.

The Army authorized only 18 additional positions for the FORSCOM Headquarters because of its concern that legitimate headquarters functions were being performed by two field

operating activities (FOAs). In fact, manpower and information systems functions and positions (one document states 274) were transferred to two of the FOAs as a means of avoiding cutting other headquarters functions (a common practice in all of the Services to avoid congressional mandates to cut headquarters size).

This rationale might be defensible if there were a legitimate basis to maintain (let alone increase) manpower positions in the headquarters. There is not. The Armed Forces war planning and execution functions have matured over the last decade, and the need for large planning staffs to oversee and develop this process is past. The planning process is now at the point where these large headquarters staffs could well impede, rather than facilitate, the national strategy.

Consider planning, for example--most of the planning (whether for mobilization, mobility, information systems, CONUS defense, etc.) should be virtually complete; maintenance should now be the dominant activity. Even assuming that there are always some requirements to develop totally new plans, the current level of manning dedicated to this function is unjustified. There are in existence numerous agencies that the FORSCOM can, and should, depend on for planning, because they also claim to be doing the same planning the FORSCOM claims for itself. In many cases, the other agencies appear to be the preferred agency--i.e., the five CONUSAs, the active duty Army Corps, the National Guard Bureau and the state Adjutants General, the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, the Training and Doctrine Command (for Joint Doctrine), etc. The same argument can be made for other headquarters functions (e.g., mobilization and reserve affairs, special operations, intelligence support, reserve training, the operations center, etc.). In fact, it appears that many of the agencies listed above are also overmanned and overlaid in the same functions for the same reasons.

Virtually all of the mission statements on headquarters functions place an inordinate emphasis on taskings that have traditionally been given a low threat assessment by the National Command Authority, and to which the FORSCOM, itself, gave its lowest management priorities. The priorities are correct, but the staffing levels do not reflect the priorities.

In addition, there are indications that both of the FOAs are also overstaffed. The Resource Management Operating Agency (RMOA), with 205 positions, is essentially a manpower survey and

requirements analysis agency, which appears to duplicate the functions of the Army Manpower Requirements and Documentation Agency, an Army Headquarters FOA. The Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) field operating activity, with 118 positions, also represents a function that appears to be heavily manned throughout the Department of Defense.

During peacetime civil or national domestic emergencies, the states, through their National Guard headquarters, retain primary authority for the defense and emergency military operations within their boundaries. During national emergencies (i.e., the defense of key assets such as bridges, ports, factories, dams, etc.) and/or the military support of civil defense, the Federalized State National Guard headquarters having primary responsibility for military forces within state boundaries exercise operational control of these forces. These Federalized state offices are the State Area Commands (STARCS).

The numbered CONUSA is the key Army management structure, that coordinates with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and/or the states. The CONUSA selects the forces (normally Guard units) and, with FORSCOM concurrence, activates and/or Federalizes, when needed. The CONUSA deploys and transfers operational command to a STARC or operational control to the FEMA, the EPA, or the state(s), when military support is needed for domestic emergencies. The FORSCOM and all other major Army commands must be prepared to provide disaster assistance as directed by the numbered CONUSA.

To provide defense of key assets, the numbered CONUSA is authorized to task all active duty installations and Army Reserve component forces in its area of responsibility. Other active Army and Service forces may be employed on request.

The CONUSA retains operational control of land forces. The FORSCOM, therefore, clearly has no direct command authority over domestic defense or civil emergency forces and it plays no significant role in planning or execution. The command does have the option of mediating force allocation throughout the CONUS, but that is a function normally performed by a supporting command. The FORSCOM does not execute plans.

The FORSCOM and its component commands can be looked at as one headquarters structure. However, the CONUSAs clearly have the dominant responsibilities for the operational control of

military ground forces for the land defense of the U.S. and continental key assets, responses to domestic emergencies, etc., within their respective states. Although a STARC comes under the command of a CONUSA when Federalized, for administrative purposes, the states do not give up their authority. Each STARC in the lower 48 states clearly retains and exercises operational command of the land defense forces within each state.

Agreements with Canada for continental defense of key assets is, likewise, a task that has insufficient substance to justify the creation of a specified command. Any staffing responsibilities for plans development, on which to reach agreements with Canada regarding mutual protection of key continental assets, clearly rests with either the Joint Staff or the Army Headquarters.

The role the FORSCOM outlines for itself relative to Alaska also does not justify making it a specified command. The Air Force has the lead for the Joint Task Force, Alaska, and the FORSCOM would, in its Army hat, routinely provide forces as a supporting Army component for the land defense of all of Alaska, except for the Aleutian Island chain--an anomaly that makes no sense.

The Navy, with Coast Guard support, is responsible for the naval defense of the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Coasts, the Great Lakes and Western Rivers.

Two Maritime Defense Zones were created. The Atlantic Zone Commander reports to the U.S. Atlantic Fleet Commander and is responsible for the indepth maritime defense of internal, inshore and coastal waters of the eastern portion of the CONUS that extends inland to the state boundaries that approximate the continental divide. The Pacific Zone Commander reports to the U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander and is responsible for the rest of the CONUS.

One reason for making FORSCOM a specified command was to give it the responsibility for the land defense of the CONUS (i.e., the key national assets selected by each state). The states have apparently identified many assets that are port or navigation-oriented facilities (examples might be Baltimore Harbor and the Chesapeake Bay and its bridges, the Tennessee River Valley, the Columbia River power generation and

transmission complex, etc.). A clear demarcation between land defense, maritime defense and state defense does not exist. The Governor of the State of Maryland, the Atlantic Maritime Defense Zone Commander, and the Commander-in-Chief, FORSCOM, cannot all be primarily responsible for defending the Port of Baltimore "indepth." Unfortunately, that appears to be precisely what has been allowed to occur. Plans are being developed and resources consumed to prepare for ghost missions.

The justification for the FORSCOM to be a specified command, in order to perform the land defense functions outlined above, is flawed. In addition, the FORSCOM subordinate components (the CONUSAs) appear to have more planning and execution authority than does the FORSCOM, because the CONUSAs directly support and work with the states, and/or the Federal agencies that have primary authority for an emergency. The Study Team, therefore, questions the validity of the REDCOM taskings that were transferred to the FORSCOM.

Making the FORSCOM a specified command and giving it the REDCOM missions gave credence to an aggravated and already confusing, jumbled line of authority, unclear and overlapping charters, and a lack of any coherent strategic plan. No one is clearly in charge. The National Command Authority must take the lead to work with all of the affected Federal departments, the states and the Congress to solve this dilemma. While there may eventually prove to be a need for a unified command, there is clearly no justification for the FORSCOM Specified Command status.

Once the FORSCOM returns to its legitimate role as an Army major command, providing ready combat forces to the Unified Commanders, a mission and tasking review must be undertaken to ensure that the FORSCOM is not taking the lead (except in support of USLANTCOM) in those functions that are the primary responsibility of the Unified Commander (e.g., the development of intelligence assessments, joint contingency and exercise plans, the preparation of annexes to Joint Staff documents, etc.). The FORSCOM should continue to monitor, comment, and coordinate on Unified and Combined Command and Joint Staff planning documents, fulfill its role as a supporting command, and ensure that combat and support forces are properly tasked and capabilities are not exceeded.

Far too many FORSCOM functions and staff are devoted to mobilization management, particularly of the Reserve Forces. Mobilization policy and procedures have been well developed and exercised by the Services, the OSD and the Joint Staff. There is a need to be able to execute mobilization policy. There is, however, no need for a FORSCOM mobilization policy function.

### Recommendations

J-1. Disestablish U.S. Army Forces Command as a Specified Command and eliminate a minimum of 300 billets in the FORSCOM Headquarters and field operating activities. Reestablish the FORSCOM as an Army supporting command.

J-2. Clarify the role the Armed Forces should play in the defense of the United States, and decide on a command and headquarters structure that will best carry out that charter.

J-3. Conduct immediately the planned manpower audit of the FORSCOM Headquarters and field operating agencies (which the Army has already decided to do). The Army manpower audit should be expanded to include FORSCOM positions located at the five component commands, the five CONUSA headquarters, and the (CONUSA) field operating activities. Consolidated manpower documents should be prepared that include all the manpower needed to operate each headquarters. In conducting the manpower audit, at a minimum the following factors should be considered:

- The FORSCOM is not a Specified Command, but instead is a supporting Army command. All of the missions transferred to the FORSCOM from the REDCOM should be discarded, except for those functions that are logically performed by the FORSCOM as a U.S. Army supporting command.

- The mix of military versus civilian positions may not be optimum. The FORSCOM appears to be over manned by civilians for a command whose primary mission should be ensuring the readiness of U.S. Army units.

- Plans and operations functions should be evaluated primarily as being in support of a resource manager and trainer for Army combat forces--not as a war fighter. The planning function focus should be maintaining (vice developing) resource allocation, combat training, equipping and sustainment plans for Army combat forces.

- As an Army supporting command, the FORSCOM needs to take its fair share of mandated headquarters manpower cuts. Mandated officer reductions should not be converted to civilian or enlisted positions.

- Rescind any outstanding requests for additional manpower to support the FORSCOM as a specified command.

- Maintain the functions that are responsible for developing and maintaining mobility plans.

J-4. Retain the FORSCOM - CONUSA command structure, but ensure there is no overlapping of functions and responsibilities. Scale back, consolidate and integrate functions at the most suitable command level. Deactivate at least two CONUSAs (the 2nd and the 4th Armies were recently reactivated) and eliminate and/or transfer positions to part-time Reserve responsibility. Downgrade general officer positions at the CONUSAs--at least until the National Command Authority eliminates the redundancy, clarifies the roles and decides the command structure needed for CONUS/continental military operations. (Eliminate a minimum of another 300 positions and/or transfer to part-time Reserve status when the position(s) are wartime required only.)

J-5. Cancel the funding for new facilities, information systems and contractor support to sustain a Specified Command and its component commands.



## HEADQUARTERS, TACTICAL AIR COMMAND SUBORDINATE COMMANDS AND ACTIVITIES

### Stated Mission

As an Air Force major command, the Tactical Air Command (TAC) supports both Unified and Combined Commands by organizing, training, equipping, administering and maintaining combat-ready tactical air and support forces for rapid deployment to conflict or contingency areas, including forces for the air defense of North America.

As the Air Force component of Atlantic Command, the Air Forces, Atlantic (AFLANT), the TAC plans for, trains for, and directs tactical air operations in support of the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command (CINCLANT). Except for the obvious differences in weapon systems and Service-unique management traditions, the TAC performs the same primary missions as U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM), but without the additional management costs that generally come with being a U.S. Specified Command.

### Organization and Manpower

The TAC is supported by three subordinate commands, which are also the component commands to a Unified or Combined Command, the 1st, 9th, and 12th Air Forces. All TAC commanders organize, train, and administer assigned and attached forces to ensure operational readiness.

The 9th Air Force Commander, who acts as Commander, U.S. Central Air Force (USCENTAF), reports directly to the Commander, U.S. Central Command (CINCUSCENT) during emergencies, and retains both operational command and control of assigned Air Forces.

The 12th Air Force Commander, who acts as Commander, Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH), reports directly to the Commander, Southern Command (CINCSOUTH), and retains both operational command and control of assigned Air Forces.

The 1st Air Force Command structure differs from that of the 9th and 12th Forces. The Commander, 1st Air Force is charged with a threefold mission as (1) the Commander, Continental United

States (CONUS) Region of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a combined command, (2) the Commander, CONUS Air Defense Region of U.S. Element North American Aerospace Defense Command (USELMNORAD), and (3) the supporting commander for Air Force Iceland.

The first two roles are the same, except that in the first case the command hierarchy includes Canada in a combined command defense of North America. In the second case, however, it is the sole U.S. command and does not include Canada. In both cases, the commander is responsible for planning and exercising operational control over all assigned forces for the purposes of ensuring air sovereignty, providing atmospheric attack warnings, and assessing air defenses. The Air Force Iceland, in turn, transfers to the operational control of the Iceland Defense Force (ICEDEFOR) during emergencies, which is a subordinate command of the U.S. Air Force Atlantic (USAFANT) and the U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM).

Headquarters, Tactical Air Command	FY 1988 Authorized Manpower			
	Officer	Enlisted	Civilian	Total
Command Staff	20	27	15	62
Inspector General	83	55	4	142
Staff Judge Advocate	8	4	2	14
Special Staff	49	40	17	106
Operations	126	50	38	214
Requirements	91	25	19	135
Plans	101	50	50	201
Logistics	115	179	69	363
Engineer and Services	36	15	83	134
Intelligence	35	19	9	63
Personnel	54	94	50	198
Comptroller	32	30	34	96
Comm-Computer*	-	-	-	-
Surgeon	16	10	9	35
Subtotal	766	598	399	1,763

(\*Air Force Communications Command Organization)

(continued)

<u>Headquarters, Tactical Air Command</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Tactical Air Combat	134	147	64	345
Operations Staff				
1st Air Force	41	39	13	93
Air Divisions Combat	50	76	7	133
Operations Staff				
9th Air Force		(see U.S. Central Command)		
12th Air Force	94	76	21	191
Combat Operations Staff	<u>53</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>88</u>
Subtotal	<u>372</u>	<u>366</u>	<u>112</u>	<u>850</u>
Total	<u>1,138</u>	<u>964</u>	<u>511</u>	<u>2,613</u>

#### Management Support Contracts

The contracts Headquarters TAC identified are not relevant to the issues pursued in this study.

#### Observations

Some TAC missions, based on threat assessments and budget constraints, are given lesser priorities--e.g., the defense of the Atlantic, Alaska, Iceland, the Caribbean, and "Survival, Recovery, and Reconstitution." Hence, manpower and materiel resource allocations mirror mission priorities. Most resources should be allocated against those missions that strategic threat assessments indicate require the highest priority--Europe, Southwest Asia, etc. The question then becomes one of how efficiently and effectively the TAC has allocated its resources to meet these priorities.

In the past, the TAC, particularly Headquarters TAC, rightfully played a dominant and effective role in the development of force mobility (deployment), employment and sustainment plans, and it has been an effective leader in joint exercises and real-world contingencies. Whereas five years ago the TAC was

ascendant, there are now viable joint and Air Force component subcommands, whose authority and resources have been substantially increased. The question then becomes how well the TAC has passed the wand of authority to the newly strengthened commands and has revised its own management structures appropriately. A general conclusion is that this process is incomplete. The Headquarters, TAC still retains the same resources and mission statements to operate as it did five years ago, before the Unified Commands and their Air Force component subcommands were strengthened with additional management resources and the authority of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Act).

The Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, has been organized to oversee the TAC mission as an Air Force supporting command. A separate, subordinate organization, the Tactical Air Command Combat Operations Staff (TACOPS), provides tactical air combat operations staff support, and is assigned combat operations and readiness responsibilities in support of the Unified and Combined Commands and to serve as the combat operations staff of the U.S. Air Force Atlantic (USAFALANT).

The TACOPS has several responsibilities that appear to conflict with or overlap with the responsibilities of the Unified and Combined Commanders-in-Chief and their Air Force component commands (e.g., the USAFLANT, the NORAD, the USCENAF, and the AFSOUTH), as follows:

- The Deputy Director for Operations "...supervises tactical fighter, reconnaissance and search/rescue units in support of, combat operational plans...."

- The TAC Command Post Division "...manages the ... Operations Center to provide positive command and control of tactical combat forces."

- The JCS Exercise Division "...directs and supervises the planning, coordination, and management of Air Force component command support of JCS joint and combined/joint exercises."

- The Contingency Plans Division "...directs and supervises the development, coordination, and publication of operation annexes to contingency, and general war plans. Serves as Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for Battle Staff operational matters.... Responsible for planning and management of component commands. Battle Staff participation in JCS-sponsored command post exercises that test/exercise the procedures to execute operations plans."

- The Deputy Director for Plans "...develops plans for accomplishing component command contingency/wartime responsibilities."

- The Europe/Southwest Asia/Africa Plans Division "...develops, supervises, and monitors preparation of joint contingency plans to accomplish component command responsibilities...."

- The Assistant Deputy Director for Manpower and Organization "...manages manpower requirements in support of mobility, contingency, and wartime objectives. Assists contingency planners in the development of Time Phase Force Deployment Lists (TPFDLs)...."

- The Deputy Director for Intelligence "...assesses enemy threat information and (applies) that information to (component commands)...regional contingency, general war, or deployment plans."

The Armed Forces war planning and execution functions have matured over the last decade, and the need for large planning staffs to oversee and develop this process is past. These large headquarters staffs could well impede, rather than facilitate, the national strategy. Most of the planning (whether for mobilization, mobility, information systems, etc.) should be virtually complete; maintenance should now be the dominant activity. Even assuming that there are always some requirements to develop totally new plans, the current level of manning that is dedicated to this function is unjustified. There are numerous agencies that TAC Headquarters can, and should, depend on for help in planning, because they appear to be doing much of the same planning that TAC Headquarters (and its TACOPS) claims for itself. In many cases, the other agency appears to be the preferred agency--i.e., the numbered Air Forces; the Transportation Command; the Air National Guard Support Center; Headquarters, Air Force Reserve; the Air Staff; etc. In fact, it appears that many of the agencies listed above are also overmanned and over-layered in the same functions for the same reasons.

The TACOPS (on behalf TAC Headquarters) carries out functions that should be scaled down or eliminated. Each numbered Air Force also has a combat operations staff whose mission is intended to complement the TACOPS, but is more operationally oriented, and concentrates on combat planning, intelligence, logistics and personnel resources management under one operational function. For example, the Air Defense Combat

Operations Staff (ADCOS) is the combat operations arm of the 1st Air Force. Its mission is to "...provide combat-ready air defense forces within designated geographic areas of responsibility under the operational control of CINCNORAD to defend these areas against aerospace attack."

There also appears to be a substantial overlap between the mission of the NORAD Headquarters and the 1st Air Force Headquarters, particularly in the combat operations staffs.

In support of the NORAD (a combined command), the 1st Air Force commander, dual-hatted as the Commander-in-Chief, Continental United States NORAD REGION, retains operational command of his forces, but clearly shares operational control with NORAD Commander. Both commanders are in the command and control structure, and it is possible for the NORAD to transmit execution orders to the CONUS NORAD REGION. During real-world emergencies, however, it is inevitable that the NORAD will control and employ the forces. The CONUS NORAD REGION will assume a supporting role, with the ADCOS likely assuming operational command only if the NORAD is compromised. The ADCOS should, therefore, be disestablished and the facility put on stand-by backup status.

Manpower and budgetary savings can be accomplished. Some augmentation may be needed during emergencies but, at a minimum, 300 manpower positions can be deleted from the TACOPS and TAC Headquarters. An additional 121 positions can be deleted from the ADCOS. In addition, a side-by-side comparison of AFLANT staff functions with those of USLANTCOM may show some additional duplication of effort. (The 12th Air Force was not addressed in this review; the 9th Air Force is addressed elsewhere.)

## Recommendations

K-1. Disestablish the Tactical Air Combat Operations Staff as a separate organization and place the operations facility on standby status, using a cadre of staff. Plan to augment with headquarters staff when needed. Consolidate, restructure or delete headquarters functions in order to meet manpower ceiling criteria. Transfer responsibilities and functions (but not the manpower authorizations) to the organization(s) now having primary responsibility under the Act. Simply delete those responsibilities and functions for which no home can be found. (Elimination of a minimum of 300 billets.)

K-2. Ensure that TAC Headquarters:

- does not "direct and supervise the planning, coordination, and management of an Air Force component command," except in support of the Commander, USAFLANT.

- no longer "supervises tactical fighter, reconnaissance and search/rescue units in direct support of (combat operational plans)," except in support of the Commander, USAFLANT.

- does not take the lead (except in support of the Commander, USAFLANT) in joint policy development, planning, and execution functions that are now, by law, the responsibility of the Unified Commanders and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

K-3. Establish a specific division of responsibilities for those functions that (1) are now clearly the responsibility of the Unified Commanders, (2) those in which both a Unified Commander and the Commander, TAC, share responsibilities, and (3) those for which TAC Headquarters has the expertise and corporate memory to take the lead on behalf of the Unified Commander (for example, the planning, programming, and budgeting system).

K-4. Restructure the level of intelligence activity at TAC Headquarters in light of its current mission (taking into account the reorganization of the Department of Defense). The TACOPs stated role to "...provide intelligence warning and operational intelligence support for conducting tactical air operations in support of national and unified command requirements..." does not comport with the TAC Headquarters mission and it is overstated for supporting USAFLANT.

K-5. Change the titles of the operations activities to more precisely reflect their true functions. It is a "Battle Staff" only to the extent that the USAFLANT is conducting air operations during a contingency. The "Tactical Air Combat Operations Staff" is really a tactical air combat planning and support staff. The only place where "war fighter" terms are appropriate is for those functions that actually help execute the order of battle--i.e., in support of the USLANTCOM.

K-6. Determine which functions performed by the 1st Air Force and its combat operations staff (226 manpower positions) overlaps those functions claimed by the NORAD and its combat operations staff; transfer, delete, consolidate, or reduce missions, and budget line items (but do not transfer authorized billets).

K-7. Disestablish the ADCOS and place the facility on standby status. Eliminate 121 of the 131 billets, and transfer the remaining 10 billets to 1st Air Force Headquarters as a cadre to maintain the operations facility.



## STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

### Stated Mission

The Strategic Air Command (SAC) is the oldest specified command. The Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), commands the Air Force strategic missile and bomber forces and exercises control over the targeting of the Navy strategic submarine forces from his headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. As a Specified Commander, the CINCSAC, is responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). As the commander of a major Air Force command, he also operates the SAC under policies set up by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force.

As commander of a major Air Force command, the CINCSAC exercises command over all assigned SAC forces, units, activities, systems, and installations. The Strategic Air Command organizes, operates, evaluates, administers, maintains, and performs operational readiness inspections for strategic forces, units, and systems assigned or otherwise made available to the SAC.

The Strategic Air Command has three major subordinate organizations--two numbered Air Forces and a Strategic Air Division. The 8th Air Force is located at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, and the 15th Air Force at March Air Force Base, California. The 1st Strategic Air Division is located at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Each numbered Air Force has five subordinate Air Divisions, with four located within the United States and one overseas.

### Organization and Manpower

In addition to the three major SAC components and their subordinates, there are three other organizational elements that warrant review--the Headquarters, SAC staff, the Strategic Air Combat Operations Staff (SACOS), and units that report directly to the Headquarters, SAC staff.

<u>Headquarters, Strategic Air Command</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			<u>Total</u>
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	
Command	30	15	10	55
Administration	6	37	19	62
Inspector General	88	52	10	150
Chaplin	5	5	1	11
Public Affairs	14	12	5	31
Reserve Advisor	0	0	1	1
Staff Judge Advocate	8	4	4	16
Science and Research	0	0	25	25
Surgeon	18	22	7	47
Historian	0	4	13	17
Security Police	22	15	9	46
Eng & Services	58	40	126	219
Comptroller	34	28	44	106
Intelligence	62	45	16	123
Logistics	190	320	64	574
Operations	179	106	23	308
Strategic Planning	21	6	3	30
Personnel	57	124	66	247
Plans	<u>248</u>	<u>62</u>	<u>62</u>	<u>372</u>
Subtotal	<u>1,035</u>	<u>897</u>	<u>508</u>	<u>2,440</u>

<u>Combat Operations Staff</u>	<u>FY 1988 Authorized Manpower</u>			<u>Total</u>
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	
Operations	173	87	25	283
Strategic Planning	98	38	3	139
Intelligence	45	39	4	88
Logistics	15	40	3	58
Personnel	5	7	3	15
Plans	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>9</u>
Subtotal	<u>337</u>	<u>217</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>592</u>
Total	<u>1,372</u>	<u>1,114</u>	<u>546</u>	<u>3,032</u>

- Headquarters, SAC Staff. The Headquarters, SAC staff is the normal command/staff structure similar to most other Air Force major commands. It consists of special staff agencies and major functional deputy chiefs of staff for logistics, operations, plans, etc. The headquarters staff is authorized 1,035 officers, 897 airmen, and 508 civilians, for a total manning of 2,440. The Headquarters, SAC staff, was exempt from the Goldwater/Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act

reductions, but the two numbered Air Forces were not exempt and underwent a 10 percent reduction. The manning at Headquarters, SAC, is projected to remain stable through FY 1989.

- Strategic Air Combat Operations Staff. The Strategic Air Combat Operations Staff (SACOS) is comprised of intelligence, logistics, strategic planning and analysis, plans, operations, and personnel elements. These functions are directly related to combat functions that focus on force application and targeting. They are considered by the SAC to be essential to the development and implementation of nuclear and conventional war plans and collateral missions and the operational employment of the force. The SACOS is structured along the lines of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, with the Commander in Chief, SAC, as the director and a number of the Headquarters, SAC deputy chiefs of staff as deputy directors. The SACOS personnel are fully integrated into the SAC Headquarters staff.

The SACOS is categorized as a direct reporting unit and, therefore, not subject to management headquarters reductions. There are 592 authorized positions, consisting of 337 officers, 217 enlisted, and 38 civilians. These authorizations are in addition to the 2,440 authorized for the Headquarters, SAC staff. The SACOS personnel, however, perform the same work as the work being performed by the SAC Headquarters staff--i.e., functioning as an extension of the headquarters staff. They report to their dual-hatted counterparts on the SAC Headquarters staff. For example, the operational intelligence function within the SACOS reports to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence on the SAC Headquarters staff, who is dual-hatted as a deputy director within the SACOS. This concept had its genesis in the 1976 time frame, due to a fear that continual reductions in management headquarters might cut into combat strength. (Air Force Headquarters not only approved the SACOS concept for the SAC and the two numbered Air Forces, but also for the Tactical Air Command, the Military Airlift Command, the United States Air Force Europe, and the Pacific Air Force.) Initially, 340 positions authorized for the SACOS were withdrawn from SAC Headquarters authorizations, considerably fewer than the almost 600 authorized today.

- Direct Reporting Units to Headquarters, SAC Staff. There are 19 direct reporting units that report to various elements of the SAC Headquarters staff, but are exempt from management headquarters reductions. These units vary in size from 16 personnel in the 549th Weapon System Evaluation Squadron, which reports to the SAC Headquarters Science and Research staff, to the 544th Strategic Intelligence Wing, consisting of over 1,200 personnel reporting to the SAC Headquarters Deputy Chief

of Staff for Intelligence. The missions of these units varies--some are extremely specialized and others cut across the entire spectrum of the SAC. A capsule version of the mission of two of these direct reporting units is presented for clarity.

The 1st Combat Evaluation Group is located at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, and is authorized 889 personnel. The group reports to the SAC Headquarters Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. The organization provides command standardization, evaluation and bomb scoring programs and such contingency warfare support as may be assigned. One of its important functions is to monitor and evaluate SAC aircraft units for nuclear, contingency, air refueling, and reconnaissance operations. It also conducts standardization, training, and tactics-oriented visits to the SAC and Air Forces units.

The 3901st Strategic Missile Squadron is located at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, and reports directly to the SAC Headquarters Directorate of Missiles, and it is authorized 130 positions. The unit develops command Intercontinental Ballistic Missile standardization and evaluation programs and evaluates and reports on the status of these and associated programs in operational units. It also formulates the evaluation program, associated with missile maintenance and missile munitions. In addition, the unit monitors and evaluates maintenance personnel proficiency, technical training, and weapon system and training hardware. The unit formulates and monitors the command missile combat crew evaluation program, comprised of standardization, evaluation, operations training, emergency war order training, and code operations and training programs.

- SAC Numbered Air Forces. The Strategic Air Command has two numbered Air Forces--the 8th Air Force and the 15th Air Force. The stated mission is to command and administer SAC-assigned aircraft, missile, and forces, and to achieve and maintain, at all times, the level of alert force readiness as directed by the SAC; to organize, train, and equip, and be prepared to deploy and employ through a SAC advance echelon those elements necessary to conduct conventional long-range bombing operations, in accordance with Unified Commander operational plans. The two numbered Air Forces provide advanced echelon elements, as required, to support long-range reconnaissance operations in the Unified Commander area of responsibility. The numbered Air Forces also provide aerial tanker support for deploying forces, as directed by the Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command.

The 8th Air Force at Barksdale Air Force Base has an authorized strength of 334 in its headquarters and 74 in the combat operations staff. The numbered Air Force staffs were not exempt from reductions under the Goldwater/Nichols legislation and took a 10 percent reduction. The combat operations staffs were protected from the cuts due to their Air Force designation as nonmanagement headquarters units. The 8th Air Force has five subordinate Air Divisions--four are located within the United States and one is at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.

The 15th Air Force, located at March Air Force Base, California, has an authorized strength of 318 on the headquarters staff and 86 in the combat operations staff. The 15th has five subordinate Air Divisions--four Air Divisions are located in the United States and one at Anderson Air Force Base, Guam.

- Air Divisions. The eight SAC Air Divisions within the United States are located at major SAC bases throughout the command. Each Air Division has from three to five wings under its jurisdiction. The Air Division mission is to exercise command jurisdiction and administrative control of assigned units; to monitor the combat capability and management effectiveness of each organization in relation to the emergency war order, contingency, mobility, and other planning documents; to assist in the correction of deficiencies; to provide assistance in command and control, operations plans, intelligence, training, standardization and evaluation, and alert force; and to perform such other activities as may be assigned.

The SAC Air Divisions have not been subject to management headquarters reductions. They have small staffs composed of 13 to 15 personnel, divided into command, logistics, and operations functions. The Air Divisions report to their respective numbered Air Forces.

The two SAC Air Divisions overseas have additional responsibilities and larger staffs. The 3rd Air Division at Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, has a staff of 47 personnel divided into command, logistics, intelligence, operations, and a small special staff. The 7th SAC Air Division at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, has 46 personnel configured similarly to the 3rd Air Division. The 3rd and 7th Air Divisions exercise operational control of assigned units and represent the SAC Commander to the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), the U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE), the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), and the U.S. Pacific Air Force (USPACAF) in the development of war contingency plans. Both divisions are also involved with advanced echelons for contingencies and tanker task forces.

- SAC Liaison Pacific. The SAC Liaison Pacific (SACLOPAC) is a SAC operating location at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. It performs liaison with the USPACOM, the USPACAF, and other subordinate agencies, and supports SAC air operations conducted at Hickam Air Force Base. There are 17 personnel authorized, consisting of eight officers and nine enlisted. The chief of the SACLOPAC reports to the 15th Air Force Commander.

#### Management Support Contracts

There was insufficient time to permit a review of management support contracts.

#### Observations

While time did not permit a position-by-position review of each activity on the SAC Headquarters staff, the Study Team is not convinced that the SAC Headquarters staff should have been excluded from the 10 percent reduction mandated in the Goldwater/Nichols Reorganization Act. This is especially true for the logistics, intelligence, plans and operations staffs. Logistics staffs were identified at every level of command, down to, and including, the wings. Out of the 632 total logistics positions, only 58 were considered essential to combat operations and placed in the SACOS "safe haven." The Study Team noted that the remaining 574 authorizations on the SAC Headquarters logistics staff exceeds the total of an entire numbered Air Force combined staff, to include the combat operation staff. The Directorate of Aircraft Maintenance has devoted 81 authorizations to a Command Maintenance Standardization and Evaluation Program for aircraft wings. There are also maintenance quality control sections within each wing that conduct standardization and evaluation checks. It was further noted that this function within the missile force was also performed by the 3901st Strategic Missile Evaluation Squadron. Consideration should be given to having this function performed at the numbered Air Forces with a small staff retained at the SAC Headquarters to manage and monitor the program. While recognizing the responsibilities for planning, provisioning, and funding major programs carried out by the SAC Headquarters logistics staff, the Study Team is equally concerned with the important logistic responsibilities of the numbered Air Force staffs that experienced a 10 percent reduction. These logistic staffs work the day-to-day logistics issues, procedures, and problem resolution with the combat wings to ensure readiness. This is where the major logistics emphasis should be placed.

The true manpower strength of the SAC Headquarters intelligence staff is misleading. There are not only the 123 authorizations for the SAC Headquarters staff, as well as 88 in the SACOS, but also 1,228 in the 544th Strategic Intelligence Wing, under the operational control of the SAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. There are additional intelligence authorizations at the numbered Air Forces, at the two overseas Air Divisions, and in the wings. All three directorates under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, on the SAC Headquarters staff, tasks the 544th Strategic Intelligence Wing to fulfill the SAC intelligence mission. Such tasking is indicated in the SAC Headquarters organization and function regulation. Likewise, the 544th is a major contributor of dual-hatted positions (43) for the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS). The Study Team concluded that, although the 544th is a direct reporting unit not subject to management headquarters reductions, it plays a major role in the accomplishment of the mission of the SAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and, in fact, functions as an extension of the headquarters intelligence staff.

The SAC planning requirements are labor intensive. Nearly every staff element has a section devoted to plans. For example, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics has a plans directorate, as does the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. In addition, there are two major Deputy Chiefs of Staff with primary responsibilities for planning. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Planning and Analysis is responsible for all aspects of general single integrated operational plans and limited nuclear and nonnuclear war planning. There are 169 authorizations devoted to this effort, with 30 authorizations in the SAC Headquarters staff; and 139 assigned to the SACOS safe haven, with 82 of these dual-hatted to the JSTPS. In addition, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans has 372 authorizations on the SAC Headquarters staff and nine within the SACOS. There is even a Plans Directorate within the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, with 31 authorizations. The Plans Directorate responsibilities are to formulate and develop Command concepts, doctrines, policies, programs, and requirements.

There are also operational staffs at every level within the SAC chain, down to, and including, the wings. There are 307 authorizations on the SAC Headquarters staff and 283 authorizations within the SACOS. In addition, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations has operational control of five direct reporting units that have 1,475 authorizations. The contribution of the SAC operations staff to the SACOS is considerable and rapidly approaching the total strength of the SACOS at its

inception. The Study Team is not convinced there has been a corresponding reduction in the SAC Headquarters operations staff with the consistent increases in operational authorizations within the SACOS, as was the initial stated intent.

The Strategic Air Combat Operations Staff (SACOS) was activated as a named unit on June 30, 1976. At its inception, the SACOS was organized with elements from the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Intelligence, Operations, Operations Plans, and Logistics. There were 340 spaces transferred to the SACOS from the SAC Headquarters staff. In 1980, the numbered Air Forces were reorganized to create combat operations staffs with 157 spaces. Since its inception in 1976, the SACOS has grown continually and is now at 592 authorized FY 1988 spaces. While the basic SACOS concept may be sound, it has been used as an organizational device to protect spaces from management headquarters reductions. It is noted that, from FY 1984-1987, the SACOS grew by 139 spaces, while at the same time the SAC and numbered Air Force Headquarters staffs remained stable at 3,164 spaces. It must, therefore, be concluded that the concept of a parallel reduction in the SAC Headquarters staff, with an increase in the SACOS is null and void. The Study Team is aware of the addition of elements from maintenance, operations, and personnel. It appears that the SACOS concept is being abused.

The Study Team applauds the SAC self-initiated officer conversion within the SAC Headquarters staff scheduled to take effect next fall. This program would convert some 85 officer positions to civilian and enlisted spaces. However, inasmuch as the SAC Headquarters staff has remained relatively stable over the last five years, while at the same time there have been consistent increases in the SACOS, the Study Team concludes that the conversion should be changed to a reduction on the SAC Headquarters staff. The reduction configuration should be at the discretion of the Command, but the Logistics, Intelligence, Plans, and Operations staffs should be targeted. This reduction would have no impact on what that SAC considers as combat essential positions in the SACOS.

The Study Team cannot agree that the SAC Air Divisions, located within the United States, are other than management headquarters and, therefore, exempt from headquarters manpower reductions. A review of one SAC Air Division, and interviews with all operations and logistics personnel assigned, revealed that the duties and functions clearly parallel those identified in DoD Directive 5100.73, as management headquarters and headquarters support functions.



For example, all personnel interviewed indicated they devoted the majority of their time to oversight of the five wings under the administrative control of the Command. This is clearly a management function, as is command. Other major functions include administration, monitoring mission indicators, advising, preparing and reviewing officer and airman performance reports, and special projects as directed by higher headquarters.

An example of a major function of both the division logistics and operation staffs is the augmentation provided the numbered Air Force pre-inspection team that visits a wing prior to a SAC Operational Readiness Inspection. The concept is to determine if the wing is prepared for the forthcoming inspection. After the inspection, the division staffs also follow-up on any major discrepancies. Again, these functions are clearly identified in DoD Directive 5100.73 as management headquarters and headquarters support functions.

The SAC Air Divisions located within the United States represent excessive layering of organizational echelons. Many of the functions performed in the Air Division Headquarters are duplicative in nature and are already being performed in the wings, at the numbered Air Forces and/or at the SAC Headquarters. For example, the Air Divisions monitor mission indicators to determine mission readiness and all that encompasses. This is also done in the individual wings, at the numbered Air Forces, and at SAC Headquarters. In another example, the SAC Inspector General conducts regular Operations Readiness Inspections to determine mission and management capability and reports it through the SAC chain. The 1st Combat Evaluation Group, a SAC direct reporting unit, evaluates unit standardization and evaluation programs that ensure air crew readiness and reports it through the chain. The 3901st Strategic Missile Evaluation Squadron, another direct reporting unit, does the same thing for the missile force, to include maintenance, and reports it through command chain. The SAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, through a large Directorate of Aircraft Maintenance staff, evaluates the aircraft maintenance function at individual wings, including the effectiveness of the Unit Maintenance Standardization and Evaluation Program, and reports it through the chain. Finally, the numbered Air Force commanders make periodic visits to all units and are constantly updated on mission indicators within their commands by their respective operations and logistics staffs. The headquarters staffs also make regular visits to the wings and report their findings to Command. In addition, the crews and forces are regularly exercised through the SAC command and control system to determine mission capability. There would appear to be an extensive system of oversight and review of mission indicators in place without another layer at the Air Divisions.

Unlike the two overseas Air Divisions, the Air Divisions located within the United States have no operational control over forces. While there may be some small span of control problem created with the elimination of these small Air Division Headquarters staffs, it should not compromise the command and control of the forces or the safety and efficiency of the individual units. It is a matter of a changing operating climate resulting from budgetary constraints.

The two overseas Air Divisions have a vital and expanding role in representing the Strategic Air Command at the U.S. European Command, the U.S. Air Force Europe, the U.S. Pacific Command and the U.S. Pacific Air Force in the development of contingency plans and strategic initiatives. It is important that the Unified Commanders have available to them the best expertise in the employment of the B-52, the KC-135, and reconnaissance systems in their theaters of operation. Similarly, there is a continuing requirement for direct interface, mutual planning, and continuity between the SAC Headquarters and the Unified Commanders. This, coupled with the need for the overseas Air Divisions to exercise operational control over SAC resources, leads to the conclusion that the small 3rd Air Division Headquarters at Anderson AFB, Guam, could best serve SAC Headquarters and the U.S. Pacific Command by being aligned with the the Unified Command at Hickam Air Force Base (AFB), Hawaii. The small SAC liaison unit at Hickam AFB would be dissolved and the 3rd Air Division could reduce some support functions with gained administrative support from the PACAF.

### Recommendations

L-1. Disestablish the eight SAC Air Division Headquarters staffs located within the United States and eliminate 130 billets, including eight general officer positions and 31 full colonel slots. (Fifteen of these colonel spaces are overstrengths that exist in the eight CONUS Air Divisions.) This will reduce layering and duplication of functions, but will not impact the control of operational forces in the numbered Air Forces.

L-2. Align the small 3rd Air Division Headquarters located at Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, with Pacific Command at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, disestablish the SAC liaison unit at Hickam, and eliminate 17 billets. This will contribute to better employment, planning, and coordination of SAC resources in the USPACOM theater of operations.

L-3. Realign the 47 spaces within the 3rd Air Division, eliminate five support and administrative billets, and add a small reconnaissance capability and expertise for coordination and planning within the U.S. Pacific Command theater of operation.

L-4. Change the SAC Headquarters officer conversion to a reduction and eliminate 85 billets. The configuration of the reduction is at the discretion of the Command, but the Logistics, Intelligence, Plans, and Operations staffs should be targeted. This will somewhat compensate for the consistent growth in the SACOS, which has been protected from reductions.